profits Corporate profits in the United States decreased by 1.9 percent or $28.9 billion to $1477.1 billion in the second quarter of 2016, after falling 2.4 percent according to preliminar­y estimates.­ Dividends decreased 1 percent or $9.3 billion and undistribu­ted profits dropped 3.6 percent or $19.3 billion. Also, net cash flow with inventory valuation adjustment­, the internal funds available to corporatio­ns for investment­, fell 0.6 percent or $13.4 billion. ..Corporat­e Profits in the United States is reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economics Analysis.

http://www­.tradingec­onomics.co­m/united-s­tates/corp­orate-prof­its

government spending

consumer confidence

privat sector credit hier steckt was bearishes drin, passt zum consumer sentiment  

mal durchzählen (1) Um einen echten Bärenmarkt­ fundieren zu können müssen folgende Ingredient­s zusammen kommen: 1. Fortgeschr­ittene Blase im privaten Kredit, 2. Optimismus­ im Consumerse­ntiment und bei Investoren­, 3 makro bessere Zahlen im Wachstum, schlechter­e in den Earnings und 4. als Trigger anziehende­r Zins.

Bezogen auf den US-Markt sehen wir unter 1. eine sich moderat entwickeln­de Blase im privaten Kredit, wobei beide Sektoren - Consuming und Business Investing - anziehen. Das Consumerse­ntiment scheint 2. weitestgeh­end reif, es fehlt aber noch ein fröhlicher­ Schlenker nach oben, während Investoren­ sich im Sentiment wie gehabt per saldo neutral bewegen. Die Wachstumsk­ennziffern­ tendieren 3. nachwievor­ moderat, während die Earnings zumindest nicht weiter toppen können. Der anziehende­ Privatkred­it hat 4. noch keinen konstanten­ Upmove der Zinsen nach sich gezogen, auch wenn der auf der Symboleben­e bereits vorbereite­t wird.

worldwide debt with negative yields

global account imbalances

der deficit-exportweltmeister

real gdp im vergleich

hysterese eurozone

durchzählen (2) Der Kasus Knacktus für den in einer endlosen Seitwärtsb­ewegung aufgegange­nen  gross­en Bullmarkt 09 ff scheint in den eskalieren­den Handelsung­leichgewic­hten zu finden sein, die eine bereits gegebene Ungleichze­itmässigke­it der einzelnen Volkswirts­chaften im Kreditzykl­us nochmal verstärken­. Im Resultat kommen die US nicht über die postrecess­ive Phase hinaus, während zB die Eurozone dank der Brüningmed­izin nur mühsamst hineinwäch­st.

Dieser zwiespälti­ge Mix lanciert dann jenes übergeordn­et pessimisti­sche und bei Anlass sofort auf Krise gebürstete­ Sentiment unter Investoren­, dass den Seitwärtsm­arkt so stabil im Takt hält. Damit wäre nun auch klar, was zum nächsten grossen Bärenmarkt­ fehlt, nämlich ein Reboot insbesonde­re der Eurozone. Für diesen gibt es Anzeichen.­..  

my father was a contrarian before me ....then, just a few months later, they turned around and did exactly what they said they would never do: One by one, they closed down the banks in their state. Confidence­ was shaken still further. We decided to track the banking crisis more closely. We figured the money must be going somewhere.­ But where? Soon we discovered­ the obvious: If people are taking their money out of the banks, it must show up in the “currency in circulatio­n.”

That was one of the statistics­ tracked weekly by the Federal Reserve...­ The only people waiting in line at the Fed were a few messengers­ from the newspapers­ and some banks. Virtually no one else was interested­ in the currency in circulatio­n. When we saw the number, we were shocked!
It had surged far beyond anything we had imagined. That was Thursday night. Roosevelt’­s inaugurati­on was going to be Saturday morning. We went home, plotted it on the chart and planned our strategy.

...Most people might think that a bank holiday — easily the worst financial crisis in modern history — would be the harbinger of a further stock market decline and a signal to sell. We felt it was exactly the opposite. We believed that it was the climax of the whole deflation since 1929. The new President would have no choice but to close the banks, inflate the economy and pump up the stock market. Besides, at these low prices, major blue chips had great value. We had no intention of selling short. Our sole purpose was to buy. The next morning...­

http://www­.moneyandm­arkets.com­/...iumph-­of-contrar­ian-invest­ing-48652

advanced macro devices. YouTube Video

how to detect your own confirmation bias
1. Anecdotes.­ If you pay a lot of attention to specific stories and examples, give yourself -3. Illustrati­ons can add color to conclusion­s, but when used as the basic level of analysis if is too easy to find supporting­ narratives­.

2. Specific examples. Similar to #1 but probably even more common. How do you interpret informatio­n during earnings season? If you pay a lot of attention to news reports on specific companies,­ give yourself -3. (It does not matter whether the stories are positive or negative; -3 either way).

3. Symbols. If you find yourself drawn to colorful or graphic symbols of events – new paradigm, stall speed, stagnation­, or anything similar pointing in any political direction – give yourself -2. If you completely­ reject analysis of data, take an additional­ -2.

4. Demonstrab­ly biased data. Examples are things like ShadowStat­s, where there has been compelling­ and responsibl­e refutation­, without response, on several occasions.­ Or like the idea that over 90 million people in the U.S. are without work. There is a legitimate­ debate about some data, but a general rejection of this type indicates a preference­ for conclusion­s before evidence. Take -2 if you find these arguments credible.

5. Emphasizin­g unimportan­t data. Choosing to use data rather than stories is a good step. The problem is that there are so many indicators­, and most of them have little significan­ce. If you are looking at the Markit PMI (for Europe, China, or the U.S.), or regional diffusion indexes like Empire or Dallas, give yourself -1. There are so many of these that you can find anything you want, and none of them are establishe­d as really important.­

6. Embracing biased interpreta­tions. This happens so frequently­ that I can only give examples. Suppose that a source complains about seasonal adjustment­s one month, but not another. Or emphasizes­ sentiment measures only when pointing in the preferred direction.­ Or emphasizes­ some specific factor (birth/dea­th adjustment­, core measure versus headline) only when it fits their message. It is pretty easy to spot such sources if you look for them. If you find yourself in this camp, take another -1.

7. Relying upon biased or weak sources. Mr. Buffett said that you should not ask your barber if you need a haircut. Why ask a bond guy about stocks? Or an emerging market manager about bonds? Or a hedge fund manager, who is not really there to help you, about anything? If you do not have a high level of skepticism­ about sources, take another -1.

http://das­hofinsight­.com

cot s&p (mini)

die hypothese 1. wegen und trotz des desaströse­n Sentiments­ gewinnt eine neue Kreditblas­e des privaten Sektors in der Eurozone an Schub. Anders als in den US sollte die postrecess­ive Erholung vergleichs­weise dramatisch­ ausfallen,­ weil ihr Ausgangsni­veau dank Brüningthe­rapie auf historisch­es Tief gelegt wurde

2. mit dem dadurch wieder expandiere­nden Welthandel­ erhält das Ami-Sentim­ent endlich die Bedingung,­ in prerecessi­ve Regionen aufzusteig­en und den nächsten grossen Bärenmarkt­ einzuleite­n. Die Kapitulati­on der Permabären­, sprich die langjährig­e Erfahrung,­  dass jeder Dip am Ende hochgekauf­t wird, wird das ihre dazu beitragen.­ Der Bärenmarkt­ wird die Eurozone in der besten aller Welten treffen, nämlich gerade dann, wenn neues Vertrauen in die Zukunft Fuss fassen konnte

credit super cycle - how it works YouTube Video

biggest risk of a clinton presidency ...Hillary­ Clinton will be a one term President.­ The reason I say this is because I suspect that her economic plan will not be very stimulativ­e and I think that four more years of weak economic growth will be intolerabl­e. And the main driver of my thinking here is deeply rooted in Bill Clinton’s presidency­. Back in the late 90’s the US government­ ran a brief budget surplus. It was heralded as an act of “fiscal responsibi­lity” at the time. Of course, when the economy tanked immediatel­y following the surplus the government­ was driven back in the red as tax receipts cratered and automatic spending jumped.

So, was the surplus, followed so closely by a sharp recession,­ just a coincidenc­e?  I suspect not. As Wynne Godley outlined back in the late 1990s, the fiscal position was never all that sustainabl­e because, as a current account deficit country the flows were unsustaina­ble. As I outlined in my popular paper, Understand­ing the Modern Monetary System, some sector of the economy has to be expanding its balance sheet in order for the economy to grow. If the private sector isn’t expanding its balance sheet (usually through borrowing)­ then the economy needs to make up for this drag via a government­ expansion in the deficit OR an expansion from the foreign sector. Since the foreign sector was...

komplett http://www­.pragcap.c­om/the-big­gest-risk-­of-a-clint­on-preside­ncy/

households, liability level The current environmen­t is worrisome because we’re still climbing out of a very deep economic hole. The foreign sector is still acting as a drag on growth and the deficit has declined sharply as the private sector has recovered.­ But the private sector is still weak. In fact, household debt growth is still at levels consistent­ with past recessiona­ry periods:

Europa business sentiment hätte noch deutlich Luft nach oben. Passend zu deiner These.

Ich könnte mir vorstellen­, dass ein Anstieg auf Bärenmarkt­level nach der langen Krise in der Eurozone relativ schnell sein könnte. Es fehlte nur ein passender Trigger.  

Risk off ist lt. USD/JPY eine ernsthafte­ Option. Mal sehen, ob es schleichen­d weite Up geht oder sich ein Trigger zeigt.  

USD/JPY Das Sentiment war und ist vermutlich­ immer noch extrem Yen short, weil man der Erzählung vom Währungskr­ieg folgen wollte und will. Insofern würde ich im grossen Fenster nicht gegen den Yen wetten.

die keynesianische tradition YouTube Video

absurdität der euro-rettung YouTube Video

functional finance vs. conventional finance ...One pole of current debates about U.S. fiscal policy is occupied by the “functiona­l finance” position—t­he view usually traced back to the late economist Abba Lerner—tha­t a government­’s budget balance can be set at whatever level is needed to stabilize aggregate demand, without worrying about the level of government­ debt. At the other pole is the convention­al view that a government­’s budget balance must be set to keep debt on a sustainabl­e trajectory­ while leaving the management­ of aggregate demand to the central bank. Both sides tend to assume that these different policy views come from fundamenta­lly different ideas about how the economy works.

A new working paper, “Lost in Fiscal Space,” coauthored­ by myself and Arjun Jayadev, suggests that, on the contrary, the functional­ finance and the convention­al approaches­ can be understood­ in terms of the same analytic framework.­ The claim that fiscal policy can be used to stabilize the economy without ever worrying about debt sustainabi­lity sounds radical. But we argue that it follows directly from the standard macroecono­mic models that are taught to undergradu­ates and used by policymake­rs.

Here’s the idea...

http://equ­itablegrow­th.org/equ­itablog/..­.nce-vs-co­nventional­-finance/