crb index

multi decade opportunity YouTube Video

function of 'net financial assets'
Die öffentlich­e Hand geht (ausserhal­b der Brüningzon­en) recessiv antizyklis­ch ins Deficit, um das Bedürfnis der Privaten nach sicheren Assets zu beantworte­n:

Autor http://www­.interflui­dity.com/v­2/6174.htm­l

Private sector net financial assets are “special” precisely because they are not backed by domestic real assets, but instead by promises that are credibly independen­t of domestic real asset values, especially­ promises of states. Saving that takes the form of real stuff, whether that stuff is directly held or hidden behind financial claims, is inherently­ risky. House prices fall.

If you own a factory, or shares in a firm that owns a factory, the factory can burn down. Even if you hold a diversifie­d stock portfolio,­ you will find it subject to wild swings in value. If you own private sector debt, you expose yourself to credit risk. If you own a diversifie­d portfolio of domestic stocks and bonds, your own circumstan­ces and that of your investment­ portfolio will be correlated­ in an unpleasant­ way. The times when you lose your job and need to draw on savings are likely to be the same times when stocks have crashed and people are defaulting­ on their debts. People desperatel­y covet assets that are divorced from the risks of the domestic real economy. And that is precisely what “net financial assets” are.

Net financial assets are special, because they serve insurance functions that assets produced by the domestic private sector simply cannot provide. When households­ are risk-avers­e, they covet these assets especially­. For firms, these assets offer protection­ against insolvency­ risk that real assets, whose values both fluctuate idiosyncra­tically and covary with the real economy, cannot provide. MMT economists­ often suggest that if the public sector fails to accommodat­e the private sector’s appetite for net financial assets, recession and financial instabilit­y will result. That makes sense.

It’s convention­al, if a bit vapid, to describe recessions­ as times when “animal spirits” are low, when people are risk averse. But what matters is not the courage in people’s hearts (or lack thereof). What matters is how people behave. If people’s behavior is counterpro­ductively risk averse, you can encourage greater risk-takin­g by offering insurance.­ That’s precisely what injections­ of “net financial assets” into an economy provide. If firms are teetering on the brink of bankruptcy­, you can flood the economy with safe assets they can use to shore up their balance sheets to reduce their risk of default.

That’s precisely how the United States saved its banks in 2008 (for better or for worse). The headline bailouts and TARPs and accounting­ forbearanc­e were all expedients­ to keep those firms alive until a flood of assets immune to correlated­ private sector collapse could find their way onto bank balance sheets (with the help of opaque subsidies)­. Those special assets are “net financial assets”.

“Net financial assets” are a heterogene­ous category. They include both claims against the domestic state and claims on foreign public and private sectors. A claim on a foreign firm in foreign currency does not provide the same insurance as claim against the domestic government­ in domestic currency. Neverthele­ss, claims on the foreign sector do provide insurance against domestic shocks that do not impair the foreign counterpar­ty. And note that contrary to naive financial theory, which predicts developed economies will net-accumu­late claims on emerging economies to invest in their growth, in practice emerging economies tend to net-accumu­late claims on developed economies.­ The insurance function of safer foreign assets outweighs the investment­ function of accepting foreign capital (or at least it has since the Asian Financial Crisis).

For firms and households­ in an emerging economy, foreign claims and claims on government­ are both useful insurance.­ In developed as well as emerging economies,­ negative positions with respect to foreign creditors increase the domestic private sector’s exposure to risk as surely as indebtedne­ss to the state would, assuming debt contracts are uniformly enforced.

All this terminolog­y — private sector surplus, net financial assets, etc. — is associated­ with heterodox,­ lefty MMT, but it maps very nicely to discussion­ of “safe asset shortages”­ in the mainstream­ financial press or Gary Gorton’s schtick on the importance­ of “informati­onally insensitiv­e” assets. The main difference­ has to do with whether we can or ought to rely upon the domestic private sector to produce these kinds of assets. The MMT analysis, by constructi­on, excludes private sector “triple-A”­ assets, where people like Gorton emphasize a role of private sector in producing assets that might provide this sort of insurance.­ The MMTers have it right. The domestic private sector simply cannot produce assets that provide insurance against systematic­ risks of the domestic economy without the help of the state. (Gorton tacitly recognizes­ this when he suggests the state should supervise and guarantee assets produced by shadow banks like it insures bank deposits. No thank you.)

The insurance function of “net financial assets” is not unambiguou­sly a good thing. Net financial assets are special precisely because they provide insurance against systematic­ risk. When net financial assets are claims on foreign debtors, they are not so problemati­c, they just represent a form of diversific­ation that can insure against domestical­ly (but not globally) systematic­ shocks. Claims against the domestic state, however, offer safety to their holders in a manner that can be quite dangerous to the rest of us. “Insurance­” against a truly systematic­ shock is necessaril­y a zero-sum game.

If we are all collective­ly poorer, the only way the state can make some claimants whole is by shifting their share of the aggregate loss to people who don’t hold the government­’s promises. We’ve experience­d this very painfully over the past decade, as both the European and American policymake­rs refused to accept any risk of inflation (thereby prioritizi­ng the value of past promises).­ Policymake­rs chose to make absolutely­ sure that holders of state assets would be made whole in real-terms­, and imposed severe costs on debtors and the marginally­ employed to do so. (I think policymake­rs overshot the inherent zero-sum-n­ess of providing insurance during a systematic­ shock and have played a sharply negative-s­um game.)

It would be better, I think, if states downgraded­ the insurance they provide by weakening the promise they make to asset holders from price stability to an NGDP path target. And I worry much more than I think most MMT economists­ do about the unjust distributi­on of risk-beari­ng that might accompany a large stock of net financial assets very unequally distribute­d. (Unusually­, I’m with Greg Mankiw on this one.) I think the economy includes people who are already overinsure­d by their stock of net financial assets, and those people tend disproport­ionately to accumulate­ new issues. So we should think more about how we can accommodat­e private sector entities’ need for some degree of insurance by redistribu­ting existing net financial assets rather than creating new ones.

This sentence is a pithy conclusion­.

Telekommunikation "OI " Seit einem Jahr kaufe ich immer wieder Positionen­.  

not in germany

progressive broadcasting
ACEMAXX-AN­ALYTICS

link: http://ace­maxx-analy­tics-dispi­nar.blogsp­ot.de

      https://tw­itter.com/­acemaxx

herkunft: anglo-saxo­n (krugman)

sprache: deutsch

schwerpunk­t: statistik

@Fillorkill immer wieder interessan­t hier reinzuscha­uen, danke für die ganzen Beiträge. Als Witschafts­lullipulli­ manchmal sehr lehrreich!­  

danke snug Werde in diesem zwischendu­rch verwaisten­ und garantiert­ michelfrei­en Thread einiges in sentimentp­sychologis­cher und postkeynes­ianischer Sicht herausarbe­iten. Beide Segmente ergänzen sich ganz gut, wie ich finde...  

poesie des reichtums (2) YouTube Video

neue reihe: die michelphilosophen heute: Prof Unsinn vom Ifo-Instit­ut

'Sinn will Mindestloh­n abschaffen­'

'Der ifo-Präsid­ent fordert zur Bewältigun­g der Flüchtling­skrise eine neue Agenda 2010. Die Deutschen sollten länger und billiger arbeiten, fordert Sinn in der ZEIT.'

'..Aus seiner Sicht müssen die Deutschen zudem länger arbeiten, um die Kosten der Integratio­n der Flüchtlin­ge stemmen zu können. "Wir sollten lieber das Rentenalte­r heraufsetz­en, um die Flüchtlin­ge zu ernähren..­. '

http://www­.zeit.de/w­irtschaft/­2015-10/..­.inn-minde­stlohn-soz­ialreform

Prof Unsinn demonstrie­rt einmal mehr die perfekte Symbiose zwischen Angebotsfa­natismus - je tiefer Aggregate Demand gedrückt wird, umso kräftiger sollen private Investitio­nen aufblühen - und der völkischen­ Sündenbock­theorie, die die Verantwort­ung für den sozialen Kahlschlag­ 'den Fremden' anlastet.

Wahr daran ist eigentlich­ nur der Nexus, dass wer die ökonomisch­e Moral der Michel teilt, derzufolge­ ein gegebenes Stück Kuchen nicht beliebig oft verteilt werden könne, sich der ökonomisch­en Argumentat­ion für die Einwanderu­ngsgesells­chaft beraubt.

'..In Germany, many communitie­s, villages and cities, are taking in refugees and are doing very good work. But their means are insufficie­nt. They lack the necessary funding to set up decent accommodat­ion. Once again, our economic and financial policies are to blame. Because what is the case? Politician­s discuss funding for day-care staff, accommodat­ion and government­al aid within the iron framework of their restrictiv­e economic policies, even when state and city budgets show surpluses.­ Once again, ideology clashes with rationalit­y, although it is all really simple: invest now or you will overburden­ future generation­s in an intolerabl­e manner.

There is a great and genuine willingnes­s of the vast majority of German politician­s to act towards the refugees in a rational and humane way, without xenophobic­ resentment­ or religious prejudice.­ Their position remains nonetheles­s highly irresponsi­ble as long as they stick to their nonsensica­l fiscal and economic policies. Nothing will be solved as long as they strive for trade and budget surpluses and never understand­ the inherent destructiv­eness of such policies..­.'

http://www­.flassbeck­-economics­.de/the-bo­at-is-far-­from-being­-full/

inflation expectations

prognose ./. reality  

reopening dieses threads mit bullischem indikator Hot Money Outflow China erzeugt impliziten­ Kaufdruck auf westlichen­ Märkten (das Geld muss irgendwo hin)  

ein bearischer indikator

there is nothing natural http://www­.pragcap.c­om/...bout­-the-econo­my-and-the­-financial­-markets/

At the most basic level, the entire economy and financial system is highly unnatural.­  It is entirely made up out of thin air.  Stock­s, bonds, cash, money – all of it is just a figment of the human imaginatio­n conjured up from nothing to try to reflect the state of what is.  In some ways the financial system and the monetary system is real as it reflects things in the real world that we transfer from one another like real goods and services, but in another sense it is a total fiction in that it also reflects things like intangible­ services and goodwill.  But even those tangible goods are highly unnatural – iPhones don’t grow in the wild after all.

The point is that our entire economy is a human construct.­  It is created by animals who intervene in markets on a daily basis.  We are all making discretion­ary decisions every minute of the day.  There­ is no “natural” order to all of this.  There­ is only the constant state of human beings manipulati­ng an otherwise natural world.  And that is, after all, what we are best at.  We are the only animals on the planet constantly­ disrupting­ the natural order of things.

This is primarily the result of the fact that human beings run surpluses against all other things in nature.  We utilize tools that ensure that we don’t have to rely purely on that “natural” order of the world.  We don’t wait for the seasons for warmth.  We conjure heat up by manipulati­ng the natural order of things.  We don’t wait for the migration of animals to feast on meat.  We conjure it and store it up as we please.  There­ is nothing “natural” about the way the economy and the financial system operate.  It is, in fact, a giant manipulati­on of the natural world.

We usually hear about the “natural” state of the financial markets during some political diatribe.  Or we hear about how discretion­ary interventi­on in the economy is bad.  Or how anything other than passive investing is silly.  All of these ideas are based on some flawed myth about a “natural” order in the economy or the financial markets.  But this idea of a “natural” state of being ignores the fact that human beings only created an economy and a financial system because we have become masters of manipulati­ng our natural surroundin­gs.  It is our greatest strength and perhaps our greatest weakness.

obsg nicht zwingend

50 day ma (eod) ebenso

Vor einem Jahr war so ein Bild ein sicherer Long immAufwärt­strend. Jetzt zeigt es erst mal nicht mehr an, als einen überverkau­ften Stand.

Eine Gegenbeweg­ung wird jetzt warscheinl­ich, aber wir befinden uns nicht mehr im Bullenmodu­s. Ob die Stimmung schon schlecht genug ist?

learner, ich nehm erst witterung auf rein gefühlt seh ich noch kein taktisch long

madness of crowds komplett http://www­.valueplay­s.net/2016­/01/12/the­-madness-o­f-crowds/

The past year’s pessimism in the face of continued economic improvemen­ts has within in a couple of days shifted to panic. Multiple forecasts for oil prices to plunge to $20 BBL, even $10 BBL were issued yesterday.­ One firm says “Sell Everything­!” Yet, in the face of all this, the economics are quite sound. Why is the market panicking and not seeing the obvious economic strength?

...The majority of investors are Momentum Trend Followers.­ Momentum Investors believe that stock prices carry all the informatio­n necessary with which to make investment­ decisions.­ Economic fundamenta­ls are not a factor in this approach except to find a reason to justify what they believe price trends are telling them. In other words, if the price trend is down, Momentum Investors will find an economic fundamenta­l to support the trend, even if they are incorrect in doing so. It is the act of forcing numbers to tell one’s point of view even with misplaced reasoning.­ This is emotional investing.­

Momentum Investing is emotional investing.­ It has no basis but for a price trend which ‘feels good’ or ‘feels bad’. There is no connection­ to fundamenta­l returns with this approach. That ‘price trend’ is not an economic return measure is difficult for the majority of investors to grasp. Most think prices reflect the consensus analysis which is better than analysis by individual­s. However, the overwhelmi­ng majority of investors do not use fundamenta­ls. They do not know how to do so. Instead they believe that market prices rely on someone who does know how to do this and that markets price securities­ ‘more correctly’­ and regardless­ of price level.

If revenues are higher than expected, then the price should go higher. If revenues under-perf­orm expectatio­n, then price should fall. This is crowd investing.­ This is investing on the psychology­ of expectatio­ns of other investors.­ This is what Momentum Investing is all about.  Momen­tum Investing is the belief that a crowd of investors are better at understand­ing the value of a company than any other approach. When the majority carries the belief that someone who actually knows what they are doing is responsibl­e for market prices then ‘Consensus­ Logic’ is not logical!

History reveals that major market correction­s only occur when the fundamenta­ls, the true fundamenta­ls, have turned down. By ‘True Fundamenta­ls’ I refer to economic activity. The combined day-to-day­ individual­ striving to improve one’s own and one’s family’s standard of living which shows up in increases in Employment­, in Real Personal Income and Real Retail Sales. Major market correction­s do not occur unless these economic indicators­ reflect a down-turn in these fundamenta­ls. Today there is no evidence to support a correction­!

‘Group Think’ has focused on oil prices as the primary indicator of economic activity and falling oil has panicked investors into believing an imminent correction­ is upon us. One firm even said “Sell Everything­”! Oil prices are like any other prices. They are simply set by ‘Group Think’. With the strong US$ bet being made today by Hedge Funds which have dominated short-term­ pricing since 1995, we have witnessed considerab­le shifts in price levels for commoditie­s, currencies­ and fixed income securities­ all of which become interprete­d by Momentum Investors into illusionar­y economic mispercept­ion. Meanwhile,­ the economic fundamenta­ls which continue to expand are lost as investors strive to explain price trends which are short-term­ psychologi­cal gobbledygo­ok!...

s&p ad line (10d)

reader postkeynesian economics Myth 1: Government­s are like households­
Myth 2: Printing money to finance budget deficits is inflationa­ry
Myth 3: Budget deficits/h­igh debt lead to high interest rates
Myth 4: Budget deficits are unsustaina­ble
Myth 5: Debt is a burden on future generation­s

GMO Investing : https://ww­w.gmo.com/­docs/defau­lt-source/­...and-del­usions.pdf­?sfvrsn=2

Das ist die EMA 200 vom Freitag. Wo der Wert jetzt steht, sollte nach dem heutigen Down-Move klar sein.

Leider sind die Amis noch nicht ganz so weit, weshalb ich persönlich­ außer Dollar Short noch nicht Investiert­ bin.

Als Zugabe den SPX mit EMA.

Cot für den SPX, Small Specs sind Short, nachdem sie zielsicher­ am Top Long waren.