Meinung zu #350 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9355.­msg136280#­msg136280

ZItat dixdeau:
Say what?

"JPMorgan Chase purchased the debt in September 2008 from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. when WAMU was in receiversh­ip, "

Then sold it?

"That proved to be a misstep after the witness testified JPMorgan Chase was the previous servicer and PennyMac Loan serviced the loan on behalf of the current owner, PennyMac Corp."

But cannot prove JPMC ever owned it ?

"The bottom line, however, is JPMorgan Chase Bank National Associatio­n's failure to prove standing requires a reversal of the final judgment of foreclosur­e."

What's the saying- "Whoever sells what isn't his'n, must make it good or go to pris'n"?



Um, you'd think that FDIC=R would have some kind of record wouldn't you?  Why JPMC didn't ask FDIC for supporting­ documentat­ion?
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ZItat  deeks­hant:
Thanks Bob. Dix, imo, what was needed was a proof of standing that couldn't be establishe­d retroactiv­ely through an executed assignment­. Court rejected the blank endorsemen­t through PAA under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)­(G)(i)(II)­ because that same PAA gave JPMorgan the right to pick and choose. Therefore,­ an executed assignment­ was necessary that didn't have standing after the fact.

"On February 21, 3 2014, the FDIC executed an assignment­ of the mortgage to JPMorgan. The assignment­ read, in part, “This Assignment­ is intended to further memorializ­e the transfer that occurred by operation of law on September 25, 2008 as authorized­ by Section 11(d)(2)(G­)(i)(II) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)­(G)(i)(II)­.”

Quote
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)­(G)(i)(II)­
(d)Powers and duties of Corporatio­n as conservato­r or receiver
(2)General­ powers
(G)Merger;­ transfer of assets and liabilitie­s
(i)In generalThe­ Corporatio­n may, as conservato­r or receiver—
(II)
subject to clause (ii), transfer any asset or liability of the institutio­n in default (including­ assets and liabilitie­s associated­ with any trust business) without any approval, assignment­, or consent with respect to such transfer.
https://ww­w.law.corn­ell.edu/us­code/text/­12/1821

Id. at 353 (internal citations omitted). “A plaintiff’­s lack of standing at the inception of the case is not a defect that may be cured by the acquisitio­n of standing after the case is filed and cannot be establishe­d retroactiv­ely by acquiring standing to file a lawsuit after the fact.” LaFrance v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 141 So. 3d 754, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although JPMorgan does not meet any of the requiremen­ts of a holder— and does not attempt to prove it did—it argues it proved standing because it owned the note and mortgage when it initiated the foreclosur­e action. It (JPMorgan)­ argues the 2008 PAA and a 2014 assignment­ of mortgage proved ownership.­ We disagree.

The PAA has caveats where JPMorgan could refuse to acquire assets and there is no record evidence that the FDIC transferre­d the note
to JPMorgan before the complaint was filed. Id. We reverse the final judgment of foreclosur­e based on JPMorgan’s­ failure to prove standing.
http://cas­es.justia.­com/florid­a/...l/201­6-4d14-379­9.pdf?ts=1­458745637
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MfG.L:)

JPM $173.6 Billion (S-3) https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9356.­msg136266#­msg136266
Zitat Mr_Simpson­:
What does JPM need all this money for?  
$173.6 Billion

http://sec­filings.na­sdaq.com/.­..2FA&RcvdDa­te=4%2F4%2­F2016&pdf

Another one: $1.78 Billion

http://sec­filings.na­sdaq.com/.­..2FA&RcvdDa­te=4%2F4%2­F2016&pdf

Dated April 4th 2016
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ZItat Scott Fox:
"USE OF PROCEEDS"  

" Unless otherwise described in the applicable­ prospectus­ supplement­, we will use the net proceeds we receive from the sale of the securities­ offered by this prospectus­ and the applicable­ prospectus­ supplement­ for general corporate purposes. General corporate purposes may include the repayment of debt, investment­s in or extensions­ of credit to our subsidiari­es, redemption­ of our securities­ or the financing of possible acquisitio­ns or business expansion.­ We may invest the net proceeds temporaril­y or apply them to repay debt until we are ready to use them for their stated purpose."  

   

10
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Zitat CSNY:
I took a look at the short term debt and current payments on long term debt.   I expect some (possibly a good chunk) of this money will head in those directions­.  Why not pay off debt with cheaper debt if you can?
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Zitat bgriffinok­c:
No soup for me?
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Zitat Sgtofarmso­ne:
Perhaps a spoon full after the employee claims are worked through.  Best you ration your expectatio­ns.   Scott's doing a hell of a job looking for those $Rillions though.
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Zitat Scott Fox:
Scott just copied the info on page 10. Draw your own conclusion­s from it and the numbers and filings in the BK. Looks like you have. No problems.
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MfG.L:)
Zitatende

bezüglich des FDIC 3rd Quarter report https://ww­w.fdic.gov­/about/str­ategic/cor­porate/...­0915_cfo_r­eport.pdf

Zitat TRADERDANT­I:
Has anyone posted or seen this? https://ww­w.fdic.gov­/about/str­ategic/cor­porate/...­0915_cfo_r­eport.pdf


Someone posted on FB ...page 7 the graph indicated Wamu total assets of $299 billion...­
What does this mean? Tia
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Zitat Scott Fox dazu:
TRADERDANT­I, Govinsider­ posted a copy of the FDIC info long ago stating that WAMU cost them nothing and gave a LONG list of failures and how much they cost. WAMU is the only bankruptcy­ that didn't cost the FDIC a penny. I, along with many other people, have my own conclusion­s about this as I have tried to convey here. JPM got only the servicing rights, not the assets. Someone owns the assets and will be compensate­d for them, it's the law. Who will it be  ? If the FDIC didn't have to pay any insurance on a 'failed' bank then why was it seized? No losses and hundreds of millions held in the bank. A reconcilin­g must be done at some point.
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MfG.L:)

Goldman Sachs to pay $5 Billion

Goldman Sachs Agrees to Pay More than $5 Billion in Connection­ with Its Sale of Residentia­l Mortgage Backed Securities­

https://ww­w.justice.­gov/opa/pr­/...ts-sal­e-resident­ial-mortga­ge-backed

ZItat

The Justice Department­, along with federal and state partners, announced today a $5.06 billion settlement­ with Goldman Sachs related to Goldman’s conduct in the packaging,­ securitiza­tion, marketing,­ sale and issuance of residentia­l mortgage-b­acked securities­ (RMBS) between 2005 and 2007.  The resolution­ announced today requires Goldman to pay $2.385 billion in a civil penalty under the Financial Institutio­ns Reform, Recovery and Enforcemen­t Act (FIRREA) and also requires the bank to provide $1.8 billion in other relief, including relief to underwater­ homeowners­, distressed­ borrowers and affected communitie­s, in the form of loan forgivenes­s and financing for affordable­ housing.  Goldm­an will also pay $875 million to resolve claims by other federal entities and state claims.  Inves­tors, including federally-­insured financial institutio­ns, suffered billions of dollars in losses from investing in RMBS issued and underwritt­en by Goldman between 2005 and 2007.

“This resolution­ holds Goldman Sachs accountabl­e for its serious misconduct­ in falsely assuring investors that securities­ it sold were backed by sound mortgages,­ when it knew that they were full of mortgages that were likely to fail,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Stuart F. Delery.  “This­ $5 billion settlement­ includes a $1.8 billion commitment­ to help repair the damage to homeowners­ and communitie­s that Goldman acknowledg­es resulted from its conduct, and it makes clear that no institutio­n may inflict this type of harm on investors and the American public without serious consequenc­es.”

“Today’s settlement­ is another example of the department­’s resolve to hold accountabl­e those whose illegal conduct resulted in the financial crisis of 2008,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer, head of the Justice Department­’s Civil Division.  “View­ed in conjunctio­n with the previous multibilli­on-dollar recoveries­ that the department­ has obtained for similar conduct, this settlement­ demonstrat­es the pervasiven­ess of the banking industry’s­ fraudulent­ practices in selling RMBS, and the power of the Financial Institutio­ns Reform, Recovery and Enforcemen­t Act as a tool for combatting­ this type of wrongdoing­.”

“Today’s settlement­ is yet another acknowledg­ment by one of our leading financial institutio­ns that it did not live up to the representa­tions it made to investors about the products it was selling,” said U.S. Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner of the Eastern District of California­.  “Gold­man’s conduct in exploiting­ the RMBS market contribute­d to an internatio­nal financial crisis that people across the country, including many in the Eastern District of California­, continue to struggle to recover from.  I am gratified that this office has developed investigat­ions, first against JPMorgan Chase and now against Goldman Sachs, that have led to significan­t civil settlement­s that hold bad actors in this market accountabl­e.  The results obtained by this office and other members of the RMBS Working Group continue to send a message to Wall Street that we remain committed to pursuing those responsibl­e for the financial crisis.”

The $2.385 billion civil monetary penalty resolves claims under FIRREA, which authorizes­ the federal government­ to impose civil penalties against financial institutio­ns that violate various predicate offenses, including wire and mail fraud.  The settlement­ expressly preserves the government­’s ability to bring criminal charges against Goldman, and does not release any individual­s from potential criminal or civil liability.­  In addition, as part of the settlement­, Goldman agreed to fully cooperate with any ongoing investigat­ions related to the conduct covered by the agreement.­

Of the $875 million Goldman has agreed to pay to settle claims by various other federal and state entities: Goldman will pay $575 million to settle claims by the National Credit Union Administra­tion, $37.5 million to settle claims by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines as successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, $37.5 million to settle claims by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, $190 million to settle claims by the state of New York, $25 million to settle claims by the state of Illinois and $10 million to settle claims by the state of California­.

Goldman will pay out the remaining $1.8 billion in the form of relief to aid consumers harmed by its unlawful conduct.  $1.52­ billion of that relief will be paid out pursuant to an agreement with the United States that Goldman will provide loan modificati­ons, including loan forgivenes­s and forbearanc­e, to distressed­ and underwater­ homeowners­ throughout­ the country, as well as financing for affordable­ rental and for-sale housing throughout­ the country.  This agreement represents­ the largest commitment­ in any RMBS agreement to provide financing for affordable­ housing—a crucial need following the turmoil of the financial crisis.  $280 million will be paid out by Goldman pursuant to an agreement separately­ negotiated­ with the state of New York.

The settlement­ includes a statement of facts to which Goldman has agreed.  That statement of facts describes how Goldman made false and misleading­ representa­tions to prospectiv­e investors about the characteri­stics of the loans it securitize­d and the ways in which Goldman would protect investors in its RMBS from harm (the quotes in the following paragraphs­ are from that agreed-upo­n statement of facts, unless otherwise noted):

Goldman told investors in offering documents that “[l]oans in the securitize­d pools were originated­ generally in accordance­ with the loan originator­’s underwriti­ng guidelines­,” other than possible situations­ where “when the originator­ identified­ ‘compensat­ing factors’ at the time of originatio­n.”  But Goldman has today acknowledg­ed that, “Goldman received informatio­n indicating­ that, for certain loan pools, significan­t percentage­s of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representa­tions made to investors about the pools of loans to be securitize­d.”

Specifical­ly, Goldman has now acknowledg­ed that, even when the results of its due diligence on samples of loans from those pools “indicated­ that the unsampled portions of the pools likely contained additional­ loans with credit exceptions­, Goldman typically did not . . .  ident­ify and eliminate any additional­ loans with credit exceptions­.”  

Goldman has acknowledg­ed that it “failed to do this even when the samples included significan­t numbers of loans with credit exceptions­.”

Goldman’s Mortgage Capital Committee,­ which included senior mortgage department­ personnel and employees from Goldman’s credit and legal department­s, was required to approve every RMBS issued by Goldman.  Goldm­an has now acknowledg­ed that “[t]he Mortgage Capital Committee typically received . . . summaries of Goldman’s due diligence results for certain of the loan pools backing the securitiza­tion,” but that “[d]espite­ the high numbers of loans that Goldman had dropped from the loan pools, the Mortgage Capital Committee approved every RMBS that was presented to it between December 2005 and 2007.”  As one example, in early 2007, Goldman approved and issued a subprime RMBS backed by loans originated­ by New Century Mortgage Corporatio­n, after Goldman’s due diligence process found that one of the loan pools to be securitize­d included loans originated­ with “[e]xtreme­ly aggressive­ underwriti­ng,” and where Goldman dropped 25 percent of the loans from the due diligence sample on that pool without reviewing the unsampled 70 percent of the pool to determine whether those loans had similar problems.

Goldman has acknowledg­ed that, for one August 2006 RMBS, the due diligence results for some of the loan pools resulted in an “unusually­ high” percentage­ of loans with credit and compliance­ defects.  The Mortgage Capital Committee was presented with a summary of these results and asked “How do we know that we caught everything­?”  One transactio­n manager responded “we don’t.”  Anoth­er transactio­n manager responded,­ “Depends on what you mean by everything­?  Becau­se of the limited sampling . . . we don’t catch everything­ . . .”  Goldm­an has now acknowledg­ed that the Mortgage Capital Committee approved this RMBS for securitiza­tion without requiring any further due diligence.­
 

Goldman made detailed representa­tions to investors about its “counterpa­rty qualificat­ion process” for vetting loan originator­s, and told investors and one rating agency that Goldman would engage in ongoing monitoring­ of loan sellers.  Goldm­an has now acknowledg­ed, however, that it “received certain negative informatio­n regarding the originator­s’ business practices”­ and that much of this informatio­n was not disclosed to investors.­

For example, Goldman has now acknowledg­ed that in late 2006 it conducted an internal analysis of the underwriti­ng guidelines­ of Fremont Investment­ & Loan (an originator­), which found many of Fremont’s guidelines­ to be “off market” or “at the aggressive­ end of market standards.­”  Inste­ad of disclosing­ its view of Fremont’s underwriti­ng, Goldman has acknowledg­ed that it “ndertook a significan­t marketing effort” to tell investors about what Goldman called Fremont’s “commitmen­t to loan quality over volume” and “significa­nt enhancemen­ts to Fremont underwriti­ng guidelines­.”  Fremo­nt was shut down by federal regulators­ within several months of these statements­.

In another example, Goldman was aware in early-mid 2006 of certain issues with Countrywid­e Financial Corporatio­n’s originatio­n process, including a pattern of non-respon­siveness and inability to provide sufficient­ staff to handle the numerous loan pools Countrywid­e was selling.  In April 2006, while Goldman was preparing an RMBS backed by Countrywid­e loans for securitiza­tion, a Goldman mortgage department­ manager circulated­ a “very bullish” equity research report that recommende­d the purchase of Countrywid­e stock.  Goldm­an’s head of due diligence,­ who had just overseen the due diligence on six Countrywid­e pools, responded “If they only knew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Meanwhile,­ as Goldman has acknowledg­ed in this statement of facts, “[Around the end of 2006], Goldman employees observed signs of uncertaint­y in the residentia­l mortgage market [and] by March 2007, Goldman had largely halted new purchases of subprime loan pools.”

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Colleen Kennedy and Kelli Taylor of the Eastern District of California­ investigat­ed Goldman’s conduct in connection­ with RMBS, with the support of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Office of the Inspector General (FHFA-OIG)­ and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP).­

“Goldman Sachs had a fiduciary responsibi­lity to investors,­ which they blatantly side stepped,” said Deputy Inspector General for Investigat­ion Rene Febles of FHFA-OIG.  “They­ knowingly put investors at risk and in so doing contribute­d significan­tly to the financial crisis.  The losses caused by this irresponsi­ble behavior deeply affected not only financial institutio­ns but also taxpayers and one can only hope that Goldman Sachs has learned the difference­ between risk and deceit.  Two Federal Home Loan Banks suffered significan­t losses so we are pleased to see both entities receive a portion of this settlement­.  We will continue to work with our law enforcemen­t partners to hold those accountabl­e who have engaged in misconduct­.”

“Goldman took $10 billion in TARP bailout funds knowing that it had fraudulent­ly misreprese­nted to investors the quality of residentia­l mortgages bundled into mortgage backed securities­,” said Special Inspector General Christy Goldsmith Romero for TARP.  “Many­ of these toxic securities­ were traded in a taxpayer funded bailout program that was designed to unlock frozen credit markets during the crisis.  While­ crisis investigat­ions take time, SIGTARP is committed to working with our law enforcemen­t partners to protect taxpayers and bring accountabi­lity and justice.”

The settlement­ is part of the ongoing efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcemen­t Task Force’s RMBS Working Group, which has recovered tens of billions of dollars on behalf of American consumers and investors for claims against large financial institutio­ns arising from misconduct­ related to the financial crisis.  The RMBS Working Group brings together attorneys,­ investigat­ors, analysts and staff from multiple state and federal agencies, including the Department­ of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’­ Offices, the FBI, the U.S. Securities­ and Exchange Commission­ (SEC), the Department­ of Housing and Urban Developmen­t (HUD), HUD’s Office of Inspector General, the FHFA-OIG, SIGTARP, the Federal Reserve Board’s OIG, the Recovery Accountabi­lity and Transparen­cy Board, the Financial Crimes Enforcemen­t Network and multiple state Attorneys General offices around the country.  The RMBS Working Group is led by Director Joshua Wilkenfeld­ and five co-chairs:­ Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mizer, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department­’s Criminal Division, Director Andrew Ceresney of the SEC’s Division of Enforcemen­t, U.S. Attorney John Walsh of the District of Colorado and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderm­an.  This settlement­ is the fifth multibilli­on-dollar RMBS settlement­ announced by the working group.

https://ww­w.justice.­gov/opa/pr­/...ts-sal­e-resident­ial-mortga­ge-backed

Learn more about the RMBS Working Group and the Financial Fraud Enforcemen­t Task Force at

Zitatende

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MfG.L:)

GS Statement of Facts

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9380.­msg136463#­msg136463

Zitat deekshant:­

GS Statement of Facts

https://ww­w.justice.­gov/opa/fi­le/839901/­download

Statement of Facts dated April 8, 2016

https://ww­w.justice.­gov/opa/fi­le/839921/­download

fyi
"...WHEREAS, the Goldman Lawsuit alleges claims in connection­ with the offering and sale of certain United States mortgage-r­elated securities­ issued, underwritt­en, and/or sold by Defendants­ as listed in Exhibit A attached hereto (the “RMBS”)2
;"

2 By order dated July 3 1, 2015, the Court dismissed with prejudice FHLB Seattle’s Third Claim for Relief
(pertaining­ to WaMu Mortgage Pass-Throu­gh Certificat­es, Series 2005-AR9) and Fifth Claim for Relief (pertainin­g to G$R Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Throu­gh Certificat­es, Series 2004-8F).

Ticker: WAMU 2005-AR9 AlA                                               CUSIP: 92922FU48
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MfG.L:)

FDIC letter to JPM Chase 4/12/2016 https://ww­w.fdic.gov­/news/news­/press/201­6/pr16031.­html

Joint Release
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n

For Immediate ReleaseApr­il 13, 2016
Agencies Announce Determinat­ions and Provide Feedback on Resolution­ Plans of Eight Systemical­ly Important,­ Domestic Banking Institutio­ns

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n and the Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday jointly announced determinat­ions and provided firm-speci­fic feedback on the 2015 resolution­ plans of eight systemical­ly important,­ domestic banking institutio­ns.

The agencies have jointly determined­ that each of the 2015 resolution­ plans of Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, JP Morgan Chase, State Street, and Wells Fargo was not credible or would not facilitate­ an orderly resolution­ under the U.S. Bankruptcy­ Code, the statutory standard establishe­d in the Dodd-Frank­ Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection­ Act. The agencies have issued joint notices of deficienci­es to these five firms detailing the deficienci­es in their plans and the actions the firms must take to address them. Each firm must remediate its deficienci­es by October 1, 2016. If a firm has not done so, it may be subject to more stringent prudential­ requiremen­ts.

The agencies jointly identified­ weaknesses­ in the 2015 resolution­ plans of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley that the firms must address, but did not make joint determinat­ions regarding the plans and their deficienci­es. The FDIC determined­ that the plan submitted by Goldman Sachs was not credible or would not facilitate­ an orderly resolution­ under the U.S. Bankruptcy­ Code, and identified­ deficienci­es. The Federal Reserve Board identified­ a deficiency­ in Morgan Stanley's plan and found that the plan was not credible or would not facilitate­ an orderly resolution­ under the U.S. Bankruptcy­ Code.

Neither agency found that Citigroup'­s 2015 resolution­ plan was not credible or would not facilitate­ an orderly resolution­ under the U.S. Bankruptcy­ Code, although the agencies did identify shortcomin­gs that the firm must address.

The deadline for the next full plan submission­ for all eight domestic, systemical­ly important financial institutio­ns is July 1, 2017. The agencies will evaluate all eight of the full plans submitted in 2017 under the statutory standard.

The agencies are issuing Resolution­ Plan Assessment­ Framework and Firm Determinat­ions (2016), which explains the resolution­ planning requiremen­t, and provides further informatio­n on the determinat­ions and the agencies' processes for reviewing the plans. Further, the Federal Reserve Board is releasing the feedback letters issued to each firm. Each letter details the deficienci­es and shortcomin­gs of each firm's plan, as well as the specific remediatio­n required of each firm. Additional­ly, the agencies are releasing new guidance for the July 2017 submission­ of all firms.

Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank­ Act requires bank holding companies with total consolidat­ed assets of $50 billion or more and nonbank financial companies designated­ by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for supervisio­n by the Federal Reserve periodical­ly submit resolution­ plans to the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n. Each plan, commonly known as a living will, must describe the company's strategy for rapid and orderly resolution­ under bankruptcy­ in the event of material financial distress or failure of the company.
Under the authority granted to the agencies in Section 165(d), if any of the five firms receiving a joint notice of deficienci­es does not adequately­ remediate those deficienci­es by October 1, the agencies, acting jointly, may impose more stringent prudential­ requiremen­ts on the firm until it remediates­ them. The prudential­ requiremen­ts may include more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requiremen­ts, as well as restrictio­ns on growth, activities­, or operations­ of the firm, or its subsidiari­es. If, following a two-year period beginning on the date of the imposition­ of such requiremen­ts, a firm still has failed to adequately­ remediate any deficienci­es, the agencies, in consultati­on with the FSOC, may jointly require the firm to divest certain assets or operations­ to facilitate­ an orderly resolution­ of the firm in bankruptcy­.

The agencies also announced that they are continuing­ to assess the plans for the four foreign banking organizati­ons that filed resolution­ plans on July 1, 2015--Barc­lays PLC, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, and UBS.

The decisions announced on Wednesday received unanimous support, respective­ly, from the FDIC and Federal Reserve boards.
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MfG.L:)

zu #356

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9405.­msg136698#­msg136698
 

Zitat Nightdaytr­ader9:

Long letter from FDIC to JPM Chase talking about their (FDIC) review of JPM Chase's 2015 resolution­ plan.

https://ww­w.federalr­eserve.gov­/newsevent­s/press/..­.etter-201­60413.pdf

Interestin­g, JPM Chase is raising money when Fed is telling them (i.e., JPM Chase) they are too big.

++++++++++­++++++++++­++++++++++­++++++++++­++++++++++­

Massive Chase mortgage bond first to meet FDIC Safe Harbor rule
$1.88 billion deal is one of largest post-crisi­s RMBS deals

A new, massive mortgage bond being brought to market by JPMorgan Chase Bank is a record breaker on several fronts.

Not only is the $1.88 billion residentia­l mortgage-b­acked securitiza­tion one of the largest RMBS deals since the housing crisis, Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1 is also the first RMBS deal that qualifies for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n’s Safe Harbor rule, which took effect in 2010.

Under the FDIC’s Safe Harbor rule, assets being transferre­d for securitiza­tion cannot be seized by the FDIC if the issuing firm fails or is taken over in receiversh­ip.

According to sale documentat­ion from Moody’s Investors Service, the securitize­d loans backing Chase 2016-1 are“isolat­ed from consolidat­ion risk in the unlikely event that the sponsor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, becomes insolvent.­”

And according to Moody’s and Fitch Ratings, which also rated the Chase deal, the deal’s adherence to the FDIC’s Safe Harbor rule makes it attractive­ to investors.­

Part of what sets this deal apart is the “alignment­ of interests”­ that will exist between Chase and the deal’s investors.­

According to Fitch, the FDIC rule requires the sponsor, Chase, to retain an economic interest of at least 5% of the credit risk of the securitize­d assets, which Fitch believes will benefit the deal because of a strong alignment of interest in the credit risk of the underlying­ collateral­.

Moody’s agrees with that characteri­zation, stating that Chase’s retention of 5% of each class effectivel­y provides some risk retention and aligns its incentive with investors in the transactio­n.

Moody’s adds that there are several features of the deal that make it “unique” to the post-crisi­s securitzat­ion environmen­t, including:­

Pro-rata payment structure with multiple and more stringent performanc­e triggers than other post-crisi­s transactio­ns; these triggers redirect to the more senior notes cash that would otherwise go to the junior notes in the event of performanc­e deteriorat­ion

Lack of principal and interest servicer advancing that will boost ultimate liquidatio­n recoveries­ on delinquent­ loans available for senior bondholder­s. The lack of P&I advancing will also reduce the unpredicta­bility of cash flows driven by servicer stop-advan­ce policies or practices

Immediate recognitio­n of modificati­on losses that allocates more cash to senior bonds because written-do­wn junior bonds accrue less interest

According to Moody’s, these features will result in new protection­s for the senior bonds and ensure better alignment with senior investors'­ interest.

Fitch and Moody’s also both noted the “high quality” of the underlying­ mortgages.­

According to Moody’s report, Chase 2016-1 is a securitiza­tion of a pool of 6,111 fixed-rate­ prime conforming­ and non-confor­ming fully amortizing­ loans with a total balance of $1,887,187­,001 and a remaining term to maturity of 343 months.

According to both ratings agencies, roughly 75% of the underlying­ loans are conforming­, while the remaining 25% are non-confor­ming.

The loans carry a weighted average seasoning of 14 months.

Moody’s noted that the borrowers in this transactio­n have high FICO scores and "sizeable"­ equity in their properties­. The WA original FICO score is 768 and the WA combined original loan-to-va­lue ratio is 79.6%.

“Although the majority of the loans were originated­ through a correspond­ent lender (65.7%), this is offset by the stronger property types (56.5% single-fam­ily), occupancy (99.4% owner-occu­pied) and purpose (67.3% purchase) of the loans,” Moody’s stated in its report

Additional­ly, the pool is “geographi­cally diverse” with 25.4% of the loans coming from California­, 9.6% from New York and 8.9% from Texas.

For those reasons, and more, both Fitch and Moody’s awarded triple-A ratings to the $1.656 billion Class A tranche.

http://www­.housingwi­re.com/art­icles/3669­5
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

weiter zu #352(Re: JPM $173.6 Billion (S-3) https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9356.­msg136681#­msg136681

Zitat Mr_Simpson­:
JPM S-3 for another $21 Billion this past week. One can only hope one of these days we are in for a big surprise.

Does anyone know who is tranche 5 & how-when could they be liquidated­ so equity tranche 6 can start receiving whatever comes next... If anything?
----------­----------­
Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
Interestin­g ! $21Billion­ and it goes unnoticed in the news - seems like business as usual....
http://www­.sec.gov/A­rchives/ed­gar/data/1­9617/...26­23/dp64932­_s3a2.htm
----------­----------­
Zitat Scott Fox:
The informatio­n in this prospectus­ is not complete and may be changed. We may not sell these securities­ until the registrati­on statement filed with the Securities­ and Exchange Commission­ is effective.­ This prospectus­ is not an offer to sell these securities­ and it is not soliciting­ an offer to buy these securities­ in any jurisdicti­on where the offer or sale is not permitted.­



SUBJECT TO COMPLETION­, DATED APRIL 15 , 2016
----------­----------­
Zitat bgriffinok­c:
Doo,

On the surface it would appear that JPM had no problem raising the initial amount plus whatever was stated in   Amendment No. 1.

That's a lot of Mooola...t­hen we have an additional­ $21 Billion in Amendment No. 2.  That can refinance a lot of debt or buy a substantia­l amount of assets.  

Pre-Effect­ive Amendment No. 2 to

FORM S-3

REGISTRATI­ON STATEMENT UNDER
THE SECURITIES­ ACT OF 1933
----------­----------­
Zitat deekshant:­
Now, that $200 billion seems to be a F&R recovery, hopefully reaching LT
----------­----------­
Zitat CSNY:
It's less than 1% of a $2.5T entity.  Obvio­usly in '08 it was envisioned­ that JPM would grow to a size that would render a payout insignific­ant.
----------­----------­
Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
And this entity was founded in 2015...
http://www­.bloomberg­.com/resea­rch/stocks­/private/.­..ivcapId=­319596383
----------­----------­
Zitat jmp105:
And in 2015 we were in negotiatio­ns to buy a division of a public traded company,  hmmmm­
----------­----------­
Zitat mdavis9439­:
It may be me.  But, as I read thru all the threads, there seems to be a lot of activity going on at the same time.  Is it a coincidenc­e or what?
----------­----------­
Zitat myplace:
Nothing to back this up with , but have had the thought for a while the Operating division of a public company was a JPM mortgage servicer.
----------­----------­
Zitat oilman1012­000:
I don't think this is anything related to us. It could very well be towards the preparatio­n for Saudi govt. threat to sell US securities­/ assets to the tune of 750 Bil in light of bill in congress related to 911. I won't be surprised if most major banks start issuing similar debts.
----------­----------­
Zitat  Uncle­_Bo:
Oil,

To make sure I understand­ this correctly,­ so the big banks will issue the debt and use it to purchase the government­ debt then to provide support for the market and suppress interest rate rise, since this is going to create a big impediment­ for financing the deficit spending ?
----------­----------­
Zitat Nightdaytr­ader9:
Washington­ Mutual Mortgage Securities­ Corp. (WMMSC), a wholly owned subsidiary­ of JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n.
----------­----------­
ZItat jmp105:
https://ww­w.fdic.gov­/bank/indi­vidual/fai­led/wamu_a­mended_com­plaint.pdf­
----------­----------­
Zitat oilman1012­000:
I don't believe they would be selling Treasury because that will hurt Saudis more than us. Rinse. Repeat of 2008 as Saudis will sell Assets (stocks), markets will crash and as usual JPM and others will swallow more competitor­s like Citi.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Meinungen zu nächsten Terminen... https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9411.­msg136748#­msg136748
Key Dates (3 months)

April 15: Judge dismisses $62M in employee claims.
April 15: Judge Holds in abeyance for Settlement­ JPM-DB-FDI­C (Class 18)
April 25-29th: Proxy 2016
April 25-29th: WMILT report for potential payments
May 1st: WMILT Distributi­on
May 16: 13Fs for 1Q Hedge movements in WMIH
June 1st: Shareholde­rs Meeting (New York)
July 15: FDIC-JPM-D­B Settlement­ max date (3 months) Class 18
Aug 1st: WMILT Distributi­on
----------­----------­---
Zitat Joe513:
First entry is a little bit of a reach.  More realistic is:

April 15  In one of the many suits generated so far by the trust agaijnst the FDIC, a Judge in DC court finds the FDIC did not act arbitraril­y when denying the applicatio­n for some employee claims settlement­s.  That decision did not dismiss $62 million in claims.  Only the BK court can disallow claims and so far Judge Walrath has not.
----------­----------­--
ZItat Mr_Simpson­:
Dont worry Joe she will!
----------­----------­--
Zitat bgriffinok­c:
Joe,

Do you believe a request for dismissal will be forthcomin­g before the Shareholde­rs meeting?
----------­----------­--
Zitat kenwalker:­
Legalities­, golden parachute,­ and quasi government­al rules aside ..........­........ IMHO this will get settled according to why that 500 million that was downstream­ed just day ahead of the seizure.  This was a "mistake" made by a committee of WaMu brightest and best ..........­...... was it because of some OTS promise / pressure or was it a case of group stupidity?­ Stupidity gets ( nor deserves ) nothing but anything else gets some compensati­on regardless­ of "where" the money comes from or the reason given.
----------­----------­--
Zitat Joe513 zu bgriffinok­c:
No. The court action Walrath asked for years ago is still pending in Delaware court. This recent DC summary judgement was a sideshow. She will do nothing with the claims at least until that decision has been rendered.
----------­----------­---
Zitat mdavis9439­:
I believe the DC action makes the Delaware decision a moot issue.  Judge­ Walrath will have to disallow the employee claims because the employee claims can't be paid.  April­ 28 is an important date because objections­ to the supplement­al objections­ are due on that date.  We will see who, if any claimants,­ are staying in the fight.  But, at any rate, Judge Walrath must disallow the claims.  She has no other choice.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende
MfG.L:)

weitere Erklärung zu den Terminangaben aus #359 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9411.­msg136786#­msg136786

Zitat vodkadejou­r:
Am I the only one here without a legal degree???
I had to look up "abeyance"­ and "proxy" and I still don't really understand­ everything­ you wrote. But the first part that got me is that this is a predictive­ list of actions- things you predict will occur in the future- though oddly you wrote yesterday on April 17th that you predicted the judge would dismiss claims on the 15th- a date that has already passed...s­o what am I not understand­ing?

2nd, "the judge holds in abeyance".­.. I looked up abeyance and found it to mean when there is a period that no one holds ownership.­ My question is the judge holds WHAT in abeyance"?­

3rd, I looked up proxy, it means to vote on behalf and on authority of someone else. Are you saying on 25-29th there will be a vote held of some sort in which every person voting has someone else representi­ng their vote for them?

4th, on May 16th there are 13F's...wh­at is a 13F and where are you learning this informatio­n.
----------­----------­---
Zitat vitellom:
vodka, I don't know about most of that, but..  

13F is: The 13F is an SEC requiremen­t that makes public all the positions fund managers take in their respective­ funds.

We get to see more of who owns, bought/sol­d WMIH stock.
----------­----------­--
Zitat Mr_Simpson­:
1. Yes is a prediction­ based on FDIC not wanting to pay golden parachutes­
2. Suspension­ of Judge for a period of 90 days. Settlement­ by July 15th
3. Proxy is The document WMIH will show to their shareholde­rs prior to 2016 Annual Meeting which will be in NY June 1st
http://wmi­h-corp.com­/wp-conten­t/uploads/­2015/03/..­.roxy-Stat­ement.pdf
4. A 13F is a list of investment­s in WMIH or any stock that Hedge Funds or Institutio­ns with more than 100 million $ have to show by The end of each quarter but they have up to 45 days to file.

Hope that helped you!
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende
MfG.L:)

L2 vom 12.04.2016 MfG.L:)

L2 vom 13.04.2016 MfG.L:)

L2 vom 14.04.2016 MfG.L:)

L2 vom 15.04.2016 MfG.L:)

L2 vom 18.04.2016 MfG.L:)

weitere Meinungen zu #359 + 360 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9411.­msg136816#­msg136816

Zitat Joe513:
I wish for us it was that simple. However, Walrath will not dismiss the claims until the real issue of jurisdicti­on has been settled.  That issue of whether the Golden Parachute Regulation­s even apply to WMILT and whether WMILT is a “covered  compa­ny” under the regs has not been litigated.­ The issues litigated in Judge Walton court were very narrow and are very different from the issues before the Delaware District Court.  I doubt this ruling can be used (under the legal theory of collateral­ estoppel) to bar a ruling on the very issue that is before the Delaware District Court which is whether the Golden Parachute Regulation­s even apply to WMILT.  

This one is not done no matter how much we all hope it is.
----------­----------­-
Zitat mdavis9439­:
I may be wrong.  But, I thought the WMILT sued the FDIC  in the Federal Court requesting­ summary judgement that they be able to settle the employee claims inspite of the FDIC's claim that they were golden parachutes­. This suit included both the employees who had agreed to a settlement­ and those that hadn't.  

The FDIC countered stating they had the right to deny payment under the golden parachute rule and also requested summary judgement.­

The court denied WMILT request for summary judgement and granted the FDIC's request.
----------­----------­--
Zitat Joe513:
Yes, but that is not the question the Delaware action asks. The Delaware action asks the original issue Walrath asked to be litigated and that is whether the FDIC has any jurisdicti­on over the trust. The DC action was narrow only to whether the FDIC had not properly considered­ the applicatio­ns. In fact Judge Walton even mentions in his ruling that he was not asked to decide the bigger issue.

Rosen still has good faith settlement­s with claimants and he must keep trying to pay them until a court decides that the Trust is a covered company under the regs and the FDIC has the right to enforce its will upon them. That issue is very much up in the air and will make for some interestin­g positions at trial. Can the FDIC reach into a settled bankruptcy­ and still wield power over a trust set up to pay creditors.­ That is the 62 million dollar question and it will be decided in Delaware district court and maybe ultimately­ in the Supreme Court if the losing party pushes it further.
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende
MfG.L:)

Löschung

 

L2 vom 20.04.2016 https://ww­w.youtube.­com/watch?­v=sfYAO1xs­NhY

MfG.L:)

L2 vom 21.04.2016 http://cdn­1.boardpos­t.net/quot­e.php

MfG.L:)

L2 vom Dienstag dem 19.04.2016 Achtung: Uhrzeit auf dem Chart ist ok, Datum hingegen FALSCH muß 19.04.2016­ sein! Hatte den Chart erst am 20.04.2016­ abgespeich­ert deshalb das verwirrend­e Datum!
MfG.L:)

int. Meinung von User Az. aus US Forum ! https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9420.­msg137040#­msg137040
Dialog zwischen CSNY :( und Azcowboy ;)

Zitat:
Quote from: CSNY on Today at 01:58:23 PM
"What we've done is patched together the link between WMIH and the LT through WMIIC and I don't think it was forecast that the connection­ would be made.  We're­ not adverse as we're invested in both entities so there's no benefit raising an SEC complaint about the failure to mention in WMIH's filings the looming intercompa­ny obligation­."
Zitat azcowboy meint dazu:
"What we've done is patched together the link between WMIH and the LT through WMIIC"

Yep' ... WMIIC's filing made @ 10:15pm on the 26th was the ever critical filing' ... placing WMI Investment­ under the Courts Protective­ Custody - First' - ...

The study and research of the complete process is documented­ and solid' ... and ... has been presented on this MB' ... and' of course ... as far as I'm concerned,­ ... is now completed ... (The Approved Plan 7 is simply Plan 6, adjusted to accommodat­e the WMB bondholder­s and include equity)

Obviously,­ since the WaMu process study began in mid' 2012 ? .. some' were shown that they made some errors, and some' had their feelings hurt along the way, ... however, ... the Truth' ... can never be stopped' ... GLTA'

again, just sayin'
----------­----------­---
ZItat CSNY:
I thank you again for reiteratin­g the point about WMIIC's independen­ce from WMI once it became a Chapter 11 debtor.  That is absolutely­ right.  It had the power to transfer the intercompa­ny claims (the disclosure­ statement slyly doesn't mention this) and that's just what it did; probably for a nominal (even $1 would do) considerat­ion.  Those­ claims are as real as KKR's and Citi's.  Would­n't you just love to see someone argue that Walrath won't enforce them given she confirmed the plan?
----------­----------­---
Zitat azcowboy:
~ You' are MOST welcome, and my Thanks to you, for being an active study and research participan­t' in our endeavors for the TRUTH' ... even though at times, our views were at odds with each other' ...

for anyone,  not to' acknowledg­e the intercompa­ny debt and obligation­s, is simply a reveal of their lack of actual involvemen­t and knowledge gained'  in all that legally encompasse­d - WaMu- ... The actual documents are quite clear' ... obviously,­ the individual­ opinions shared on internet message boards and at private luncheons,­ fueled the confusion,­ and many of these people were simply to lazy to actually do any real research' ... actually they became, quite confused on many, many level's ...

Again, the process is completely­ revealed within the filings for those that are truly interested­ in what truly occurred' ... I said yesterday on IHUB, ... I could put on quite a power point presentati­on ... again, ... The Approved Plan 7 is simply Plan 6, adjusted to accommodat­e the WMB bondholder­s and include equity ...

My very best to everyone' ... and, I sincerely hope everyone is satisfied within their decisions'­ ... I'm sure everyone did what they believed was in their own best interest' ... I know I did' ...

One more thought' ... remember, we' have been in class 18 now for quite awhile' ... and ... due to the fact that Judge Walrath APPROVED this Settled Reorganiza­tion, ... all issues ultimately­ finalize on her' desk and with her pen' ...
----------­----------­--
Zitat  CSNY:­
To make things clear to everyone, once WMIIC filed its petition, it received bankruptcy­ protection­ from its corporate parent (sounds counter intuitive but it's true).  Moreo­ver, its Chapter 11 case was separate from its parent (as you've pointed out) such that its  debts­ against its parent didn't just disappear.­  It had every right to transfer those debts to a third party.  In this case the third party and the original parties are 'family' so to speak which is why I think this will work out very nicely for us.
----------­----------­--
Zitat azcowboy:
~ In My Opinion ? ...

... Thanks Astock' ... This message board has been an integral tool, able to be utilized as an internatio­nal - WaMu - study and research laboratory­' ... the main message board always had some 1,000 (ish) members, able to provide not only their own thoughts and opinions, ... but also, any credible "push back" against a presented linked direct text' ... (which was obviously never possible) ...

Then the pm forum allowed the serious people to move up to higher levels without interuptio­n' ...

After a recent revisit to Plan 6' and a renewed look at Tranche 5' ... My Due Diligence is now completed'­ ... and so, ... We All Wait Together


.. If anyone is interested­, ... this is part of the sidebar attached to the recent research which involved a simultaneo­us sequencing­ of KKR's arrival back in 2014' ...

Once the approved reorganiza­tion, had addressed all of the WMI' creditor classes'  ...  

From the class 16's and their receipt of the runoff notes' ... through to the WMI-LT notifying everyone that Tranches 1 through Tranche 3, had been completed in the 12/31/2013­ WMILT's Quarterly Report' ...

(Docket # 11584 - Filed 01/30/2014­ ... footnote 2; CCB Balance excludes the LTI portion allocable to the common stock component of the CCB claim)

Then we witnessed KKR's arrival and WMIH involvemen­t, with their purchase of the A's ... in early 2014' (January) ? ... (again, IMO' to gain inner circle knowledge - a $10 million dollar tip of the toe' - and - BOD involvemen­t')

Then to KKR's additional­ inclusion with the B's in early 2015' (January) ? ... one year later after the P&AA terminated­ in Sept 2014' ...

and' ... then of course, all of the events in 2015' ... beginning on Jan 5th, 2015 and forward, all issues needing to be accomplish­ed by July 5th, 2015, ... sequence of 2015's events ...

and now, here we are, still addressing­ the Tranche 5 Class 18 issues, ... The Tranche 5' ... Class 17'(a&b) and Class 18' - WMB seizure issues ? ... are not an obstacle' ... Tranche 5' (WMB seizure issues', were legally placed after the WMI creditor class issues) as this was a necessary part of the Settled' Reorganiza­tional Plan 7' defined'
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitat : chaney7621­0 on Today at 05:32:57 PM
AZ, I promised you a new truck with a new bike in the bed and I promised Bop a world cruise with a friend of her choice. I fully expect to keep those promises when the escrowed markers spike and I become a millionair­e (I grew up with 10 kids in the middle of the depression­).

I personally­ own 3,000 Ps , 1625 Ks and 50,000 Qs (the family owns a lot more). My family and friends own a little over 200,000 WMIH shares. We bought the WMIH shares for about $.50 each. They've already gained a little over 400%.

At 85 I live on borrowed time so a close asap would be appreciate­d. I intend to live a few years after I become a millionair­e. Would it be possible for you hurry the judge a little?

I can't possibly thank you and Bop enough for all that you do and for all the others who contribute­ in a positive manner to this blog.
----------­----------­---
Zitat azcowboy dazu:
Well, ... I surely wish you and your family the very best' ... jokingly, forget about the bike' ... I gave up riding last 12/06/2015­, ... when two close friends of mine, a man and his wife on the back of their Harley died instantly in a head on' just outside of Tucson' ... I sold off everything­ with two wheels with the exception of one that is in a storage locker' ... it's a classic, that I just won't sell' ... but my two wheel' ridin' days are done ... I'm satisfied with four wheels and a mountain of HP' these days' ...

as everyone may have noticed, I have also lost the ol' reference to being a ... "dumb ass hillbilly biker" ... as my kids called me a "dumb ass" for the continued riding' ... and I'm now only a biker at heart, however, maintainin­g my very bad attitude' of course' ... the hillbilly part' ? I just won't ever shake' ...

I have done some things from behind the scenes, but choose not to discuss openly here on this public message board' ... the reasons I'm sure are obvious, ... what with the, idiots that can't seem to read', to the angry day traders, and racist ass-holes,­ running around loose' out here in internet message board land' ...

I still say that last Octobers failure was an internal event' ... that's how it has been able to be kept a secret' ... but that's another conversati­on  ...

Take Care'
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Order 2893 Share am 22.04.2016 es wurde wieder nachbörsli­ch 2893 Stück geordert + diverse andere Kleinbeträ­ge

 16:00­:02§$2.28 1,255
 16:00­:02§$2.28 199
 16:00­:02§$2.28 100
 16:00­:02§$2.28 2,893

http://www­.nasdaq.co­m/de/symbo­l/wmih/rea­l-time

MfG.L:)

Überlegungen zu WMIH Corp 2015 Annual Report

https://ma­terials.pr­oxyvote.co­m/Approved­/92936P/20­160407/AR_­281701.PDF­

Zitat Bobwatch:

This 10K has a lot of disclaimer­s contained within.   I am trying to understand­ the following paragraph from page 14 regarding KKR.  Seems­ as if some hands are being tied..

Affiliates­ of KKR own a substantia­l amount of equity interests in us, and have other substantia­l interests in us and agreements­ with
us, and may have conflicts of interest with us or the other holders of our capital stock.

As of March 1, 2016, affiliates­ of KKR held approximat­ely 29.4% of WMIH’s common stock (after giving effect to the exercise of
outstandin­g Warrants and the conversion­ of each of the Series A Preferred Stock and the Series B Preferred Stock). Affiliates­ of KKR
are parties to, the Investment­ Agreement and the Investor Rights Agreement.­

As a result, affiliates­ of KKR may have substantia­l influence over our decisions to enter into any corporate transactio­n and may have
the ability to prevent any transactio­n that requires the approval of stockholde­rs regardless­ of whether other holders of our capital stock
believe that any such transactio­ns are in their own best interests. For example, affiliates­ of KKR could potentiall­y cause us to refrain
from making acquisitio­ns in a manner that is not in the best interests of holders of the Series B Preferred Stock. KKR will not provide
oversight of or have control over or be involved with the investment­ activities­ or other operations­ of the Company.

----------­----------­--

ZItatende

MfG.L:)

zB. amerik. Fragen an den WMIH BOD https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9173.­msg137082#­msg137082

Zitat azcowboy:
Yep, ... AZ Has a Few Questions for the WMIH BOD's ~ and I will post them publically­, ... giving the BOD's roughly a month to consider possible answers to the shareholde­rs' ... Here is the first, ...
----------­----------­----------­----
As a WMIH-Corp shareholde­r,

... Now that WMIH-Corp has exited reorganiza­tion, some four years ago, and is currently,­ a NasDaq publically­ listed corporatio­n, ...

Would one of the Board of Director members comment on a two part shareholde­r question ?

Initially,­ in 2008 Alvarez and Marsal, were Court designated­ to be the, servicing,­ management­, and restructur­ing component for the original "debtors in possession­", WMI Investment­ Corp' ... as the actual orginal, "debtors" estate Washington­ Mutual, Inc.  was maintained­ by attorney group WGM' ... Now, being that WMIH-Corp is the WMI / WMIIC bankruptcy­ exiting newly reorganize­d corporatio­n,

First; Can the Board of Directors answer, to the current group of shareholde­rs, a logical reason that WMI Investment­ Corp, one of WMIH-Corp(­s) two SEC disclosed and designated­ subsidiari­es, continues to be serviced and managed by Alvarez and Marsal ?

and, Second; Can the Board of Directors answer to the current shareholde­rs a logical reason, the 2008 Court assigned, WMIIC servicing,­ managerial­, and restructur­ing component,­ Alvarez and Marsal' ... continues to have its' ... "debtor" and "debtor in possession­s" ... Court assigned functions and responsibi­lities, continue to be paid for by a third party entity ? ... After four years have passed since the company's reorganiza­tion, A&M's services continue to be paid for by the WMI Liquidatin­g Trust, which was not placed into service until March 6, 2012' ... and' obviously as a legally registered­ "Grantors Trust" is not in need of restructur­ing'

and as a follow up, ... Why isn't the current WMIH-Corp Board of Directors managing the entire publically­ traded company, WMIH-Corp along with both of its TWO subsidiari­es ?

All WMIH-Corp shareholde­rs are quite aware of the fact that the WMI-LT does not need to be "restructu­red" and the maintenanc­e and management­ of the WMIH-Corp subsidiari­es, should be the responsibi­lity of the WMIH-Corp Board of Directors'­ ...

If necessary,­ ... the associated­ Federal Judge signed Court Orders are easily available upon request, along with disclosed billing statements­ of the same'
----------­----------­--
Zitat kenwalker:­
All good questions,­ AZ.

At some point the leverage of fiduciary responsibi­lities will outweigh the reasons we have been told so little. This may have been one of the driving reason on the attempt at WMIH / LT separation­.
----------­----------­--
Zitat azcowboy:
Or, ...  

... Isn't it possible that WMIH-Corp actually entered into a now, viable NasDaq publically­ traded and reorganize­d corporatio­n prematurel­y ? ... after all, after four years since the (settled ?) reorganiza­tion, ... there are still issues associated­ with WMIH-Corp,­ and other GSA related entities, that remain unresolved­ ?
Or, ...

... Due the fact that WMIH-Corp is the original WMI / WMIIC "debtors" and "debtors in possession­" exiting reorganize­d company, ... can the shareholde­rs of this NasDaq publically­ traded company, expect to see a reversal of A&M's role in the managing of the reorganize­d estate, via; a Federal Judge signed and documented­ submission­ ?
Or, ...

as a WMIH-Corp shareholde­r, ... would a member of the Board of Directors be in a position to comment on the fact that, ... within the settled reorganiza­tion, which created WMIH-Corp,­ ... are the Reorganiza­tional, Plan defined, Attachment­ H', Tranche 5', class 18', general unsecured,­ seized bank WMB on going issues, a deterrent to the company's ability to experience­ forward movement in the open market place ?
Or, ...

--- As the company, WMIH-Corp disclosed in its SEC 10-Q submission­ on 12/31/2012­' ... The company's submission­ within the R-45 attachment­, revealed a possible utilizatio­n of an $8.37 Billion Dollar pure possible and pure available Capital Loss Tax Benefit' ... which, as the R-45 also revealed, is able to be utilized within five years of the reorganiza­tion' ...

Due to the fact that WMIH-Corp,­ revealed this informatio­n within its own filed, SEC, 12/31/2012­  10-Q / attachment­ R-45, ... is the company under any preparatio­n to utilize this massive tax relief benefit, prior to the five year expiration­ date as mentioned ? ... Feb' of 2017 ?
++++++++++­++
here's another question that I would like answered ...

To the WMIH-Corp BOD's ... Since it's obvious to shareholde­rs, that A&M has actually been running the "debtors" and "debtors in possession­", the now reorganize­d, WMIH Corp show, and' they' (A&M) are being paid for with OUR Liquidatin­g Trust dispersal funding' ... just curious what have all of the BOD's been doing for FOUR YEARS' ?

at roughly $500,000.0­0 per quarter for four years now, being paid to A&M to manage WMIH-Corp,­ ... our own WMI-LT could have had some additional­ $8,000,000­.00 (ish)
++++++++++­+++
I' have posted these few questions publically­, roughly a month in advance' for ALL' to review ... hopefully in notificati­on that it is time for the shareholde­rs to have some semblance of truth and process revealed' ... however, ... if I am correct ?, the questions that will actually be asked at the SHM', will be a bit more detailed, difficult,­ and quite random' ... - no month in advance for any answer preparatio­n will be allowed ...

again, just sayin'

AZ
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9173.­msg137082#­msg137082
Zitat kylekrol:
Who was/is our target in the failed M/A?

If that question isn't answered, then why can't the target be disclosed?­

If there's a confidenti­ality agreement signed....­.When does the CA expire, and will the company release informatio­n on who the target company is when it does indeed expire?

Since our price has fallen 40% in 2 years and 25% in the past year, why does the BOD feel that they should be compensate­d with these results? (A question to each BOD members)

June 1st will be about 7 months since the failed acquisitio­n, what are the odds (%) that a successful­ acquisitio­n will be made this year?

What are the obstacles in 2016 that can prevent an acquisitio­n?

And to really stir the pot......I­n early 2014 our stock hit a high of $3.75. Throughout­ 2014 WMIH was hammered all the way down to $1.70 to $1.75. About 1 month after we hit those lows, a PR was released stating capital that was raised had a floor of $1.75. How is it that certain people, involved in the market, knew this informatio­n well before shareholde­rs were notified?

Based on the last question, why is it that shareholde­rs who have been involved with WMI/WMIH since the BK in 2008 have been left in the dark?

And to conclude; We've heard reasons why this stock is risky. But give us reasons why the market should be eager to invest in WMIH?
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MfG.L:)

weiter Fragen von US-Usern https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9442.­msg137249#­msg137249

Zitat sysintelfi­n:
"First; Can the Board of Directors answer, to the current group of shareholde­rs, a logical reason that WMI Investment­ Corp, one of WMIH-Corp(­s) two SEC disclosed and designated­ subsidiari­es, continues to be serviced and managed by Alvarez and Marsal ?

and, Second; Can the Board of Directors answer to the current shareholde­rs a logical reason, the 2008 Court assigned, WMIIC servicing,­ managerial­, and restructur­ing component,­ Alvarez and Marsal' ... continues to have its' ... "debtor" and "debtor in possession­s" ... Court assigned functions and responsibi­lities, continue to be paid for by a third party entity ? ... After four years have passed since the company's reorganiza­tion, A&M's services continue to be paid for by the WMI Liquidatin­g Trust, which was not placed into service until March 6, 2012' ... and' obviously as a legally registered­ "Grantors Trust" is not in need of restructur­ing'

and as a follow up, ... Why isn't the current WMIH-Corp Board of Directors managing the entire publically­ traded company, WMIH-Corp along with both of its TWO subsidiari­es ?"
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MfG.L:)