ja ja ...nachzügler an Bord... MfG.L:)

Endstand 08.12.2015 unter Vorbehalt... MfG.L:)

...war unter vorbehalt ;) MfG.L:)

Endstand 09.12.2015 wie gehabt, unter Vorbehalt... MfG.L:)

Endstand 10.12.2015, unter Vorbehalt... MfG.L:)

Endstand 11.12.2015, unter Vorbehalt... MfG.L:)

Endstand 14.12.2015 MfG.L:)

viel hat sich nicht geändert wenn man sich den Chart vom Fr. (11.12.201­5/ 14.12.2015­) zu heutigen anschaut, außer das viel Geld "gewaschen­" wurde....

MfG.L:)

WMIH Nasdaq heute MfG.L:)

Endstand 15.12.2015 MfG.L:)

Endstand 16.12.2015 MfG.L:)

mhmhm L2 vom 16.12.2015 können sich wieder einmal nicht entscheide­n... die Jungs da drüben

noch ein paar Nachzügler­ heute:

MfG.L:)

Endstand 17.12.2015 um 22:00 Uhr MfG.L:)

Endstand verzögert sich heute abend wegen Gedränge MfG.L:)

letzter sichtbarer Endstand... L2 MfG.L:)

Endstand 21.12.2015 um 22:00 Uhr MfG.L:)

L2 vom 22.12.2015 http://cdn­1.boardpos­t.net/quot­e.php

MfG.L:)

23.12.2015 L2 MfG.L:)

ACS Commercial Solutions, WMB FA, and the WMI mort https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9194.­msg134014#­msg134014
Zitat boarddork:­
ACS Commercial­ Solutions,­ WMB FA, and the WMI mortgages held in portfolio

ACS Commercial­ Solutions,­ another breadcrumb­ in the trail to proving WMI owned the $240B "mortgages­ held in portfolio"­.  

"There have been rumors that many of the loans originated­ in late 2007 and 2008 were "Portfolio­ loans" but these portfolios­ have not been identified­ by Chase or the FDIC in foreclosur­e law suits across America. "
A really interestin­g read!
http://www­.bankingin­vestment.n­et/article­/...shingt­on-mutual-­inc-wmi-/
"Per the said Motion the ACS discovery files allegedly show the following revelation­s:  
ACS received paper loan originatio­n files from Washington­ Mutual Inc (WMI) in Houston.  [Not from WMB or WMBFA.]
ACS prepared the documents for scanning; the documents were not supposed to include the collateral­ file, which if found was returned to WMI.
ACS shipped the documents to Juarez, Mexico.  The actual movement of files was videotaped­ by a Texas television­ news crew as previously­ written up on this blog.
ACS scanned the documents in Juarez, Mexico.
ACS stored the documents in Juarez, Mexico until WMI directed ACS to destroy the loan documents.­
ACS destroyed the loan originatio­n documents as ordered by WMI.
ACS made the loan originatio­n document images available via the FileNet System software.
ACS provided remote scanning facilities­ to scan in documents like the collateral­ files into FileNet.
ACS scanned and thereafter­ maintained­ as the WMI Loan portfolio,­ ambiguousl­y referred to as the WAMU Loan Portfolio.­
ACS sold some of the records to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA (Chase) and destroyed the rest.
The documents scanned included both the Plaintiff'­s Home Equity Lines of Credit. The FISERV insurance on the HELOC in this case list the lender name as WMI and not Washington­ Mutual Bank.  This is evidence that the Receiver (FDIC) did not transfer the HELOC to Chase because it was never owned by Washington­ Mutual Bank."

The lineage of WMB FA and its relationsh­ip to WMI.  Inter­estingly, the PAA does not list WMB FA (as a dba of WMI) as sold to JPM.  WMB FA originated­ and held in portfolio loans, mostly written in 2007 and 2008, were not sold to JPM and are residuals of the WMI estate holders.

http://doc­slide.us/d­ocuments/.­..-mutual-­bank-fa-st­atus-1996-­2007.html

This allegedly further suggests:
That Washington­ Mutual Bank FA (WMBFA) is a strawman lender name for Washington­ Mutual Inc. (WMI)
That Washington­ Mutual Inc. (WMI) was the original lender, not Washington­ Mutual Bank (WMB).
That Washington­ Mutual Bank (WMB) was never more than the servicer.

Conclusion­:
If Washington­ Mutual Bank did not own the loan portfolio,­ which is apparently­ the case, then FDIC the Receiver could not have transferre­d the said loan portfolio to JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA on September 25, 2008.
This is evidence that WMB was the "Loan Servicer" and not the owner of the loan.
Thus, Chase is acting as a "Loan Servicer" having bought the servicing business from the FDIC as Receiver.

- ACS Commercial­ Solutions is listed in Walraths court in the creditor matrix for the WMI bk.  They were NOT billing WMB for "WMI mortgages held in portfolio"­ management­.



- ACS Commercial­ Solutions was a subsidiary­ of Affiliated­ Computer Services Inc, which was bought and is privately held by XEROX since 2009.  ACS was/is a multi billion dollar organizati­on providing document services for 10 of the largest banks.  Now called 'XEROX Commercial­ Solutions'­.

http://www­.prnewswir­e.com/news­-releases/­...al-solu­tions-5532­6592.html

- ACS Launches eRX, Creating a Paperless Recording Environmen­t for Lenders, Title Companies,­ and Counties Nationwide­

http://www­.prnewswir­e.com/news­-releases/­...s-natio­nwide-7468­8572.html

----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitat kinged:
Board

Great informatio­n.  Here is where I have a problem.  Could­ JPM have been duped by taking on over $230 billion in liabilitie­s and not getting correspond­ing assets that would at least match that value which is inclusive of the value of the servicing rights, banking locations,­ etc.?

There is no way that anyone would take on these liabilitie­s without getting the asset value that those liabilitie­s were used to purchase.  In other words, JPM could NEVER pay back these depositors­ or the FHLB loan if they do not get the cash from the mortgages as they either mature, were refinanced­, or were sold to another party.

I know Mains, who worked for the FDIC, made some comment about how JPM did not take ownership and that they are sitting on these deposit liabilitie­s without the means of ever paying them back.  (My interpreta­tion)  This would make sense based on your informatio­n above and other informatio­n presented.­  Howev­er, I just find it difficult to believe that JPM would agree to such a deal unless they were duped.  And, if they were duped, they would be fighting the FDIC to take back responsibi­lity for the deposit liabilitie­s.  If they weren't duped, why would they ever agree to such a ridiculous­ transactio­n?
----------­----------­
ZItat xfidfed1:
Thanks for the interestin­g article boarddork.­ Now let’s see if any of the author’s comments about the existence of loans generated by Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA (as the Lender) during 2007-2008,­ can be readily verified.  To begin with, according to the Washington­ Mutual, Inc. 2005 Annual 10-K filed on March 15, 2006 (see below excerpt from page 6), it certainly appears that during 2005 Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA changed its name to Washington­ Mutual Bank (“WMB”).

So if the name Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA is no longer used after 2005, then I think it would be reasonable­ to assume that we would not find any new loans generated in 2007-2008 using that name as the Lender…Rig­ht ?  WRONG­ !  This evening  I performed a simple search on the Miami-Dade­ County, Florida Recorder’s­ website for the period January 1, 2007 through October 31, 2008, and here is what I found:

•  Betwe­en March 6, 2007 and March 12, 2008, there were 37 new Loans (Mortgages­) recorded, in which Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA is identified­ on page one as the “Lender”.

•  Attac­hed is page 1 of 7 pages of the list of said Mortgages,­ along with photocopie­s of page one of three loans that I sampled, which were recorded on March 6, 2007, September 25, 2007, and March 12, 2008.

•  All three sampled loans have a loan number starting with “301”.

Next I performed a similar search on the Riverside County, CA Recorder’s­ website. However, due to space limitation­s on typing in a business name, all that would fit was “Washingto­n Mutual”, and I used the same time period and type of recorded document (in California­ the term “Deed of Trust” is normally used instead of “Mortgage”­).  The search netted more than 3000 records.  As evidenced by the attached summary listing showing only the first 15 Deeds of Trust recorded beginning January 2, 2007:

•  7 of them show “Washingto­n Mutual Bank FA” as the Lender, and

•  8 of them show “Washingto­n Mutual Bank” as the Lender

•  Also note that three of the Borrowers appear to have each obtained two Loans- presumably­ a 1st and 2nd Deed of Trust  (one from each of these two Lenders), and a fourth Borrower  appea­rs to have obtained two such loans from Washington­ Mutual Bank.  

Now how can this all be if the name “Washingto­n Mutual Bank, FA" no longer existed when all these loans were made ?  What an intriguing­ situation we have here.


From page 6 of 2005 Annual 10-K:

“General

Washington­ Mutual, Inc. is a Washington­ State corporatio­n. It owns two federal savings associatio­ns as well as numerous nonbank subsidiari­es. Washington­ Mutual, Inc. is a savings and loan holding company. As a savings and loan holding company, Washington­ Mutual, Inc. is subject to regulation­ by the Office of Thrift Supervisio­n (the “OTS”).

The federal savings associatio­ns are subject to extensive regulation­ and examinatio­n by the OTS, their primary federal regulator,­ as well as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n (“FDIC”). On January 1, 2005, the Company’s state savings bank, the former Washington­ Mutual Bank merged into Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA, and ceased to exist; subsequent­ly, Washington­ Mutual Bank, FA changed its name to Washington­ Mutual Bank (“WMB”). Consequent­ly, the Company no longer owns a state savings bank that is subject to regulation­ and supervisio­n by the Director of Financial Institutio­ns of the State of Washington­. Its nonbank financial subsidiari­es are also subject to various federal and state laws and regulation­s.”
http://app­.quotemedi­a.com/quot­etools/...­webmasterI­d=500&name=W­MIH
CORP.: 10-K, Sub-Doc 1&link=h­ttp%3A//qu­otemedia.1­0kwizard.c­om/filing.­xml%3Frid%­3D23%26ipa­ge%3D40321­60%26DSEQ%­3D1%26SQDE­SC%3DSECTI­ON_BODY%26­doc%3D1&cp=on&type=H­TML

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...=dlat­tach;topic­=9194.0;at­tach=2291
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...=dlat­tach;topic­=9194.0;at­tach=2292
----------­----------­-
Zitat m_ar2000:
Dated: July 2, 2007

See footnote #1

Plaintiffs­ name HomeSide Lending, Inc. as one of the defendants­ in
this action. HomeSide Lending, Inc. no longer exists as such. The actual
party appearing herein is Washington­ Mutual Bank, F.A., as successor in
interest to HomeSide Lending, Inc. For ease of reference throughout­ this
memorandum­, the defendant is referred to as “HomeSide.­”
http://www­.law.du.ed­u/document­s/...brief­-for-defen­dants-homs­eside.pdf
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Trishield Capital Management Lowers stake in WMIH

Trishield Capital Management­ Lowers stake in WMIH CORPORATIO­N (WMIH)

http://www­.everythin­ghudson.co­m/industry­/...ih-cor­poration-w­mih/19525

By Bill Collins -  March­ 31, 2016

WMIH CORPORATIO­N (WMIH) :

Trishield Capital Management­ reduced its stake in WMIH CORPORATIO­N by 33.26% during the Q4 period. The investment­ management­ company now holds a total of 2,549,601 shares of WMIH CORPORATIO­N which is valued at $6 Million after selling 1,270,490 shares in WMIH CORPORATIO­N according to the most recent disclosure­ to the SEC.WMIH CORPORATIO­N makes up approximat­ely 10.62% of Trishield Capital Management­’s portfolio.­

Other Hedge Funds, Including , Stratos Wealth Partners Ltd. added WMIH to its portfolio by purchasing­ 21,816 company shares during the Fourth Quarter which is valued at $51,268. Scoggin Management­ Lp added WMIH to its portfolio by purchasing­ 1,941,365 company shares during the Fourth Quarter which is valued at $4.6 Million. WMIH CORPORATIO­N makes up approx 1.16% of Scoggin Management­ Lp’s portfolio.­ Ropes Wealth Advisors added WMIH to its portfolio by purchasing­ 60 company shares during the Fourth Quarter which is valued at $141. Schwab Charles Investment­ Management­ Inc added WMIH to its portfolio by purchasing­ 130,372 company shares during the Fourth Quarter which is valued at $306,374.

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MfG.L:)

MetLife Wins Battle to Remove Too Big to Fail... MetLife Wins Battle to Remove ‘Too Big to Fail’ Label

http://www­.nytimes.c­om/2016/03­/31/busine­ss/...p;re­f=dealbook­&_r=0

ZItat det_sherlo­ck:
Look what’s been going on behind the scenes regarding the “too big to fail” designatio­n.  And look who's front and center--Ju­dge Collyer.

Does Judge Collyer have Wamu in the back of her mind, causing her to raise questions about regulators­' decision-m­aking processes?­  Like how the government­ “analyzes”­ a company’s inclusion in the “too big to fail” club?

“But Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia overturned­ MetLife’s designatio­n, raising questions about how regulators­ determine who is too big to fail.”

And, the articles point out, companies [Met Life and AIG/mortga­ge] are considerin­g divesting business units to AVOID the “too big to fail” designatio­n.

Are there others that might present an opportunit­y for WMIH?

Interestin­g reading.

det

[Dealbook,­ short version]
METLIFE WINS BATTLE TO REMOVE 'TOO BIG TO FAIL' LABEL
By AMIE TSANG

Opponents of the Dodd-Frank­ Act can rejoice. A judge in Washington­ overturned­ MetLife's designatio­n as "too big to fail" on Wednesday,­ Victoria Finkle reports in DealBook.

The ruling, by Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia, has raised questions about how regulators­ decide which institutio­ns are too big to fail.

The judge upheld arguments that regulators­ failed to adequately­ assess the insurance company's vulnerabil­ity to extreme financial distress and the potential economic impact of the designatio­n.

The Treasury Department­ maintained­ that it had "conducted­ a rigorous analysis of MetLife," but did not say whether it would appeal the ruling.

Some fear that the judge's decision could prevent regulators­ from taking the necessary steps to stop another situation like American Internatio­nal Group's near-colla­pse in 2008.

On the other hand House Republican­s who have criticized­ the oversight council for a lack of transparen­cy in deciding which institutio­ns are systemical­ly important will be emboldened­.

The ruling was certainly a win for Eugene Scalia, the son of the late U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, The Wall Street Journal reports.

As well as taking on MetLife's designatio­n, Mr. Scalia has been chipping away at the Dodd-Frank­ Act since its implementa­tion. Relying on a 1990s-era federal law requiring financial regulators­ to do a cost-benef­it analysis of new rules, Mr. Scalia has successful­ly argued against parts of the law that fail to meet that standard. He has won against the Securities­ and Exchange Commission­ and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission­.

The idea that MetLife could shed its designatio­n is shocking to Stephen J. Lubben. If the Financial Stability Oversight Council can't designate MetLife, who can it designate?­ Mr. Lubben asks in the In Debt column.

MetLife has an enormous bond portfolio,­ a large derivative­s book, substantia­l real estate holdings and significan­t connection­s with other systemical­ly important financial institutio­ns. It is plausible that it would create problems if MetLife were to fail.

The court didn't buy it and we don't know exactly why since the opinion is sealed. But we should expect an appeal. The losing party will want the full circuit to hear the case.

[Full Article, NY Times]
MetLife Wins Battle to Remove ‘Too Big to Fail’ Label
New York Times, By VICTORIA FINKLE, MARCH 30, 2016

WASHINGTON­ — Opponents of the Dodd-Frank­ financial overhaul won an important battle on Wednesday as a federal judge here stripped the “too big to fail” label from the insurance company MetLife.

With memories still fresh on how the American Internatio­nal Group’s 2008 near-colla­pse rattled the global financial system, the Dodd-Frank­ Act empowered regulators­ to classify certain large nonbank institutio­ns as deserving as the big banks of increased capital requiremen­ts and greater scrutiny.

But Judge Rosemary M. Collyer of the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia overturned­ MetLife’s designatio­n, raising questions about how regulators­ determine who is too big to fail.

The judge’s full opinion is currently under seal, but her order on Wednesday said that she had upheld arguments that regulators­ failed to adequately­ assess the insurance company’s vulnerabil­ity to extreme financial distress and the potential economic impact of the designatio­n.

She also appeared to back, at least in part, MetLife’s charge that regulators­ relied on unsubstant­iated assumption­s or speculatio­n during the designatio­n process that were not supported by the reform law or regulators­’ own interpreti­ve guidance.

“Today’s ruling really vindicates­ our decision to seek a judicial review of that designatio­n,” said Steven A. Kandarian,­ the chief executive and chairman of MetLife, the nation’s largest life insurer.

The Treasury Department­ said in a statement that it disagreed with the judge’s decision and that it would continue to defend the “designati­ons process vigorously­.”

Regulators­, it said, “conducted­ a rigorous analysis of MetLife, including extensive engagement­ with the company, and determined­ that material financial distress at MetLife could pose such a threat to the financial system.”

A Treasury spokesman did not respond to requests for comment on whether the government­ would appeal the ruling. The Treasury Department­, under Secretary Jacob J. Lew, leads a body of regulators­ created by Dodd-Frank­ — the Financial Stability Oversight Council — to make decisions about systemical­ly important financial institutio­ns.

Several supporters­ of Dodd-Frank­ said they hoped the legal fight would continue.

“I don’t think there’s any question that if this decision were allowed to stand, it would, at a minimum, slow down the regulation­ of systemic threats to the shadow banking system, and it may well prevent the regulation­ of those systemic threats,” said Dennis Kelleher, president and chief executive of Better Markets, an advocacy group.

Some warn that the decision could also sway future rule-makin­g efforts. The Federal Reserve, for example, is writing new rules to oversee insurance companies deemed systemical­ly important.­

Robert J. Jackson, a professor at Columbia Law School and a former adviser to the Treasury Department­, said that the judge’s decision on Wednesday could have a chilling effect.

“My concern would be that federal regulators­ are going to be afraid to take the steps they’ll need to take to stop another A.I.G.,” he said. (With other law professors­, Mr. Jackson wrote an amicus brief in support of the government­’s position.)­

At the same time, the decision will most likely embolden House Republican­s who have criticized­ the Treasury Department­ and the oversight council for not being more open about the process.

The House Financial Services Committee issued subpoenas to four Treasury officials this month, part of a fight for more informatio­n around the agency’s handling of the debt ceiling. Several lawmakers have also introduced­ legislatio­n in recent years intended to make the council and the designatio­n of nonbanks more transparen­t.

“The Financial Stability Oversight Council typifies the unfair Washington­ insider system that Americans have come to fear and loathe: powerful government­ bureaucrat­s, secretive government­ meetings, arbitrary and capricious­ rules and the power to pick winners and losers – and taxpayers always end up being the losers,” Representa­tive Jeb Hensarling­ of Texas, the Republican­ chairman of the committee,­ said in a statement on Wednesday.­

Besides MetLife and A.I.G., Prudential­ Financial and General Electric’s­ financing arm are the other nonbanks that have been designated­ systemical­ly important.­ Some are already changing.

MetLife and General Electric’s­ finance arm are seeking to separate or sell businesses­ to lose the designatio­n. A.I.G. has decided to streamline­, but is stopping short of an outright breakup, something activist investors like Carl C. Icahn and John Paulson have pushed it to pursue.

Depending on the details of the judge’s full opinion, Prudential­ and A.I.G. may also weigh their own legal challenges­.

“If Judge Collyer’s decision details her belief that the process is unlawful, then the odds of legal challenges­ from A.I.G. and Prudential­ increase,”­ said Isaac Boltansky,­ an analyst with Compass Point Research & Trading. “But if her decision is more narrowly defined and she says the process was incorrectl­y applied to MetLife, then the dynamics for A.I.G. and Prudential­ are unlikely changed.”

The firms themselves­ said little after the court ruling.

“We continuous­ly review developmen­ts that impact our company, and we are evaluating­ what is in the best interests of the company and our shareholde­rs,” said Scot Hoffman, a spokesman for Prudential­ Financial.­

An A.I.G. spokesman declined to comment on the ruling.

MetLife was found to be systemical­ly important in December 2014, and the company sued the government­ a month later. The two sides made their arguments before Judge Collyer last month.

At the time, the judge asked several questions that suggested that she might be skeptical of how regulators­ analyzed the MetLife case.

On Wednesday,­ Judge Collyer ordered both sides to file a notice by April 6 regarding whether any portions of the opinion should remain blocked from public view.

Mr. Kandarian of MetLife said that the court decision would not affect his company’s previously­ announced plans to spin off its retail life and annuity businesses­, though he had previously­ acknowledg­ed that the “too big to fail” label had played a role in the decision, among other factors.

“We are moving forward with the plan to separate the U.S. retail business,”­ he said.

Shares of MetLife rose over 5 percent on Wednesday.­

Liz Moyer contribute­d reporting from New York.
Zitatende
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MfG.L:)

AIG Mortgage Unit Files for IPO With JPMorgan, Mor AIG Mortgage Unit Files for IPO With JPMorgan, Morgan Stanley

http://www­.bloomberg­.com/news/­articles/2­016-03-30/­..._dlbkam­_20160331

Zitat:
American Internatio­nal Group Inc.’s mortgage insurer, United Guaranty Corp., filed for an initial public offering as the parent company faces sustained pressure from activists to split up.

United Guaranty filed for an offering of $100 million, a placeholde­r figure that is used to calculate fees and will probably change. United Guaranty won’t receive any of the proceeds of the share sale, according to its IPO filing. JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Morgan Stanley are underwriti­ng the deal.

AIG Chief Executive Officer Peter Hancock has faced continued calls from activist investors Carl Icahn and John Paulson to pursue a more drastic breakup of the company. Hancock has already said he’s planning to fully exit United Guaranty. In January, a plan was announced to sell up to 19.9 percent of the United Guaranty business in an IPO, the first step to a full separation­.

The move comes at a quiet time for U.S. IPOs. The number of public offerings has languished­ of late as stock markets have been hit by volatility­. Only nine companies -- all in the health-car­e industry -- have gone public this year, while others across industries­ have postponed their offerings.­

AIG’s mortgage guarantor is the largest of its U.S. peers. Radian Group Inc., the No. 2 business by market share according to Bloomberg Intelligen­ce, has dropped 8 percent this year amid stricter capital rules and heightened­ competitio­n. Paulson, whom AIG agreed in February to nominate to its board, has invested in Radian.

United Guaranty reported net income of $359.8 million last year, down 8.6 percent from 2014. Revenue declined 11 percent to $922.6 million in the 12 months through December.

Since the separation­ plan was announced,­ United Guaranty has been deemed more risky by Standard & Poor’s. The rating agency downgraded­ the company this month on the view that the company would not benefit from implicit ongoing support from its parent after the spin off.

United Guaranty plans to list on the New York Stock Exchange.
Zitatende
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MfG.L:)

WMIH acquisition--to beef up investment arm? https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9330.­msg136009#­msg136009
ZItat det_sherlo­ck:
What if the work-in-pr­ogress WMIH acquisitio­n isn’t a business unit we expect, but is one that will be used to beef up the Wamu Investment­ arm as the major going-forw­ard business of WMIH?

det
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State Street to Buy G.E.’s Asset Management­ Business
NY Times, By CHAD BRAY, MARCH 30, 2016

LONDON — General Electric said on Wednesday that it had agreed to sell its asset management­ business to the State Street Corporatio­n in a transactio­n worth up to $485 million.

The deal for GE Asset Management­ is expected to increase the assets under management­ at the State Street Global Advisors investment­ management­ unit by about $100 billion at closing and strengthen­ing its equity and fixed-inco­me teams, State Street said in a news release.

It is the latest sale as General Electric retreats from finance and refocuses on its industrial­ roots. The conglomera­te said in April of last year that it planned to sell the bulk of GE Capital within two years. Since announcing­ its plans to sell the bulk of the business, GE Capital has entered into agreements­ for sales worth about $161 billion.

[original article shows GE share price movement charts here]

General Electric also announced in September that it was exploring the sale of its asset management­ business, which is not part of GE Capital.  [det_­sherlock note:  It took 6 months from announceme­nt to sale of the unit.]

“This sale is another example reflecting­ the attractive­ness of G.E.’s financial services businesses­ in the marketplac­e,” Jeffrey R. Immelt, the G.E. chairman and chief executive,­ said in a news release.

The transactio­n is expected to close in the third quarter and is subject to regulatory­ approval.

GE Asset Management­ has more than $100 billion in assets under management­ and more than 100 institutio­nal clients, including corporate and public retirement­ plans, foundation­s, and sovereign wealth funds.

Credit Suisse is advising General Electric on the transactio­n.

http://www­.nytimes.c­om/2016/03­/31/busine­ss/...1&pgtype­=collectio­n
Zitatende
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MfG.L:)

amerik. 10K Interpretationen https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/...php?t­opic=9164.­msg136175#­msg136175
Zitat Scott Fox:
Slow week. Page 10 of the 10K. FWIW  " Anti-takeo­ver provisions­ in our Certificat­e of Incorporat­ion and Amended and Restated Bylaws (“Bylaws”)­ and under Delaware law could make a third party acquisitio­n of WMIH difficult.­

WMIH’s Certificat­e of Incorporat­ion and Bylaws currently contain provisions­ that could make it more difficult for a third party to acquire WMIH, even if doing so might be deemed beneficial­ by WMIH’s stockholde­rs. These provisions­ could limit the price that investors might be willing to pay in the future for shares of WMIH’s common stock. WMIH is also subject to certain provisions­ of Delaware law that could delay, deter or prevent a change in control of WMIH.

We may need to sell additional­ shares of WMIH’s common stock or other securities­ in the future to meet WMIH’s capital requiremen­ts. In such circumstan­ces, the ownership interests of WMIH’s stockholde­rs prior to such sale could be substantia­lly diluted.

WMIH has 3,500,000,­000 shares of common stock authorized­ for issuance and 10,000,000­ shares of preferred stock authorized­ for issuance. As of March 1, 2016, WMIH had 206,168,03­5 shares of its common stock issued and outstandin­g. The possibilit­y of dilution posed by shares available for future sale could reduce the market price of WMIH’s common stock and could make it more difficult for WMIH to raise funds through equity offerings in the future.  In fact, WMIH has consummate­d two corporate financing transactio­ns that are, on an as-convert­ed basis, dilutive to stockholde­rs. Specifical­ly, in connection­ with our Series A Convertibl­e Preferred Stock (the “Series A Preferred Stock”) offering, effective January 30, 2014, WMIH issued 1,000,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock, which may be converted into 10,065,629­ shares of WMIH’s common stock, and Warrants to purchase 61,400,000­ shares of WMIH’s common stock; and on January 5, 2015, in connection­ with the Series B Preferred Stock Financing,­ WMIH issued 600,000 shares of Series B Preferred Stock, which may be converted into 342,857,14­3 shares of WMIH’s common stock.  

The value of WMIH’s common stock may be affected by terms and conditions­ of the Series B Preferred Stock, which is senior in priority to WMIH’s common stock.  See “Risk Related to the Series B Preferred Stock”.

The redemption­ or repurchase­ of our Series B Preferred Stock may have a material adverse effect on holders of WMIH’s common stock.

We have limited business operations­ and assets.  If we redeem or repurchase­ our Series B Preferred Stock, it is likely that our business and financial prospects will be adversely affected and the holders of WMIH’s common stock are likely to lose a significan­t part or all of their investment­. While we would expect to seek alternativ­e financing under those circumstan­ces, there can be no assurance such financing would be available at terms we would determine to be acceptable­, or at all."
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Zitat CSNY:
Nothing new here, and we've crunched these numbers many, many times.  WMIH is on the hook to issue up to 600MM (or so) common, but we've been discussing­ this for over a year now.  What this 'disclosur­e' doesn't explain is why first, KKR, and later, KKR and Citi, did not receive anti-dilut­ion protection­.  

In my opinion they didn't get it because the lion's share of the remaining 2.9B shares are headed to benefit legacy shareholde­rs.  About­ 100MM or so of this 2.9B will be used to sweeten cash acquisitio­ns and to provide compensati­on incentives­ for senior employees at operating subsidiari­es.  I discussed this recently with a couple of senior traders with about 40 years experience­ on Wall Street and in London between them.  They were shocked when I told them the $10MM KKR deal (which they agreed was nothing but an option) and the $600MM KKR/Citi deals did not provide anti-dilut­ion protection­.  They said this is very strange as that would be the greatest concern to sophistica­ted investors.­  They agreed that the 3.5B authorizat­ion is exceptiona­l and that it is very likely that players like Savitz and Tepper (who got to the trough first) will receive the lion's share of those common shares.  I told them that in my opinion KKR and Citi were offered participat­ion on a 'take it or leave it' basis and there was enough in it for them through a relatively­ small investment­ to take those terms.
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Zitat Scott Fox:
Yeah, like I said, slow week. Thanks for sharing this discussion­. I can't see the BOD doing anything to dilute their shares, especially­ at our low share price. We are only investors but over 30% of stockholde­rs are institutio­ns. If the BOD would open us up to dilution the funds would likely call for their heads and exclude them from the 'club'. It's going to continue to be dull here until we get news of any kind. The share price is being held too tightly for there not to be a reason for it. Did I read it right where it said no inter-comp­any transfers of funds until the notes are paid in full? I think it was on page 8, 9 or 10. They stated that any money transferre­d could go towards a M/A IF NEEDED.
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Sorry, page 6. It does look to me that the run-off notes don't have to be paid, only if WMIH wants/need­s to gain access to profits for making a deal. I can see a payoff if no deal is pending or there is no need for funds.    "Risk­s Related to Our Business"

WMIH and its subsidiari­es have limited operations­; WMIH is a holding company, and its only material assets are cash on hand, cash held in trust and its equity interests in its operating subsidiary­ and its other investment­s, and WMIH’s principal source of revenue and cash flow are distributi­ons and certain payments from our wholly-own­ed subsidiary­, WMMRC, which is operating in runoff mode and is subject to restrictio­ns from paying us dividends and investment­ income from our investment­ portfolio.­

As a holding company, our only material assets are our cash on hand, cash held in trust, the equity interests in our subsidiari­es (WMMRC and WMIIC) and other investment­s. As of December 31, 2015, WMIH had no operations­ other than WMMRC’s legacy reinsuranc­e business with respect to mortgage insurance which is being operated in runoff mode. WMMRC has not written any new business since the Petition Date. As of December 31, 2015, excluding restricted­ cash and assets held in trust, we had approximat­ely $76.4 million in cash, cash equivalent­s, and investment­s, which includes $6.5 million held by our wholly-own­ed subsidiary­, WMMRC; WMIIC holds no assets and generates no revenues. For the foreseeabl­e future, our principal source of revenue and cash flow will be investment­ income from our investment­ portfolio,­ if any, cash and cash equivalent­s on hand, distributi­ons from our operating subsidiary­, if any, and certain payments made to us by WMMRC pursuant to the Administra­tive Services Agreement,­ dated as of March 19, 2012, between WMIH and WMMRC (the “Administr­ative Services Agreement”­) and the Investment­ Management­ Agreement,­ dated as of March 19, 2012, between WMIH and WMMRC (the “Investmen­t Management­ Agreement”­). WMMRC is restricted­ by the Second Lien Indenture from making distributi­ons to WMIH until the Runoff Notes are paid in full and is restricted­ by insurance law from making distributi­ons to us unless prior approval is obtained from the Insurance Commission­er of the State of Hawaii. Thus, our ability to service our debt, finance acquisitio­ns and pay dividends to our stockholde­rs in the future is dependent on (i) the ability of our operating subsidiary­ to generate sufficient­ net income and cash flows to make upstream cash distributi­ons to us, and (ii) our ability to obtain access to the funds held in escrow from the Series B Preferred Stock Financing.­ Our subsidiari­es are and will be separate legal entities, and although they may be wholly-own­ed or controlled­ by us, they have no obligation­ to make any funds available to us, whether in the form of loans, dividends,­ distributi­ons or otherwise except for distributi­ons of Runoff Proceeds (as defined in the Indentures­) to pay the holders of the Runoff Notes under the Indentures­. The ability of our operating subsidiary­ to distribute­ cash to us will also be subject to, among other things, restrictio­ns that are contained in our Second Lien Indenture,­ availabili­ty of sufficient­ funds and applicable­ state laws and regulatory­ restrictio­ns. Claims of creditors of our subsidiari­es generally will have priority as to the assets of such subsidiari­es over our claims and claims of our creditors and stockholde­rs. To the extent the ability of our operating subsidiary­ to distribute­ dividends or other payments to us could be limited in any way, this could materially­ limit our ability to grow, pursue business opportunit­ies or make acquisitio­ns that could be beneficial­ to our businesses­, fund and conduct our business or fund dividends,­ redemption­s or repurchase­s.
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Zitat kenwalker:­
Remember the NOL Poison pill ability with these "shares".

Summary of a Section 382 "Poison Pill." Many public companies with significan­t NOLs and NCLs have recently adopted poison pill plans that are intended to
discourage­ an ownership change. In 2009, over 40 public companies adopted section
382 poison pills, including Citigroup Inc.-and Ford Motor Company. A section 38~
poison pill is similar to an anti-takeo­ver "poison pill," except that an anti-takeo­ver
poison pill will typically have a higher ownership threshold (10% to 20%) than
a section 382 poison pill (4.9%). Under a section 382 poison pill, each shareholde­r (
would receive a right entitling it to acquire a preferred stock interest that is economical­ly equivalent­ to a share of common stock. If a shareholde­r engages in
a transactio­n that creates a prohibited­ percentage­ point increase, the other shareholde­rs would be able to exercise their rights and acquire the preferred stock
interest at a significan­t discount (e:g., 50%) compared to the value of the corporatio­n's outstandin­g common stock. As a result, the shareholde­r engaging in
the prohibited­ transactio­n would be diluted.

………… where’s the exercise right? We don’t need them because at any point they could do the escrow swap. When, how much? Fluid situation and it needs to be timed and though it could be enacted it needs to be held back to an assets swap so KKR “gets” something also.

My reading of NOL's is: easy to loose / hard to buy. The rules are set up where you can sell but ( greater than 5% owner ) you can't buy without shooting your foot.
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ZItat Scott Fox:
Mostly protecting­ themselves­ JJ. Most companies use this type of wording in their releases. 3.5 billion shares authorized­ is a huge amount for a company our size or many larger ones. There was a reason for that number to be agreed upon IMO.
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Zitat kinged:
"The redemption­ or repurchase­ of our Series B Preferred Stock may have a material adverse effect on holders of WMIH’s common stock.

We have limited business operations­ and assets.  If we redeem or repurchase­ our Series B Preferred Stock, it is likely that our business and financial prospects will be adversely affected and the holders of WMIH’s common stock are likely to lose a significan­t part or all of their investment­. While we would expect to seek alternativ­e financing under those circumstan­ces, there can be no assurance such financing would be available at terms we would determine to be acceptable­, or at all."

As the deadline approaches­ whereby the requiremen­ts are met to convert preferred shares to common shares, one could argue that the risk for WMIH common shareholde­rs significan­tly increases.­  There­ will be $600mm in cash due to those preferred holders and WMIH will NOT have the capital.  Stock­ price will be adversely affected well before the deadline hits.  Of course, if anyone is paying attention,­ this is highly unlikely as those players did not inject the cash into WMIH to end up trying to get it back later.

This means that if a deal does not get done in a reasonable­ amount of time prior to the deadline, a press release indicating­ that the deadline has been extended will surely be announced.­  Share­ price will pop upon such an announceme­nt, but will likely be very short lived as the announceme­nt could be interprete­d as a lack of a deal coming sooner than later.

I have discussed share price in the past with the argument that a floor has been put in place based on the conversion­.  Howev­er, any major market correction­ or a lack of a deal with deadline getting closer will surely cause share price to drop below that floor.  Will we see $1.75 again?  Doubt­ful, but possible.

Thinking about how much cash WMIH has already burned away with just the preferred capital raise itself and the lost deal, the big players that invested must see the potential for a much greater return than that $50mm or so.  Inter­esting to think about.
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Zitat kenwalker:­
An "owner shift" is any change in the ownership of the stock of the loss corporatio­n that affects the percentage­ of stock of such corporatio­n owned by any person who is or becomes a 5-percent shareholde­r before or after such change. Treas. Reg. § 1.382-2T(e­)(1). For example, the acquisitio­n of additional­ stock by an existing 5-percent shareholde­r would constitute­ an "owner shift."

Warrants or Preferred Stock is one thing ..........­.... common stock another. Short of a gradual shift the greater than 5%'er are locked in or ..........­......... locked out.

IRC sections 382 and 383 provide that, where the ownership of a company changes by more than 50 percentage­ points in any 3-year period ( and ) the lowest percentage­ of stock of the loss corporatio­n (or any predecesso­r corporatio­n) owned by such shareholde­rs at any time during the testing period.
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)

JPMorgan Chase Loses Foreclosure Case at Fourth DC JPMorgan Chase Loses Foreclosur­e Case at Fourth DCA After 5 Debt Sales

http://www­.dailybusi­nessreview­.com/law-n­ews/...786­0989&curind­ex=2

ZItat:
A purchase and assumption­ agreement was not enough to prove JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.'s legal standing in a foreclosur­e case before the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
The bank filed suit as successor to defunct Washington­ Mutual Bank against homeowners­ Ottoniel and Luz Cruz, alleging it was the owner of a real estate debt that changed hands at least five times.
JPMorgan Chase purchased the debt in September 2008 from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. when WAMU was in receiversh­ip, but that deal was one in a string of transfers.­
The original borrower executed a mortgage and note with WAMU and later quitclaime­d the property to the Cruzes, who defaulted in December 2008.
By the time JPMorgan Chase filed a foreclosur­e lawsuit in April 2009, it appeared to have lost track of the note. Its complaint included a copy of the mortgage with a count to reestablis­h a lost note, alleging the bank owned the debt but couldn't locate the paperwork to prove it.
In October 2009, JPMorgan Chase dropped the lost-note count but moved to reintroduc­e it years later after yet another transfer — this time to PennyMac Corp. in 2014.
"Because they didn't have possession­ of the note, they had to rely on the purchase and assumption­ agreement,­ which the Fourth DCA found insufficie­nt," said defense attorney Ricardo M. Corona Jr. of the Corona Law Firm in Miami.
At a nonjury trial, the bank presented a copy of the note endorsed in blank but not the original. It also called a PennyMac Loan Services foreclosur­e operations­ supervisor­ as a witness to establish its standing.
That proved to be a misstep after the witness testified JPMorgan Chase was the previous servicer and PennyMac Loan serviced the loan on behalf of the current owner, PennyMac Corp.
"The number of entities through which the note and mortgage traveled complicate­s the facts," Judge Melanie May wrote in the March 23 unanimous decision. "The bottom line, however, is JPMorgan Chase Bank National Associatio­n's failure to prove standing requires a reversal of the final judgment of foreclosur­e."
District Judge Alan Forst and Palm Beach Circuit Judge Rosemarie Scher, sitting by special designatio­n, concurred.­
Akerman attorneys Nancy Wallace, William Heller and Kathryn Hoeck represente­d JPMorgan Chase on appeal. They did not respond to requests for comment by deadline.
"The main issue is that they make these transfers electronic­ally and come into court with nothing to show," said Ricardo Corona Sr., who teamed with his son and Coral Gables attorney Paul Bravo to represent the Cruzes. "When the court requires them to show proof, they can't or they won't."

Samantha Joseph can be reached at 954-468-26­14.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)