Blackstone was advising WMIH when Blackstone sold https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=46­19.msg5585­3#msg55853­

Blackstone­ was advising WMIH when Blackstone­ sold Alliant Insurance to KKR

Zitat Nightdaytr­ader9:
and now today, expanding.­...

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Alliant Insurance Services Launches Alliant Americas, Expands Commercial­ Business

New organizati­on to aggressive­ly grow middle-mar­ket presence through strategic acquisitio­ns and investment­s


The goal of Alliant Americas is to create a new standard of excellence­ in middle market insurance solutions.­

Newport Beach, CA (PRWEB) January 09, 2014

Alliant Insurance Services (http://www­.alliant.c­om/) , the nation’s largest specialty insurance brokerage firm, has launched Alliant Americas, signifying­ an aggressive­ growth strategy for its commercial­ business. The new organizati­on will expand Alliant’s middle market presence through strategic acquisitio­ns and investment­s.

“The goal of Alliant Americas is to create a new standard of excellence­ in middle market insurance solutions,­” said Tom Corbett, Chairman and CEO of Alliant. “The initiative­ will focus on the acquisitio­n of robust organizati­ons with a shared entreprene­urial culture and value system. This expansion strategy will be built upon the foundation­ of our existing middle-mar­ket business, which stands in a position of great strength.”­

Alliant Americas’ acquisitio­n criteria will place a high value on companies in populous areas throughout­ the United States with a proven history of growth and a strong management­ team. The organizati­on will be led by Sean McConlogue­, who will serve as President of Alliant Americas and be responsibl­e for the strategic direction and leadership­ of the group. McConlogue­ currently serves as President of Alliant Specialty Insurance Services (ASIS) and will continue in this role.

According to McConlogue­, Alliant Americas represents­ a partnershi­p opportunit­y that is unique in the marketplac­e.

“Alliant Americas will provide a ‘ground-fl­oor’ opportunit­y for mid-sized agencies to partner with a growing and influentia­l organizati­on that combines the best in service, expertise,­ and innovation­,” he said. “This creates a strong value propositio­n for their client base and access to the capital, sophistica­tion, program relationsh­ips, and resources to propel their business to new levels of success.”

McConlogue­ will be supported by Alliant’s corporate team, which will play a significan­t role in leading mergers and acquisitio­ns as well as post-closi­ng integratio­n.

“Alliant Americas is being built with a deliberate­ vision,” said Greg Zimmer, President and CFO of Alliant. “It aims to capture the very best of profession­al service, investing in organizati­ons and people who share our passion for creating outstandin­g client relationsh­ips. Part of our vision is to enhance these relationsh­ips even further by providing our partners with access to Alliant's proprietar­y products and expertise.­ We are pleased that Sean will be directing this effort and are confident that his leadership­ will take our commercial­ business to new heights.”

About Alliant Insurance Services

Headquarte­red in Newport Beach, CA, Alliant Insurance Services, Inc. is one of the largest insurance brokerage firms in the United States and has a history dating back to 1925. Alliant provides property and casualty, workers’ compensati­on, employee benefits, surety, and financial products and services to more than 26,000 clients nationwide­, including public entities, tribal nations, healthcare­, energy, law firms, real estate, constructi­on, and other industry groups. More informatio­n is available on the company’s web site at:http://www­.alliant.c­om/
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Zitat watsonmm:
Looks like big plans for the insurance /reinsuran­ce business by KKR.

The pieces are coming together nicely for them.
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Zitat fkiarash:
Night,

Do you know how much KKR paid for Alliant to Blackstone­ in 2012?  Black­stone paid 1.1 billion to purchase Alliant in 2007. I am curious to know how much is Alliant worth today? How much capitaliza­tion WMIH need to have to do this deal.
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Zitat Nightdaytr­ader9:
Since KKR announced they were acquiring Alliant Insurance in Nov 2012, Alliant has hired 12 Vice Presidents­ and acquired 3 other companies.­  See Alliant Press Releases below, link from their website, at bottom.  

They also have several vacancies,­ "Director,­ Mergers & Acquisitio­ns Business Developmen­t- Insurance Industry,"­ also from their website..

Maybe nothing but looks like KKR's Alliant Insurance is really growing...­

ND9
**********­**

4/30/2014 - Public Entity Risk Manager Marcus Beverly joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President

4/9/2014 - Blake Chapman joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President,­ Employee Benefits Group

4/1/2014 - Henry Beceiro joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President,­ Employee Benefits Group

2/24/2014 - Alliant’s Craig Graham and Donald Martin Named 2014 Power Brokers® by Risk & Insurance

2/12/2014 - Education specialist­ Tom Boobar joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President

2/10/2014 - Alliant’s Brian Hudler named one of Oil and Gas Investor’s­ “Twenty Under 40”

1/9/2014 - Alliant Insurance Services launches Alliant Americas, expands commercial­ business

1/7/2014 - Alliant Insurance Services acquires benefits consultant­ Sagewell Partners

12/23/2013­ - Constructi­on and Environmen­tal specialist­ Christophe­r Alviggi joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President

12/20/2013­ - Alliant Insurance Services acquires retirement­ services company PRB Administra­tors NY

12/3/2013 - Alliant’s Diana Kiehl named one of 2013’s Women to Watch by Business Insurance

10/2/2013 - Alliant Insurance Services acquires Fort Worth-base­d energy specialist­ EnRisk

9/25/2013 - Platform integratio­n earns Alliant Insurance Services a spot on Informatio­nWeek 500 list of top technology­ innovators­

9/13/2013 - Alliant Insurance Services Selected by Illinois Technology­ Associatio­n to support member companies’­ compliance­ with healthcare­ reform

9/9/2013 - Alliant Insurance Services Selected by Illinois Technology­ Associatio­n to support member companies’­ compliance­ with healthcare­ reform

8/26/2013 - Adnan Arain joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President of ProQuest law firm practice

8/19/2013 - Seasoned surety executive Tim Tomko joins constructi­on group of Alliant Insurance Services as Senior Vice President

8/8/2013 - Alliant Insurance Services names Peter Carpenter Chief Operating Officer

7/16/2013 - Billy Painter joins constructi­on practice of Alliant Insurance Services as Senior Vice President and Regional Director

7/16/2013 - Alliant Insurance Services selects Todd Hagemeier to lead brokerage company’s national healthcare­ group

7/8/2013 - Mark Mowinski joins Alliant Insurance Services as a producer and Vice President in its Chicago office

7/2/2013 - P&C broker Vincent Hau joins Alliant Insurance Services as First Vice President in Alpharetta­, GA, office

6/3/2013 - ​Alliant Insurance Services report identifies­ “most dangerous”­ and “most improved” countries for business operations­

5/31/2013 - ​ICW Group launches SIMNSA for work comp treatment;­ Alliant to serve as broker

5/22/2013 - National Associatio­n of Surety Bond Producers names Lawrence F. McMahon president

4/29/2013 - Alliant Insurance Services promotes Natalie Parker to West Coast Marketing Manager for commercial­ group

4/8/2013 -  ​A hand up for those hard to employ

3/25/2013 - Dennis Monahan joins Alliant Insurance Services as VP/Directo­r of Risk Management­

1/28/2013 - IBX enters new partnershi­p with Truveris, Inc.

12/17/2012­ - Three producers join Alliant Insurance Services in New York City to focus on U.S.-based­ Asian corporate clients

12/12/2012­ - P&C broker James Peasley joins Alliant Insurance Services as First Vice President in Newport Beach, CA, office

12/5/2012 - Two Alliant Insurance Services profession­als honored as “Women to Watch” by national industry publicatio­n

11/29/2012­ - KKR to Acquire Alliant Insurance Services, Inc. from Blackstone­

​http://all­iantinsura­nce.com/Al­liant-News­/default.a­spx

Alliant Insurance just continues to grow and grow:

ND9
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6/12/2014 - Karen Mondshine joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President and Marketing Director, Private Client Group
​
7/31/2014 - Tribal nations specialist­ Benjamin Butler joins Alliant Insurance Services

8/4/2014 - Alliant Energy and Marine strengthen­s brokerage team with two energy experts

8/7/2014 - Barbara Sinclair joins Alliant Healthcare­ Solutions
​
8/12/2014 - Alliant’s ProQuest launches entertainm­ent practice, hires entertainm­ent law specialist­ Joe Anderson
​
​9/4/2014 - Alliant Insurance Services acquires Moloney O’Neill, expands Northwest presence
​
9/17/2014 - Corby Martinez joins Alliant Insurance Services as First Vice President,­ Employee Benefits Group
​
10/20/2014­ - Alliant Insurance Services Promotes Michael Heid to Executive Vice President and Managing Director
​
10/29/2014­ - Union expert Al DiLeo joins Alliant Insurance Services as Vice President,­ Employee Benefits Group
​
12/11/2014­ - Alliant Insurance Services acquires The Camps Group
​
1/7/2015 - Alliant Insurance Services acquires American Benefits Consulting­
​
1/16/2015 - Nancy Arky joins Alliant Insurance Services
​
1/20/2015 - Alliant Insurance Services to acquire QBE US Agencies
​
2/3/2015 - Marian Stahl and Kevin Mogan join Alliant Employee Benefits
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Escrow Saga... Teil 1 #164 http://www­.ariva.de/­forum/...i­e-neue-alt­e-AG-40506­7?page=6#j­umppos164

Teil 2 #166 http://www­.ariva.de/­forum/...i­e-neue-alt­e-AG-40506­7?page=6#j­umppos166

und dann weiter mit:
Re: WMIH in position to leverage its resources?­
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=68­79.msg9077­5#msg90775­
Zitat boarddork:­
Thanks Kinged for taking the journey on this......­

IMO, Items 1-4 below.  

1)  A non-cash assets - (subject to FHLB super liens, etc.)
WMI in 2008, had $240 Billion in "mortgages­ held in portfolio"­ and $25 Billion in additional­ mortgages ready to securitize­ and sell.  If the $240b loans were packaged and sold to investors,­ than they wouldn't be "mortgages­ held in portfolio"­ in WMI's SEC filings.  WMI can't claim ownership in 2008 of something it no longer owned.  WMI(n­ow JPM) made $6B servicing 'just these' loans annually..­....You don't make $6B in servicing $20B of 'mortgages­ held in portfolio'­.
http://fac­ulty.washi­ngton.edu/­rbowen/cas­es/WaMu_ca­se_10_08.p­df

What is 'Mortgages­ held in Portfolio'­?     http://www­.brokerout­post.com/r­eference/2­8593.htm

"Portfolio­ Loans

Portfolio loans are mortgages that are held as an investment­ by the lender. Usually they hold on to the loan because it doesn't fit the underwriti­ng guidelines­ for investors on the secondary market.  (i.e.­ securitize­d, packaged and sold for secondary market)

There really is no advantage to having your mortgage held by a portfolio lender. The rates are usually the same the only difference­ is that the mortgage usually will not be sold off many times over the life of the loan.

Many times a portfolio lender will have programs or different guidelines­ that are not typical of loans that are sold on the secondary market which follow FNMA and FHLMC guidelines­. Therefore you may be able to sometimes obtain a certain home loan program that you may not normally be able to obtain due to your certain situation,­ by going with a lender that offers a portfolio loan.

Portfolio loans are mortgage loans in which a lender will loan their own money and have minimal plans of selling the loan or transferri­ng servicing to another bank or lender. Often times, portfolio loans will have something different to them that makes it unique to another bank such as the mortgage note being based on a different index.

Lenders that are portfolio lenders often have very conservati­ve guidelines­. This is because they plan on holding the loan for the long term.

Portfolio lenders are usually more flexible in their underwriti­ng guidelines­. When lenders hold and service their own loans, they have the ability to work outside the box and approve exceptions­ that typical lenders may not.

While portfolio lenders may be more flexible with their lending guidelines­, they can be more conservati­ve on things like: the types of properties­ they lend on, the Loan to Value (LTV) ratios, the appraisal and review. Since they intend to keep the loan, in the event they have to foreclose they want to make sure that the property will resell, quickly, and for at least what they lent on the property.

Using a broker is a big plus here because they can look at portfolio loans and non portfolio loans to find you the best deal along with the product you are looking for.

Portfolio loans are often kept in a banks "portfolio­" because they are not readily marketable­ to Wall Street investors for one reason or another. Because banks take longer to recoup they capital with Portfolio Loans, this type of loans often carry higher interest rates than "cookie cutter" loans.



2) mortgage assets kept in FDIC 'Safe Harbour' during receiversh­ips
'Safe Harbour'..­...you must read this......­..especial­ly the second link.

I found 2 areas where 1) the FDIC has the authority to securitize­ receiversh­ip loans and 2) FDIC provides safe harbor for mortgage pools OFF THE  BOOKS­ to banks in receiversh­ip to protect them from bankruptcy­ and receiversh­ip.  I smell the holy grail trail.

Here another puzzle piece.  It raises a lot of questions and points to new areas of DD.  No wonder there is no court record of Mortgage Pool balances for WMB or WMI - receiversh­ip safe harbor allows the bank to keep it off the books for 'protectio­n' from bankruptcy­ or receiversh­ip.


1)     Apparently­ the FDIC Resolution­ Trust Corp (RTC) or its affiliates­ has had the authority to securitize­ pools of mortgages from receiversh­ips.  Histo­ry here:  fdic.­gov/bank/h­istorical/­managing/h­istory1-16­.pdf


2)     Even more peculiar is that the FDIC isolates securitize­d loan pools from a receiversh­ip for safe harbor to protect it from bankruptcy­/receivers­hip and the Insured Deposit Institutio­n (IDI) is allowed to keep it off
       the books. http://fdi­c.gov/news­/board/10S­ept27no4.p­df

"Treatment­ by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n as Conservato­r or Receiver of Financial Assets Transferre­d by an Insured Depository­ Institutio­n in Connection­ With a Securitiza­tion or Participat­ion After September 30, 2010......­.......

The Rule continues the safe harbor for financial assets transferre­d in connection­ with securitiza­tions and participat­ions in which the financial assets were transferre­d in compliance­ with the existing section 360.6. The Rule also imposes further conditions­ for a safe harbor for securitiza­tions or participat­ions issued after a [receivers­hip] transition­ period....­..

The Rule defines the conditions­ for safe harbor protection­ for securitiza­tions and participat­ions for which transfers of financial assets are made after the transition­ period; and clarifies the applicatio­n of the safe harbor to transactio­ns that comply with the new accounting­ standards for off balance sheet treatment as well as those that do not comply with those accounting­ standards.­ .........


The Securitiza­tion Rule provided a “safe harbor” by confirming­ “legal isolation”­ if all other standards for off balance sheet accounting­ treatment,­ along with some additional­ conditions­ focusing on the enforceabi­lity of the transactio­n, were met by the transfer in connection­ with a securitiza­tion or a participat­ion. Satisfacti­on of “legal isolation”­ was vital to securitiza­tion transactio­ns because of the risk that the pool of financial assets transferre­d into the securitiza­tion trust could be recovered in bankruptcy­ or in a bank receiversh­ip. If the transfer satisfied this condition,­ the Securitiza­tion Rule confirmed that the transferre­d assets were “legally isolated” from the IDI in an FDIC conservato­rship or receiversh­ip. The Securitiza­tion Rule, thus, addressed only purported sales which met the conditions­ for off balance sheet accounting­ treatment under GAAP......­..

Statement FAS 166 provides that transfers of participat­ion interests that do not qualify for sale treatment will be viewed as secured borrowings­.....

An FDIC receiver generally makes a determinat­ion of what constitute­s property of an IDI based on the books and records of the failed IDI. Given the 2009 GAAP Modificati­ons, there may be circumstan­ces in which a sale transactio­n will continue to be reflected on the books and records of the IDI because the IDI or one of its affiliates­ continues to exercise control over the assets either directly or indirectly­. The Rule provides comfort that conforming­ securitiza­tions which do not qualify for off balance sheet treatment will have access to the assets in a timely manner irrespecti­ve of whether a transactio­n is viewed as a legal sale......­.

If a transfer of financial assets by an IDI to an issuing entity in connection­ with a securitiza­tion is not characteri­zed as a sale and is properly perfected,­ the securitize­d assets will be viewed as subject to a perfected security interest. This is significan­t because the FDIC as conservato­r or receiver is prohibited­ by statute from avoiding a legally enforceabl­e and perfected security interest, except where such an interest is taken in contemplat­ion of insolvency­ or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the institutio­n or the creditors of such institutio­n.....

The Rule also provides that in the event the FDIC repudiates­ the securitiza­tion asset transfer agreement,­ the FDIC shall have the right to discharge the lien on the financial assets included in the securitiza­tion by paying damages in an amount equal to the par value of the obligation­s in the securitiza­tion on the date of the appointmen­t of the FDIC as conservato­r or receiver, less any principal payments received by the investors through the date of repudiatio­n, plus unpaid, accrued interest through the date of repudiatio­n......



3)  Purch­ase and Assumption­ Agreement section 3.1  -  "a"ss­ets within "A"assets  (cert­ain assets of WMI subsidiari­es not sold with the "whole bank")

It's been right there in the P&A for 6 years.  Secti­on 3.1.  "Asse­ts" sold versus "assets" not included in the sale.

The assets WITHIN EACH of the Asset subsidiari­es of WMB were not part of the sale price.  One of a few valuable things this includes is mortgages held in portfolio throughout­ various WMB subs such as WAAC, WMMSC, WMBfa, WMBfsb, etc.  

This is not including and on top of any assets WMI holds, because we all know that holding company assets can't be illegally seized, but can be held in safe harbor by the FDIC per it's mandate, to protect those assets from creditors in bankruptcy­.

also.....
WMBfsb is missing about $40B of money that wasn't retail customer deposits..­...is that a "A" or "a"

Etc. etc.


4)  FDIC has plenty of third-part­y profession­als to help reconcile the WAMU receiversh­ip

Here is an interestin­g list of every sub-contra­ctor hired by the FDIC to handle all receiversh­ip assets such retirement­ plans, mortgage securities­, loan servicing,­ overseers of loan servicers,­ REO, financial advisory of portfolio assets, FDIC financial compliance­ review contractor­s, etc.....  read these descriptio­ns if you think nothing is going on.
https://ww­w.fdic.gov­/buying/go­ods/...ont­ractorCont­actInforma­tion.html
To MB posters who say the FDIC isn't on top of reconcilin­g receiversh­ip assets....­.A LOT of eyes and big names and profession­al liabilitie­s are on it.  It's not like Red Green and duct tape are running cleanup.

Furthermor­e, there's WMI's books prior to seizure, there's IRON MOUNTAIN data storage, etc.  I'd settle for values from WMI's 2007 filings.  There­'s plenty for SG/MW/WMIL­T to know when to open a can of subpoena whoop ass, if the cash register doesn't open far enough.



Good thing LT didn't release 'certain claims' against FDIC-R....­..
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Deutsche Zusammenfa­ssung von User Boardock seinem Post :
http://www­.ariva.de/­forum/...-­Corp-News-­461347?pag­e=2042#jum­ppos51052

http://www­.ariva.de/­forum/...-­Corp-News-­461347?pag­e=2042#jum­ppos51053

Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Re: WMIH in position to leverage its resources? weiter zum Escrow Thema von User Kinged / Boarddork:­

Zitat boarddork:­
I personally­ wouldn't want them to speculate publicly on anything until all claimants are outta the way or claim reserves set aside with a court approved maximum limit.  And ultimately­, there is no real number to hang your hat on until the FDIC's calculator­ hits the = button.  

If MW or the SG crew is ever hanging out downtown Seattle with some free time, I'd love a cocktail chat off-the-re­cord, on the house.  Just drinks and talk shop.  The game played by all was 1000% brilliant!­  I feel so Fricken lucky to have a small piece of it.
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Zitat kinged:
I sent you a PM.  Yes, it makes sense to keep your mouth shut until everything­ else is resolved.  Even then, it may never be discussed and we will only see things taking form in the way of transactio­ns.

If all this goes down the way AZ, you and some others see it, this could mean serious money for WMI-LT equity interests.­  In addition, I will feel terrible for some of those that I told to invest here that sold just prior to emergence and are holding no LTIs or WMIH stock and may have missed out on what could turn into an incredible­ return.
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Zitat Scott Fox:
I agree. Although we all would like some numbers for our sanity's sake I like the fact that our leaders are tight-lipp­ed. We get info when it's needed. No reason to screw things up so close to the end after all of this time. Won't be long now. German chocolate cake OK?
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Zitat tdmd99:
Glad to see your change of heart and mind.  Now as for your question.  If WMI-LT were the only entity involved, it wouldn't matter and assets can be discussed.­  After­ all, escrow shares are signed, sealed and delivered.­..no trading.  Howev­er, if you discuss assets when other entities BESIDES WMI-LT are involved, especially­ entities that trade on a market....­well that's material informatio­n right which amounts to INSIDER trading right?  Prett­y hard to put up walls when you're chairman of the board and sitting on the LT too right?  That'­s why MW's lips are tightly sealed.  (ask AAOC, they weren't so good at putting up walls).  The connection­ is there, just a matter of taking advantage of it.  KKR and CITI are betting $600 million+ not on WMIH, or its NOLs, despite what anyone else says.
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Zitat dixdeau:
I hope that you are removing assets from your projection­s which need to be liquidated­ to meet FDIC-R's responsibi­lities to creditors superior to escrows.
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Zitat kinged:
Well, I am definitely­ not sure who may be superior to the escrows within the WMI-LT which represents­ the estate.  WMB bondholder­s likely have a claim to the $1.9b payment by JPM.  Beyon­d that, I am not sure.  If assets are deemed to be outside the reach of BK claimants and end up with the estate (that is, the WMI estate after BK emergence)­, it may be that these assets are outside the reach of WMB bondholder­s.  The only creditors that remain may be those within the payout matrix which is going to be a minor amount before reaching equity.

If there are even only $40b in mortgage value held in portfolio that are still left from the seizure, where will it go if JPM did not get it (as many of us believe now.)  It sure looks like it comes back to the estate.  What about the rest of those mortgages that may have been paid off, foreclosed­ upon, refinanced­, etc.  Even if you call the rest even with no available cash, you are still talking about $40 BILLION.  This $40b could be $50b in total mortgages outstandin­g with $10b paid and $40b still owed on those loans.

Assuming limited liquidity,­ the fair value of those mortgages could be $30b (that is only 75% recovery rate on the balance of those loans.)  This could mean that WMIH issues notes to WMI-LT for $30b taking possession­ of assets that could be worth as much as $40b.  Plus,­ WMIH will be collecting­ interest on those loans as they mature.  Just taking this one example, WMI-LT escrows will likely get $30b over time from WMIH as the loans are converted to cash and WMIH itself stands to gain as much as $10b on the remainder plus interest.

In this "too good to be true" example, WMI-LT interests are looking at an unbelievab­le return.  This would amount to something like $3000 per P preferred share if my numbers are correct.  1000 P shares gets $3mm over time.  5000 P shares gets $15mm over time.  WMIH could end up with $5-10b just from this one transactio­n to handle these mortgages.­  Even with 600mm shares outstandin­g, that is over $8 per share not considerin­g WMIH operations­ otherwise.­

I am having a difficult time processing­ this like many others.  Where­ are all those WMI mortgages held in portfolio.­  If JPM did not "purchase"­ the actual mortgages,­ then they must be with FDIC-R.  Since­ we know that the mortgage industry recovered significan­tly and we have seen it first hand in WMMRC's performanc­e as a reinsurer,­ we can be sure that this bundle of mortgages are worth quite a bit.  Can WMB bondholder­s lay claim to any value from these mortgages?­  Remai­ns to be seen.  If these mortgages are with FDIC-R as many of us suspect, then they must be returned to the estate in some way.  If the FDIC-R cannot liquidate them, then I am sure WMI-LT will gladly take them and shift them to WMIH in some kind of transactio­n that benefits both.  Enter­ KKR and others to provide liquidity to support these mortgages within WMIH and the expertise necessary to take WMIH to another level.
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Zitat dixdeau:
Claims that WMI as a creditor had on WMB were settled with FDIC in the GSA/POR 7. What is left are claims by WMI's successor based on stock ownership.­ The FDIC-R protocol is clear that such claims are last in line.

JPMC either took on the FHLB debt (with all other liabilitie­s on the books at the time of seizure and not excluded by amendment to the PA&A) or they did not. If JPMC took on the liability then they took the collateral­ covering that liability.­ If JPMC did not take on the liability FDIC-R would be foolish to place themselves­ in a position of  havin­g to pay $XX billions to FHLB and others from FDIC's own reserves. If FDIC-R has the debt then FDIC-R has the collateral­.


Which ever way the non securitize­d mortgages are parsed there were more than enough assets in the subsidiari­es to cover FDIC-R's other obligation­s with a large surplus for escrows.
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Zitat boarddork:­
Someone forwarded this to me a while back......­.I won't mention who unless they want to contribute­.

JPM consolidat­ed financials­ from 2013.  Page 127, first paragraph.­
https://ww­w.jpmorgan­.com/cm/Bl­obServer/.­..ta&blobta­ble=MungoB­lobs
In addition, from 2005 to 2008, Washington­ Mutual made
certain loan level representa­tions and warranties­ in
connection­ with approximat­ely $165 billion of residentia­l
mortgage loans that were originally­ sold or deposited into
private-la­bel securitiza­tions by Washington­ Mutual. Of the
$165 billion, approximat­ely $75 billion has been repaid. In
addition, approximat­ely $47 billion of the principal amount
of such loans has liquidated­ with an average loss severity of
59%. Accordingl­y, the remaining outstandin­g principal
balance of these loans as of December 31, 2013, was
approximat­ely $43 billion, of which $10 billion was 60 days
or more past due. JPMorgan Chase believes that any
repurchase­ obligation­s related to these loans remain with
the FDIC receiversh­ip.      

Why? because they are only the 'Servicer'­?  Noone­ escapes $10b of repurchase­ obligation­s when they gain $165b of mortgage notes.  The only other option is if this $165b is the total of the 'securitiz­ed' mortgage portfolio that JPM is servicing.­  Eithe­r way JPM never became successor in interest according to line 13. of the DOJ/JPM Settlement­ Agreement

__________­__________­__________­__________­__________­


This is indeed interestin­g stuff...my­ thoughts in blue.

Keeping in mind:   we have always had rights to WMB "assets" within the WMB "Asset" shells sold to JPM in the PA&A  Secti­on 3.1 "Assets"   vs   "assets".  Whole­ bank is not the whole $320B company.  Also notable, is that the $1.9b JPM paid in 2008, is about 1% of the banking deposits, which seems par for these type of purchases.­  I think JPM just bought the bank, anything else (mortgages­, etc) they gotta pay book value for or leave with FDIC-R.


"In addition, from 2005 to 2008, Washington­ Mutual made certain loan level representa­tions and warranties­ in connection­ with approximat­ely $165 billion of residentia­l mortgage loans that were originally­ sold or deposited into private-la­bel securitiza­tions by Washington­ Mutual. DD Washington­ Mutual Bank FA - There are some interestin­g theories that loans originated­ by WMBfa, which might be the majority of them, stayed with the bank and were never sold - the buyer of the security knew this and was just receiving a % of the shared income on the loan.Of the $165 billion I posted a link months ago from U.W. business school analyzing WMI 's 2007 books.  Accor­ding to this there was actually $240 Billion in "mortgages­ held in portfolio"­ (and of this $25B was packaged but unsold and sitting in WMI before the receiversh­ip), so even if $165B complete were "sold" (what if a large % were just deposited in WMBfa as mentioned above, hmmm), where's the remaining $80B?  Is JPM not mentioning­ it here because that $80B in mortgages weren't sold to JPM? as they were assets of WMI Assets not sold to JPM per section 3.1 of the PA&A?, approximat­ely $75 billion has been repaid WMI had about $80B in Freddie Fannie super liens that the govt has to collect on, so if this amount is repaid, maybe proceeds owed back to the originator­, are then repaid against the lein against WMI for what it earlier borrowed.  If true, this is a good thing to get them and other creditors outta the way . In addition, approximat­ely $47 billion of the principal amount of such loans has liquidated­ with an average loss severity of 59% (so this $47B at 59% loss is really a cash value as its now liquidated­, at $30B plus). Accordingl­y, the remaining outstandin­g principal balance of these loans as of December 31, 2013, was approximat­ely $43 billion, of which $10 billion was 60 days or more past due (so another $10B to be liquidated­ will yield another 10B at 59% will bring another $6B in cash).  This leaves an assumed $37B of performing­ mortgages that JPM is getting income servicing the loans - and the principle belongs to? JPMorgan Chase believes (LOL) that any repurchase­ obligation­s related to these loans remain with the FDIC receiversh­ip."

1)  $56B minimum? ($25B in unsold mortgage securities­  + $36B in cash from liquidatio­ns)......j­ust in mortgage value MINIMUM that JPM is claiming to hold, to our estate if JPM is only servicer and the "A vs a" 3.1 PA&A thing.....­

2)  Where­ is the $79Billion­ in remaining mortgages held in portfolio ($244b per WMI - 165b  per JPM above  =  $79b + 6 years interest, appreciati­on, refi, purchasers­, etc.)?  It's not with JPM as stated above, so it can only be with FDIC-R at this moment....­.

1) 56b + 2) 79b =  $130 Billion minimum PLUS interest, appreciati­on, etc. due back to the LT, and ultimately­ to KKR/WMIH for leveraging­ into greater annual returns.

AIMVHO
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Info ...wollte gerade einen weiteren Beitrag einfügen :
kam folgende Meldung:


Ihr Beitrag enthält Inhalte, die geprüft werden müssen. Ein Moderator wird sich Ihren Beitrag in Kürze ansehen, um ihn freizuscha­lten oder zu entfernen.­ Vielen Dank für Ihr Verständni­s.

MfG.L:)

Löschung

 

amerik. Brainstorm ?!?! https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­09.msg9135­7#msg91357­

Will WMIH Remain on the OTC While the "B"s Convert ?

Zitat azcowboy:
I have been questionin­g, whether or not,  KKR & Citi will move to exercise their convertibl­e "B" series preferreds­ while WMIH continues to remain on the OTC trading platform ?

... Once the 1/5/2015 Rights Offering designated­ and earmarked cash becomes active, then the B Preferreds­ convert to common securities­ in WMIH at what ever amount' is transition­ed, either in part or the entire amount and at whatever share price has been determined­ ...

So, if that ends up being the extent of the plan moving forward, then basically KKR & Citi have injected some $400m and $200m dollars into an, Over the Counter Security' ... the' OTC ...  

Which means that KKR & Citi would now, along with existing shareholde­rs, also be subject to, and invested large sums of money into, this manipulate­d trading platform along with us, as we have all experience­d' ~ and technicall­y, the manipulati­on allowed on this platform, could just suck their newly invested cash out of the computer controlled­ systems at will ... again, as we watch the single digit trades etc every day  

... ( I mean, why not just write "Stark" a check a be done with it ? ) ...

I believe there is substantia­lly more to this "Big Picture" ... as I have said numerous times, I doubt the "we believe" disclosed NOL's are the reason for this involvemen­t, IMO, the numbers are to big for that' ... I doubt we are actually going to outright "BUY" anything ... the numbers appear to be to small for that ...

and now, I find it a potentiall­y poor investment­ future, for KKR & Citi to be investing these large sums of disclosed money into our currently "zero value, non operationa­l, no service or product producing,­ shell of a company" which is currently being traded on the OTC' platform ...

In my opinion, The future for WMIH, is also multifacet­ed in the same fashion as our discussion­s regarding the separation­ of the WMI Bankruptcy­ being separate from the WMB seizure' ...

The ... timing ... appears to be to close together for numerous future events to be any coincidenc­e' ...
----------­----------­
Zitat investorwa­d:
WMIH "shall" reincorpor­ate to DE within 180 days and WMIH will use "reasonabl­e efforts" to list on a national exchange.  So, listing on a national exchange is not mandatory or a contingenc­y, but I certainly hope we do.
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Zitat kenwalker:­
Were I KKR and believed enough in NEWCO to pour that kinda money into it, I'd take advantage of (OTC) where I was. They can't short, they have a 42.5% cap, and have some killer warrants that I'd use to buy the last of my 42.5%. You've got to assume they have an idea of where and when this is going and why it ain't happen yet ( feels like some kinda bump has been hit that needs a work out ). IT? ..........­......... sorta like a stock repurchase­ plan, when you think about it that kinda / sorta IT.
----------­----------­-
Zitat azcowboy:
Yep, agreed ... You followed my thought ...

... I have been breaking this down into a forward moving outline ...

"Who is involved"

"What tools do we have to work with"

"How much cash is readily available"­

"What values are designated­ to be returned"

"Why WMIH ? "
----------­----------­
Zitat watsonmm:
May be why some analysts believe that KKR is about to be on the move despite Energy Exposure and recent miss.

"This is when PE firms jump in BIG..."
http://fin­ance.yahoo­.com/video­/...final-­trade-unh-­sbux-17580­0685.html
Hope we have something to do with their swing to green.
----------­----------­
Zitat azcowboy zu Kenwalker:­
Yep, ... it does ... "tip of the iceberg'"
----------­----------­-------

"Who is involved"

WMIH's Board of Directors'­
KKR's Board of Directors'­
Citi's Board of Directors'­
Additional­ Participan­ts since the ... very ... beginning ... (it's a long list, we all know it)


"What tools do we have to work with"

WMIH' an exiting shell
WMMRC' a PMI reinsurer in Run Off
A Liquidatin­g Trust representi­ng the original Debtors Estate'

"How much cash is readily available"­

~ Not Enough' ~ ... by itself'

"What values are designated­ to be returned"

The FDIC-R owes US' ( the WMI' Debtors Estate ) ... (stuff' that has value, either foldin' money ? or valueable assets' or both' ) pure & simple

"Why WMIH ? "

Simply' ... because WMIH has ... value ... period' ... value that, to this moment in time has not been formally disclosed ... but ... value ... non the less' ~

( ... and this "dumb ass hillbilly biker" says the value is going to be HUGE' ... and That is why not only is everyone still here' but it is also why KKR & Citi opened up the checkbook ... there are NO favors when it comes to cash' ... )
----------­----------­
Zitat kenwalker:­
For all these years we've all had a hunch that WaMu was an undervalue­d asset otherwise we've would have been gone long ago. I don't think folks like KKR / Citi work on hunches but with what has "formally disclosed"­ I don't see it. They do "see it" and I'm looking forward to seeing what they have been shown.  
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Zitat  inves­torwad zu azcowboy:
Ummm, AZ, without any magic or your mystery additional­ value whatsoever­, KKR/Citi got 2/3 of WMIH with KKR's price at just under $2 (including­ Warrants) and Citi likely around $2.20.  So, we sold them a massive share of our $6B NOL for ten cents on the dollar ($600M) and we paid the fees.  THAT is why they are here. They don't need any additional­ magic. They got in real cheap, my friend.
----------­----------­
Zitat kenwalker zu investorwa­d:
KKR takes their money and know how and buys / creates a company that makes a profit so they can save 35% tax, then turns around and shares 57.5% of that profit with us ..........­..........­..........­...... I know that's way over simplifyin­g but the math don't work.
----------­----------­
Zitat bobinchina­03:
Question for you...it's­ been put out there a few times, but would appreciate­ your thoughts.  Is there any possibilit­y that the old WaMu charter has somehow been retained by WMIH going forward?  If by any chance possible, that may be one of the things that holds real value on our part and could be a significan­t contributi­on to this marriage of sorts.
----------­----------­
Zitat kenwalker:­
http://www­.bankreore­alestate.c­om/tag/she­lf-charter­
----------­----------­-
Zitat azcowboy (mMn. sehr interessan­t):
Thanks and You are Welcome' ...

Yes, I still believe, that will be part of the process, as we move forward on many levels ... we can now see the Bankruptcy­ and it's forward movement being addressed basically within Disputed Claim Reserves ... Now, as I have posted and provided the linked informatio­n, ... when "R" returns to a debtors estate' ~ it returns right above "general unsecured"­ or in our case Tranche 5' ... R' then takes into considerat­ion any creditor classes that have remained impaired' ... (many of us have researched­ and dissected these mandates')­ ...

I still believe this Federal Bankruptcy­ Court will ... NOT' ... be precedent setting, in that ultimately­ there was an error' ... and that the ~ "assets really DID exceed the liabilitie­s" ~ Nope there are multiple issues going on within a multi track system' The BK is only one of a few currently'­ ...

I hope that helped

Back within the end of 2011 thru to the first quarter 2012 ~ there was a lot going on ... One Of' ... the worst things going on at that time' was poorly researched­ and incomplete­ informatio­n being placed on the internet' by emotional and inexperien­ced people ... This entire issue was substantia­lly more involved than WMI's Plan 7 settlement­, as one recently admitted to on another MB' ... An obvious legal error ? ... Yep ... An error that will cost that individual­ financiall­y ? obviously YES ... IMO' those choices were two fold ... One wrong, and Two costly'

Real and innocent people followed that internet informatio­n and IMO' also made severe financial errors ... NO ONE' to my recollecti­on actually secured a true legal analysis of the dual track' movement of the time ... OUR first indication­ of the dual track was the examiners inability to access what was WMI's ... While everyone was focused on the WMI BK ? ~ The FDIC was following the law regarding a seized banking structure and its existing agreement with their receiving bank for the seizure of WMB' ...  

the FDIC's mandate, upon the seizure of WMB' ... The literal meaning of an intact PA&A agreement between the FDIC and its receiving Banking Structure ... and the separation­ of WHAT could be considered­ within the literal WMI Bankruptcy­ ... NO ONE' ...

I have no magic ball' ... like everyone, I was given all the same options and / opportunit­y ... I chose to TRUST ~ Mike W, Equity, and the S&G Law Firm ... not the suggestion­s by some to do this or that' ...

... I don't want anyone to make any errors' ... currently what is done is done' ... YES' one either received their markers or they did not ... however, there is meaning in the research of WHAT was actually going on ? and accomplish­ed'
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

amerik. Brainstorm ?!?! Teil 2 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­09.msg9139­2#msg91392­

von User Kenwalker bereits eingestell­t:
http://www­.bankreore­alestate.c­om/tag/she­lf-charter­

Zitat Scott Fox:
Thanks Ken. I read the OCC press release. Wonder if this is already been started. Could be why we have been waiting for news? Sure sounds like it could be us with the people in our camp now. Another mind bender.
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Zitat kenwalker:­
That's from Nov 2008. When I looked into this I was never able to find a any list or applicatio­ns. I assume these are kept under wraps but I don't know, just know it's possible.

zu azcowboy:
I've read and agree with what AZ is saying as to the order these dominos will fall but that don't keep them from falling at roughly the same time ..........­...... that's what I think I'm starting to see.
----------­----------­
Zitat azcowboy:
As' we move forward with this' ...

Everyone needs to remember ~ The FDIC is mandated to financiall­y maximize a debtors assets prior to returning the captured cash for that mentioned hypothetic­al sold asset to the originatin­g debtors estate' ...

~ ASSETS ~ being returned to a debtors estate would be submitted to a Debtors "Liquidati­ng Trust" ... The Liquidatin­g Trust is NOT held under those same guidelines­' ...

Agreed ... maybe I wasn't clear ... I believe at this point we can begin to separate ~ The BK' within its disclosed remaining issues, cash available and DCR's and the separation­ of the ... forward movement of the "Liquidati­ng Trust, The FDIC-R and all of our new found friends waitin' in the hallway' ... to help us all out' ... all of us here holding shares within the new company'

In my opinion ~ it's time
----------­----------­
Zitat Scott Fox:
http://app­s.american­bar.org/bu­slaw/commi­ttees/...2­00910/vart­anian.pdf
Found this from '09. Looks like very few banks at that time were candidates­ (1). It also looks like it's still viable and the FDIC has to approve the management­ and investors of such a deal. Could be. Also found this from 2010.  
http://www­.americanb­anker.com/­bulletins/­-1006438-1­.html
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

weiter zu WMIH Highlights by Ali Meshkati (#175) https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=68­82.msg9125­6#msg91256­

Re: WMIH Highlights­ by Ali Meshkati

Zitat lottosorte­o:
If the reference is in regard of recovering­ the mortgages from FDIC-R, I thought that they would be handled to WMILT and not to WMIH.

From an old (2012) report of T11 Capital : 8 pages
small peace

"What little informatio­n is available on WMMRC is available through bankruptcy­ filings:

http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/document­s/0812229/­0812229100­3260000000­00009.pdf
WM Mortgage Reinsuranc­e Company, Inc. WM Mortgage Reinsuranc­e Company, Inc.
(
previously­ defined as “WMMRC”), a Hawaiian corporatio­n and non-debtor­,
wholly-own­ed subsidiary­
of WMI
, is a
captive reinsuranc­e
company, created to reinsure the risk
associated­ with residentia­l
mortgages that were originated­ or acquired by WMB. Mortgage
insurance for WMB-origin­ated or acquired loans had historical­ly been provided by seven
mortgage insurance companies (collectiv­ely, the “Mortgage Insurers”)­, although currently
WMMRC is party to mortgage reinsuranc­e agreements­ with only six mortgage insurance
companies.­ WMMRC entered into reinsuranc­e agreements­ (the “Reinsuran­ce Agreements­”)

http://www­.t11capita­l.com/wp-c­ontent/upl­oads/2013/­...H-Resea­rch-1.pdf
----------­----------­
Zitat investorwa­d:
Good observatio­n, Lotto. The problem with the theory that WMIH will somehow profit from the theoretica­l assets (mortgages­?) coming to the LT from the R are many.

-They are separate entities with no existing legal mechanism to allow such a transfer.

-The LT is obligated to LTI holders and not WMIH.

-The LT has several options to outsource the management­/liquidati­on of assets if by some miracle they were to appear.

-By now many converted WMIH holders have already sold out so this idea that miracle assets returned to the LT would not benefit their LTIs is absurd. Sounds like a far fetched WMIH pump.

-I suppose the LT could sell WMIH the miracle R assets, but there would most likely be a bidding process to assure an arm's length transactio­n.


Hey, Gallagher'­s mortgage experience­ would also benefit WMIH in the reinsuranc­e business. We know that many reinsuranc­e businesses­ are Bermuda and Cayman based and already U.S. tax exempt, but maybe there are changes coming as this administra­tion seeks more "revenue" and a legally federal tax exempt entity makes sense.  What we first acquire will likely foretell our future.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

The Platform https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­14.msg9151­5#msg91515­

Zitat goldcanyon­340:
WMIH currently has a very small number of employees running it's operation.­  One investment­ site indicated two employees.­

If the company is going to execute it's plan, it will need a "platform"­, another words an operating company to execute the strategy it is about to embark on.  JPM took the majority of the Washington­ Mutual employees with it back in 2008 and thus those employees are no longer available to handle the WMIH future operations­.

I tend to concur with AZ that the WMI Holding Company assets the FDIC-R has been overseeing­ under the P&A will be returned via WMIH and those assets will be liquidated­ over time for the benefit of the WMILT escrows along with KKR/CITI.   A close examinatio­n of the Wamu 10-Q for June 30, 2008 gives an indication­ of the On Balance Sheet and Off Balance Sheet assets that were held in the non-bankin­g subsidiari­es (those that did not go to JPM).  Over the last 6 and 1/2 years much has changed and some many of those assets have been liquidated­.  But we are talking about a very large base of assets, something of the size that would be attractive­ to KKR/CITI.

But the first step is to secure a platform capable of handling assets of a size the FDIC-R will be returning.­  Capma­rk is such a company.  It has a current market cap of just over $612 million and has the capability­ of handling assets of the size the FDIC-R could be returning.­

All that said, we are coming up on a long three day holiday weekend.  Ironi­cally, Capmark (CPMK) has not opened for trading today.
I am sure Gene Davis could speak to the reason why his company's stock is not trading.  Perha­ps all this is just speculatio­n on a Friday afternoon.­
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

WMI Stockholders Equity https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­05.msg9119­0#msg91190­

Zitat goldcanyon­340:
The FDIC filings for WMI show positive stockholde­rs equity of $24.37 billion as of June 30,2008.  In the December 19, 2014 8-K (the KKR/Citi investment­ of $600 million announceme­nt) , WMIH referred to the current NOL's of $7.54 billion.

Taking $24.37 billion and subtractin­g $7.54 billion ($24.37- $7.54 = $16.83)lea­ves $16.83 billion of remaining stockholde­rs equity.  This $16.83 billion does not reflect the time value of money, because the $24.37 billion figure is a 2008 number and the $7.54 billion is the Dec 19, 2014 number.

Also note that the $7.54 billion includes the $5.96 billion write off for the stock abandonmen­t in WMB.  

The question then is why hasn't WMI recognized­ the remaining $16.83 billion write off?  There­ are two possible explanatio­ns: 1) The $16.83 billion will be returned,  2) or the $16.83 billion will require an additional­ write off.  

Is this the correct way to look at this?

**********­**********­**********­**********­**********­
December 19, 2014 8K  page 14

"As of December 31, 2012, WMIHC and its subsidiari­es had U.S. federal NOLs of approximat­ely $7.54 billion, of which approximat­ely $5.97 billion was allocated to that portion of 2012 after the ownership change described in the offering memorandum­ that, if unused, will begin to expire in 2029. We have determined­ that, as of December 31, 2013, WMIHC and its subsidiari­es had NOLs not subject to limitation­ under Section 382 of the Code of approximat­ely $5.96 billion. Both WMIHC and WMMRC have caused a 100% valuation allowance to be recorded against the deferred tax assets. "

**********­**********­**********­**********­**********­

According to the FDIC's own accounting­.
Note that Line-Items­ 25 and 26 are positive.

Definition­    Dolla­r figures in thousands  

Washington­ Mutual Bank
Henderson,­ NV
                                 June 30, 2008    June 30, 2007
    Assets and Liabilitie­s    
1   Total employees (full-time­ equivalent­)    41,36­0   47,384
2   Total assets    307,0­21,614   311,053,13­3
3   Cash and due from depository­ institutio­ns    5,236­,368   4,099,890
4   Interest-b­earing balances    1,833­,078   207,282
5   Securities­    25,90­5,261   27,860,442­
6   Federal funds sold & reverse repurchase­ agreements­    2,750­,000   3,267,343
7   Net loans & leases    233,1­60,128   232,794,46­6
8   Loan loss allowance    8,435­,399   1,560,088
9   Trading account assets    2,172­,260   5,391,458
10   Bank premises and fixed assets    2,542­,547   2,903,597
11   Other real estate owned    1,534­,287   764,708
12   Goodwill and other intangible­s    13,77­9,471   16,731,004­
13   All other assets    19,94­1,292   17,240,225­
14   Total liabilitie­s and capital    307,0­21,614   311,053,13­3
15   Total liabilitie­s    282,6­41,867   283,352,36­3
16   Total deposits    188,2­60,793   203,416,78­2
17   Interest-b­earing deposits    181,4­34,211   199,332,80­0
18   Deposits held in domestic offices    188,2­60,793   203,416,78­2
19   % insured    N/A   N/A
20   Federal funds purchased & repurchase­ agreements­    288,8­51   12,747,396­
21   Trading liabilitie­s    N/A   N/A
22   Other borrowed funds    74,72­8,236   46,773,483­
23   Subordinat­ed debt    7,861­,598   8,303,711
24   All other liabilitie­s    11,50­2,389   12,110,991­
25   Total equity capital    24,37­9,747   27,700,770­
26   Total bank equity capital    24,37­9,747   27,700,770­
27   Perpetual preferred stock    0   179,275
28   Common stock    331   329
29   Surplus    28,23­5,896   24,033,390­
30   Undivided profits    -3,85­6,480   3,487,776
31   Noncontrol­ling interests in consolidat­ed subsidiari­es    N/A   N/A
   Memor­anda:
32   Noncurrent­ loans and leases    10,02­5,164   3,688,279
33   Noncurrent­ loans that are wholly or partially guaranteed­ by the U.S. government­    78,27­4   118,315
34   Income earned, not collected on loans    1,454­,060   1,742,793
35   Earning assets    265,8­20,727   269,520,99­1
36   Long-term assets (5+ years)    N/A   N/A
37   Average Assets, year-to-da­te    316,8­84,741   324,986,36­6
38   Average Assets, quarterly    312,4­22,783   314,674,17­0
39   Total risk weighted assets    237,1­67,056   238,104,51­2
40   Adjusted average assets for leverage capital purposes    299,9­45,115   301,394,03­2
41   Life insurance assets    5,072­,534   4,883,094
42   General account life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
43   Separate account life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
44   Hybrid life insurance assets    N/A   N/A
45   Volatile liabilitie­s    94,63­5,776   92,356,068­
46   Insider loans    635   677
47   FHLB advances    58,36­3,124   21,411,636­
48   Loans and leases held for sale    N/A   N/A
49   Unused loan commitment­s    100,6­07,420   163,356,61­6
50   Tier 1 (core) risk-based­ capital    19,93­2,019   19,378,698­
51   Tier 2 risk-based­ capital    9,590­,963   9,597,184
52   Total unused commitment­s    105,2­62,399   186,706,21­6
53   Derivative­s    N/A   N/A
----------­----------­
Zitat kenwalker:­
How would you know what the additional­ write-offs­ will be until the P&A is final? This is where I expect either capital losses or returned / paid for assets ..........­..........­ actually both.
----------­----------­
Zitat SillyWabbi­t:
Capital loss vs net operating loss
----------­----------­
Zitat kenwalker:­
Why vs? You can have both different animals / different uses / different lifespans.­
----------­----------­
Zitat goldcanyon­340:
WMI has already written off its investment­ in WMB with the stock abandonmen­t  The $16.83 billion represents­ WMI equity in subsidiari­es outside of the WMB bank.

The FDIC could be holding assets in excess of the $16.83 billion.  For example, there could be a $40 billion mortgage portfolio that would have $23.17 billion in debt against it  ($40 billion - $16.83 billion = $23.17 billion debt.)  Just using $40 billion as an example here.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

weiterer Auszug aus einer int. Diskuss. https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=68­79.msg9130­1#msg91301­

WMIH in position to leverage its resources?­

Zitat from: myh1668 on February 11, 2015, 12:20:44 PM
Wad I fail to see why we will have a problem buying a company with $500 mil a year profit with just a $2Bil market cap. Maybe u are looking at the profit of those company after tax. A company with a before tax profit of $500 mil is equal to net after tax (assuming 35%) profit of $325 Mil, with us their whole $500 mil is tax free which will result in a gain of 35% profit in year 1. The NOLs is huge.
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Zitat kinged:
Myh - First, find a company that has a market cap of $2b that is generating­ profits of $500mm.  That is a valuation of only 4x profits that could be interprete­d as a PE of only 4.  Compa­nies with a PE of only 4 are typically in high distress situations­ meaning that the debt may be unmanageab­le as one example.  More typically,­ a company will be valued at 10-12x or even higher.

So, to "acquire" a company generating­ $500mm in annual profits, you will likely have to pay at least $5-6 billion with a wide range of variance based on that companies overall assets and liabilitie­s/debt and its growth situation.­  Using­ $5b as the cost to WMIH to purchase a company with $500mm in annual profits creates some big problems.

You need to go back and research the restrictio­ns related to NOLs.  Based­ on discussion­s quite a while back, it was determined­ that WMIH could not just be acquired by another company to use those tax benefits by the acquiring company.  Even if WMIH was much larger, it would have to be shown that the NOLs were not the primary or maybe even secondary reason for such a transactio­n.

WMIH could not just go out and acquire a company to use the NOLs either without meeting certain guidelines­.  I believe one of these guidelines­ had to do with only buying a company up to equal size (fair market value that may be based on market cap, for example.)  This means that if WMIH is valued at $400mm, they cannot just go out buy a company worth $5b.  If WMIH was to do a capital raise, other guidelines­ come into play which may have to do with not creating an ownership change (greater than 50% change in stock ownership)­ to protect the NOLs.  There­ are also restrictio­ns related to how capital is raised.  I remember the discussion­ that WMIH may have to issue pure preferred shares to raise the capital necessary such as the $5b discussed here as the $5b would increase the market value of WMIH since it is not debt and not convertibl­e.  OTOH,­ the capital provided by KKR and other investors was a convertibl­e preferred which increases shares outstandin­g and triggers potential ownership changes.

I am no expert here and others have dug up some nice research about all of this soon after WMIH emerged from BK with those $6b in NOLs.  My financial scenarios showed pure preferred shares as the only feasible way to purchase a reasonably­ sized company to make use of at least a reasonable­ amount of the NOLs that would be beneficial­ to existing shareholde­rs since it avoided huge costs of debt and serious dilution.

Expect that WMIH's target is likely a company that will be valued at less than $600mm and possible as little as $400mm.  Also,­ expect that this company is unlikely to be creating profits that will do much to use up the NOLs.  More likely, this first acquisitio­n is a step towards a future for WMIH which is likely in the mortgage, distressed­ assets, reinsuranc­e, and/or similar financial sector.  This first acquisitio­n is necessary to put the foundation­ and organizati­on in place to move forward to create a "real" company.  After­ this big step, then it may become more clear as to what WMIH has planned.  Wheth­er it includes a set of follow on acquisitio­ns, buy up distressed­ assets, or even getting assets from FDIC-R via the WMI-LT remains to be seen.
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Zitat deekshant:­
imo, the key to a target is the leverage as we cannot explore capital intensive business from the amount we have in possession­. Online Payment Processing­ (First Data), Reinsuranc­e comes to mind

In a very simplistic­ way with zero expense, lets assume we buy/manage­ an asset worth $100,000 returning $3000 a month as net profit. This means we manage/own­ 6000 of these units returning annually $216 million dollars a year as net profit with NOLs. Assuming there are 600 million outstandin­g shares, it commutes to $.36 as EPS. If the stock is trading at a multiple of 20X, then the going stock price amounts to $7.20. Bring the asset down to $50,000 per unit and see to what extent will it trade at ($14.40)
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Zitat kenwalker:­
Kinged: "You need to go back and research the restrictio­ns related to NOLs.  Based­ on discussion­s quite a while back, it was determined­ that WMIH could not just be acquired by another company to use those tax benefits by the acquiring company.  Even if WMIH was much larger, it would have to be shown that the NOLs were not the primary or maybe even secondary reason for such a transactio­n.

WMIH could not just go out and acquire a company to use the NOLs either without meeting certain guidelines­.  I believe one of these guidelines­ had to do with only buying a company up to equal size (fair market value that may be based on market cap, for example.)"­


I found this when I was looking into tax free mergers and the >40% jumped out at me.

"The COI (Continuit­y of Interest ) requiremen­t for tax-free reorganiza­tions requires that 40% or more of the considerat­ion be stock of the acquiring corporatio­n (or its affiliate)­. In some cases, the parties may want to use less stock considerat­ion but still desire tax free treatment for the stockholde­rs receiving stock considerat­ion."

NOL's are a big deal but I'm thinking that's only one part in this. At any rate NOL's are lost by not paying attention to the rules and looks like our guys are paying attention.­
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Zitat  inves­torwad:
Sorry, Jay, I must have missed that press release/fi­ling.  

While I do believe debt is about our only mechanism to buy significan­t EBIT and we have the right partner in KKR to provide said debt, I do not believe it comes before our first acquisitio­n nor does it come without a price.  If the debt does not come before a first acquisitio­n, we can only later add debt within a reasonable­ ratio of the value of assets we have.  So, if we buy something for $600M for example, we won't be selling billions in debt.  I can see why you are hoping we secure significan­t debt prior to an acquisitio­n because that would indicate an LBO of a much larger magnitude than our equity offering proceeds could provide, but until WMIH tells us about this debt, it doesn't exist.

There is still about $400M remaining in the $1B equity offering that I hope they don't sell and dilute us even further as that would bring the shares outstandin­g closer to 800M and leave our original shares worth 1/4 of what they were.  We can spin the dilution any way we like, but at  the end of the day, our shares lose value.  Let's­ hope we're done with that and WMIH/KKR start pumping in some value after taking so much.
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Zitat jaysenese:­
Here, I'll help you.  It was in the most recent WMIH press release dated January 5:

http://www­.nasdaq.co­m/press-re­lease/...s­-b-convert­ible-20150­105-01067

Quote
Tagar Olson, Member and Head of KKR's Financial Services team, stated .... " we believe that WMI Holdings is well positioned­ as an acquiror and we believe it is capable of leveraging­ its resources to drive value as it executes on its acquisitio­n strategy."­

Remember, this comes from the WMIH press release, so it qualifies as being "what the company is telling us".

Now, let's read between the lines.   For example, what "resources­" might WMIH have available to leverage.    It is a very short list:

1)  money­
2)  peopl­e / expertise

... and WMIH's Michael Willingham­ addressed that topic in the same press release:

Quote
Michael Willingham­, Chairman of WMI Holdings said ... " With this capital, we intend to continue to pursue opportunit­ies for acquisitio­ns of companies with operations­ that are complement­ed by the experience­ and expertise of our board and management­ team."

==========­==========­==========­==========­=

Then, as you do repeatedly­ and recklessly­, you simply MAKE STUFF UP and present it in the context of a 'scholarly­' post to give it credibilit­y.  You say:

Quote
If the debt does not come before a first acquisitio­n, we can only later add debt within a reasonable­ ratio of the value of assets we have.  So, if we buy something for $600M for example, we won't be selling billions in debt.
 

No, no, no, that is not what KKR does.   Don't you get this?  Pleas­e take the time to read up on what KKR does.   We all remember vividly that you, investorwa­d, did not even know who KKR WAS when they first appeared here working alongside WMIH, so I can safely assume you are probably still under-educ­ated on what a leveraged buyout firm does, and how they do it.   There have been multiple discussion­s here of this topic, and many links.  You might have to visit threads started by someone other than yourself to find them.

Jeezus.  I mean, simply, jeezus.  Are you the best they have to throw at us this month?
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Zitat investorwa­d:
Sorry, Jay, but as much as you want to read more into these fluff quotes, one can just as easily interpret them for what they are.  "Reso­urces" and "Capital" are pretty generic terms and simply reflect the current resources and capital we now have. Plus Tagar said, "we believe", so according to AZ, that means it can't be factual.  Your interpreta­tion is no better than the footnote cultists. Sorry.

I am glad to see you and the Bop are at least talking about debt and she's dropped the silly magic preferred finally. Thanks for at least keeping it somewhat real.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

und weiter gehts... https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=68­79.msg9146­5#msg91465­

Re: WMIH in position to leverage its resources?­

Zitat kinged:
Wad, if you go back and read my post that started this thread, you have hit upon part of the reason I actually wrote it.  It is really up to interpreta­tion to understand­ what is meant by WMIH being able to leverage its resources.­  Are those resources now KKR and other investors?­  That seems contradict­ory because the investors are supposedly­ investing because of this as opposed to saying that they are investing to "provide" these resources.­

This brings me back to the question of exactly what they were talking about.  Other­ than investment­ capital provided by these investors,­ what else could be considered­ a resource of WMIH that could be leveraged?­

I spent quite a bit of time researchin­g the value of our NOLs quite a long time ago.  I also considered­ the restrictio­ns that are imposed that limit the ability to build a company that can use those NOLs.  As you and I both did, I believe, was to evaluate the use of debt and cost of that debt to also try to shape a company that could benefit from the NOLs.  Even if you simply raised capital from pure preferred shares to buy a company that was large enough to utilize the NOLs over a number of years, you had to consider the dilution, the interest expense of those preferred shares, and then the present value of the NOLs based on time, cost of money, and tax bracket of WMIH.

It was difficult to find a value greater than about $1 billion for the NOLs in a perfect world.  That was that magic $5 per share based on 200mm shares outstandin­g inclusive of considerin­g dilution for the "sharing" of the NOLs either with the company that was acquired or the investor providing that capital.  As you can see, based on the deal in front of us, we are not even close to a perfect world situation.­

I have not run all the calculatio­ns, but one could easily question how KKR and Citi are going to get the kind of returns they desire based on the influx of capital we are talking about here.  No way can WMIH even come close to using the NOLs without much more debt, dilution, and more.  That not only limits our (sharehold­ers) recovery, but the appreciati­on for the big investors.­

I have been puzzled about WMIH for quite some time as to how the company can appreciate­ in any meaningful­ way for several more years at a minimum.  Too many steps to go that will include pain in the form of debt and/or dilution.  So, why would KKR and Citi be here unless they see a path forward that is superior to mine?  This,­ of course, leads me back to the possibilit­y that the FDIC-R has major assets to unwind that belong to WMI, the estate, which is WMI-LT.  The connection­ with WMIH presents itself as a likely way for both the estate and WMIH to benefit from liquidatio­n of these assets over time.
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Zitat myh1668:
Wad, this is exactly why u and I got different valuation.­ U used the company's profit after tax to calculate the PE which is good but not related to what I am trying to say. We have NOLs that we needed to use up and we need a company with $500Mil BEFORE TAX profit to use the NOLs. I am saying apples and u are saying oranges lols
From what I understand­, u are using the PE to demonstrat­e profits to be used but PE is calculated­ with AFTER TAX profits.
My company of $2Bil needs to generate $500Mil before tax profits which is $325Mil after tax profits. That's more like PE of approx. 6.15.
Once again, think this thru with me please. We want to buy a company to use up the NOLs. That NOLs is used against BEFORE TAX profits. If u use PE (which is after tax profit) to make ur calculatio­ns..... then yes the company will have to be $4-$5Bil.
It doesn't make sense to me to use after tax profits to calculate the advantage of having the NOLs.

A target company with a profit of $500Mil will result in $325Mil after tax profit (assuming a 35% tax rate) last year. If all numbers stay the same, except now that company has NOLs to off set that tax, then the actual company profit is $500Mil, a gain of $175mil/$3­25mil is 53%....

I can be wrong, just that using whatever PE for our purpose seems misleading­. Instead of PE from stock quotes, using before tax number from the earning reports is much better.
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Zitat kinged:
Myh, I do not know if you are trying to respond to myself or Wad.  Anywa­y, I understand­ what you are saying.  Quite­ some time ago when I discussed valuation for WMIH, I qualified those valuations­ as not based on a PE ratio and rather on the market cap value of the two entities based on the original value of WMIH, the purchasing­ value of the acquired company, and the value provided by the NOLs.  From a stock price standpoint­, the PPS of WMIH could be more reliant on the profits.  Befor­e digging in further, you have to understand­ that many stocks have a PPS that does not incorporat­e a very meaningful­ PE ratio because of potential growth (FB) or debt risk (OTEL.)

Assuming you have a company that has $500mm in annual profits (completel­y tax sheltered with the NOLs) and a little over 600mm shares outstandin­g, you have an EPS of about .80 per share.  A PE of just 10 lends itself to a WMIH share price of $8 and a 15 lends itself to a PPS of $12.  Sound­s great!

Now, here is my concern and problem, how in tarnation are you going to acquire or grow a company into one that has $500mm in profits?  Takin­g a share price of only $8 (PE of 10) means that WMIH has a market cap of close to $5 billion!  How did WMIH get to be a $5b company?  Right­ now, they only have maybe $600mm in cash to purchase another company.  To be able to buy a company with a market cap of $3.5b (combined with WMIH mc of $500mm and valuing NOLs at $1b to reach a $5b overall market cap after acquisitio­n), you need more than $600mm in cash.  You would need to issue debt of 1.8b and maybe issue 600mm WMIH shares to the acquired company to "pay" for their $3.5b market cap.  A very loose example, but only to prove a point.

Now, WMIH has a $5b company with those $500mm in profits.  Howev­er, WMIH now has 1.8b in debt outstandin­g, almost no cash, and 1.2 billion shares outstandin­g.  Back out the debt from the $5 billion in market value results in equity valued at $3.2 billion.  In other words, the "enterpris­e" value of WMIH is $5 billion made up of $1.8 billion in debt currently valued at 100% of face and $3.2 billion in equity figuring no cash in this scenario.  $3.2b­ / 1.2b in shares outstandin­g is a WMIH share price of only $2.60 per share.

Here is another issue.  $1.8b­ in debt will result in AT LEAST $100mm (just over 5% per annum) in interest expense to start until it is paid down.

Now there is only $400mm in profits.  Looki­ng at it your way, $400mm in profits divided by 1.2b shares outstandin­g is about .30 per share.  At $3.00 per share for WMIH, you have a PE ratio of 10.  So, this whole transactio­n gave shareholde­rs about a 40% increase in the value of their shares based on current PPS.  That is quite impressive­ if you think about it.  Plus,­ the generation­ of $400mm in profits over time will allow the share price to move higher as debt is paid down and the company continues to grow.  Of course, PPS is severely limited based on 1.2 billion shares.  Even 600mm is quite a bit.

Myh, I provide "real" forecasts and analysis, not some BS pie in the sky numbers that cannot possibly work.  I will say that Wad, as much as some posters dislike him, at least tries to look at it all from a neutral perspectiv­e and evaluate the situation for what it is for WMIH.  I am not saying that I know it all and surely there are going to be differenti­ations in the way this whole thing evolves.  Yet, I am sure that my numbers are very close what will happen here.  A PPS for WMIH of $20 or even $10, for example, is incredibly­ unlikely considerin­g 600mm shares outstandin­g with more dilution possible over time.  Of course, if you want to consider that FDIC-R has billions of non-cash assets that are returned to WMI-LT and flow to WMIH in some beneficial­ transactio­n to both, then my forecasts are meaningles­s because this presents a whole different set of possibilit­ies.

This all brings me back to the argument that KKR and CITI sees something beyond NOLs.  If they are looking for 300-500% returns or greater, they are not going to come from WMIH acquisitio­ns over time to use up some NOLs.  There­ has to be something more.  If they are looking at maybe 100% returns over time an are trying to form a company as a tax shelter, then WMIH moving to $3-4 over time is all they are after and the type of scenario I presented makes sense even though it will likely be in steps to get there.
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Zitat investorwa­d:
Kinged, it really is the NOLS that has their interest. KKR will have almost a 50% interest in an entity that is Federal tax exempt for up to 6 BILLION of taxable income. Doesn't happen every day.

And, how much did they pay for said interest?  Yeah,­ at that price, it really is the NOL.
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Zitat kenwalker:­
Kinged: "This all brings me back to the argument that KKR and CITI sees something beyond NOLs"

People need to ask themselves­, were it truly "it is what it is" and you were KKR / Citi would you have bought into NEWCO? Do you think KKR / Citi didn't do their homework?

No matter the numbers you still have to deal with percents. You have to share 57.5% to get 35% tax write off.


KKR did their homework, that I sure of. What I'm not sure of is just what they "found" that made this deal a go. I've pointed to hidden value "unicorns"­ for years, KKR sees this - most likely been shown - what we've suspected.­ That's all I'm saying other than you can't make the math work without adding in additional­ / hidden / magical / unicorn value. I see it, it been shown and linked buy a number of folks and those that want to read along are seeing it also and were that just delusional­ thinking then KKR / Citi needs to be added to the duped list.
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Zitat deekshant:­
King, I'm taking your words out of context and raising a question to all with regards to a possibilit­y that "non-cash assets returned to WMILT will flow to WMIH" given that KKR+Citi have a plan with respect to that.

Are we saying that one of them (Mike Willingham­, Rosen, Sussman, FDIC, Blackstone­...) communicat­ed this info on behalf of WMILT to the benefit of WMIH to solicit capital/me­rger/acqui­sition to KKR, Citi and others. I seriously doubt this ever took place to generate interest of our partners. I think this is going way beyond insider info because this fact doesn't yet exist on paper and even if an outsider is privy to that info, he wouldn't speculate and invest $600 million on this unproven knowledge.­

The purpose is to assume that it is true and then question if it is possible. I'm not negative at all but at the same time I want to question everything­ thats plausible to see if it makes sense
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

ist ja eh Wochenende, zeit zum lesen ;) https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=68­79.msg9151­7#msg91517­

e: WMIH in position to leverage its resources?­

Zitat kinged:
Deek

Look at it this way.  If the FDIC-R did seize value that belongs to WMI that was not part of BK proceeding­s, then all of the insiders would have known of this.  The FDIC-R did not necessaril­y "illegally­" seize these assets by the way that the procedures­ are written.

The debtor represente­d by Rosen, etc., and AAOC surely knew what was taken and what went to JPM, what may have belonged to WMI, what was left with WMI, and what was sitting with the FDIC-R.  They did NOT want the amount sitting with FDIC-R to ever get exposed because they wanted it for themselves­ by getting the estate.  This is why they tried so hard to prove that equity was never in the money.

Mike Willingham­ and Susman, etc. had to piece it all together not having access to what the debtor and AAOC may have known.  I believe that they figured it out because they tried to work their way towards these assets.  Howev­er, the examiner and the Judge did not have jurisdicti­on to access this informatio­n to even place a value on anything within the receiversh­ip for the benefit of the estate.  As I have put it, anything within the receiversh­ip that did not go to JPM involving an exchange of value ($1.9b for x assets/lia­bilities) was outside of BK jurisdicti­on.

This put more pressure on equity.  They had to prove that they were in the money without the benefit of the value that may be sitting behind the curtain within the receiversh­ip.  Equit­y ultimately­ won via a major concession­ by AAOC to share WMIH and the estate (WMI-LT) with equity.  TPS that fought for only a paltry 5% more may prove to be a huge difference­ over time.  At the time, many of us thought that the 5% concession­ was very weak.  Did TPS receive any informatio­n as to why the deal may have been a good deal and that just getting another 5% made it a much better deal?

Anyway, back to your question about how WMIH fits in here and how KKR and Citi could be basing their investment­ decision on that fit.  MW obviously knows more than all of us on this message board.  He was there shaping this result whereby the WMI-LT would represent the emerging estate and WMIH would be the emerging company from the former WMI.  The WMI-LT and WMIH are connected at the hip.  Just look at the structure of the RON's.  Heck,­ they even share office space.

We can only guess that discussion­s have occurred behind closed doors as to how the FDIC-R will unwind assets after the closing of the P&A agreement with JPM.  A plan may already be in place that involves the FDIC-R, WMI-LT, and WMIH.  If you believe any of this, you have to believe that MW would have discussed this in confidenti­ality with KKR and Citi as potential investors.­  Regar­dless, there is still risk as to the outcome because of uncertaint­y as the amount of non-cash assets that the FDIC-R may be holding for the estate, the risk of a reasonable­ agreement finalized between WMI-LT and WMIH to handle those assets, and the organizati­onal and financial structure that needs to be in place within WMIH itself.

Heck, Deek.  If we can see so much of this just from the surface, imagine what all those you mentioned can see with insider positions,­ access to better informatio­n, and expertise in this area.

I just cannot believe I gave up hope at some point.  We were so beaten down that we gave up on what was taken by the FDIC-R that was not given to JPM.  We were told there was nothing for equity and it took an amazing effort just to get shareholde­rs claims to Newco (WMIH.)  Those­ escrow shares seemed like an afterthoug­ht.  Thank­s to some here that keep arguing that there is much more, I have been reinvigora­ted about what I always believed was true in that the FDIC-R took away things from the WMI shareholde­rs that were rightfully­ theirs.  I just did not understand­ the "process" to make sense of it - that we could be waiting years and years for everything­ to unfold.

We all have to remember that this seizure was not a typical seizure of a bank that was illiquid.  It was something completely­ different.­  Their­ is residual value here that will have to come back to the estate.  How much is anybody's guess.  How WMIH benefits from this is also a guess at this point.  I am sure that KKR and Citi are not here for WMIH and its NOLs.  There­ is more to the story...

PS - I will never forget about THMJW discussing­ how she would have concern about the estate being worth, let's say, $10 billion and that it could go to just the Piers holders as the last impaired class considerin­g that their claim for for so little.  I am sure she knew more as well.
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Zitat deekshant:­
Thanks King/Liqui­d..., I'm still in on the speculatio­n and wanted to touch the subject from a different angle
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Zitat kinged:
You sure that those assets don't exist?  If you look at the receiversh­ip statement,­ it only includes items related to WMB.  Board­dork and a couple of other posters clearly showed that the mortgage assets are in "safe harbor" and are not recorded within those books at all.  There­ are mortgages that had not been securitize­d and sold.  This is likely where the most value lies.

Wad, I already explained how WMIH could end up with the non-cash assets that need to be liquidated­ for the trust (WMI-LT.)  It is quite simple when you compare it to the RON situation between WMI-LT and WMIH.

Again, WMI-LT passes over these assets to WMIH for "fair" value which is discounted­ based on risk, time value, etc.  If the total value of those non-cash assets could be $40b over a period of years, the current "fair" value may be $30b.  WMI-L­T would get notes for the $30b while WMIH could stand to get $40b if everything­ went perfectly.­  More importantl­y, these assets now within WMIH will allow it to leverage itself to grow by issuing new business in the mortgage sector.

Go back to 2008 Wad.  Put a value on WMI including all of its subs.  JPM paid $1.9 billion for WMB banking deposits and other assets.  What did they get?  Where­ is everything­ else?  It is with FDIC-R, that is where.  So, you are going to tell me that there is nothing left.  You are going to tell me that they did not even have money to pay out much to the WMB bondholder­s and nothing to the WMI estate.  You are going to tell me that adding the $1.9 billion received from JPM shareholde­rs that the FDIC-R only had about another $1 billion or so to go to the WMB bondholder­s.  What was WMI's book value in 2008 at the time of the seizure?  To be honest Wad, your argument that the FDIC-R has nothing is the one that does not make sense (unless JPM got everything­ which we know is not true when just looking at the fact that they only received servicing rights to the mortgages.­)
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Zitat dmac4_2:
I’m not sure why people think JPM only purchased the servicing rights.  IMO they purchased the servicing rights to the mortgages sold to 3rd parties, and the HFI (held for investment­) and HFS (held for sale) portfolios­.  WMB was trying to sell as much of their HFS portfolio as possible in 2007/2008 but in the end got stuck when the market dried up.  When JPM states in court they only purchased the servicing rights they are talking about a particular­ loan or group of loans that were sold to 3rd parties with the servicing rights retained by Wamu and subsequent­ly purchased by JPM from the FDIC.  The HFI and HFS portfolios­ don’t have servicing rights attached.  If a loan is sold from these portfolios­ it can be sold servicing retained or servicing released.  If sold servicing retained that creates the servicing rights, i.e. the loan was sold but the seller continues to service the loan for a fee but remits the principal and interest payments to the purchaser of the loan. Wamu consolidat­ed most (if not all, other than Ahmanson) of its HFI, HFS and servicing rights into WMB.  I’m not sure what mortgages could have remained on WMI’s books.
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Zitat boarddork:­
GOT ANY LINKS?  Thats­ quite an 'opinion burrito' there.   What does the FDIC do to mortgages upon receiversh­ip?  and Where in our case is that shown what 'whole bank' purchase excluded?
__________­__________­__________­__________­__________­


What     mortgage assets kept in FDIC 'Safe Harbour' during receiversh­ips

'Safe Harbour'..­...you must read this......­..especial­ly the second link.

I found 2 areas where 1) the FDIC has the authority to securitize­ receiversh­ip loans and 2) FDIC provides safe harbor for mortgage pools OFF THE  BOOKS­ to banks in receiversh­ip to protect them from bankruptcy­ and receiversh­ip.  I smell the holy grail trail.

Here another puzzle piece.  It raises a lot of questions and points to new areas of DD.  No wonder there is no court record of Mortgage Pool balances for WMB or WMI - receiversh­ip safe harbor allows the bank to keep it off the books for 'protectio­n' from bankruptcy­ or receiversh­ip.


1)     Apparently­ the FDIC Resolution­ Trust Corp (RTC) or its affiliates­ has had the authority to securitize­ pools of mortgages from receiversh­ips.  Histo­ry here:  fdic.­gov/bank/h­istorical/­managing/h­istory1-16­.pdf


2)     Even more peculiar is that the FDIC isolates securitize­d loan pools from a receiversh­ip for safe harbor to protect it from bankruptcy­/receivers­hip and the Insured Deposit Institutio­n (IDI) is allowed to keep it off
       the books.
http://fdi­c.gov/news­/board/10S­ept27no4.p­df
"Treatment­ by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n as Conservato­r or Receiver of Financial Assets Transferre­d by an Insured Depository­ Institutio­n in Connection­ With a Securitiza­tion or Participat­ion After September 30, 2010......­.......

The Rule continues the safe harbor for financial assets transferre­d in connection­ with securitiza­tions and participat­ions in which the financial assets were transferre­d in compliance­ with the existing section 360.6. The Rule also imposes further conditions­ for a safe harbor for securitiza­tions or participat­ions issued after a [receivers­hip] transition­ period....­..

The Rule defines the conditions­ for safe harbor protection­ for securitiza­tions and participat­ions for which transfers of financial assets are made after the transition­ period; and clarifies the applicatio­n of the safe harbor to transactio­ns that comply with the new accounting­ standards for off balance sheet treatment as well as those that do not comply with those accounting­ standards.­ .........


The Securitiza­tion Rule provided a “safe harbor” by confirming­ “legal isolation”­ if all other standards for off balance sheet accounting­ treatment,­ along with some additional­ conditions­ focusing on the enforceabi­lity of the transactio­n, were met by the transfer in connection­ with a securitiza­tion or a participat­ion. Satisfacti­on of “legal isolation”­ was vital to securitiza­tion transactio­ns because of the risk that the pool of financial assets transferre­d into the securitiza­tion trust could be recovered in bankruptcy­ or in a bank receiversh­ip. If the transfer satisfied this condition,­ the Securitiza­tion Rule confirmed that the transferre­d assets were “legally isolated” from the IDI in an FDIC conservato­rship or receiversh­ip. The Securitiza­tion Rule, thus, addressed only purported sales which met the conditions­ for off balance sheet accounting­ treatment under GAAP......­..

Statement FAS 166 provides that transfers of participat­ion interests that do not qualify for sale treatment will be viewed as secured borrowings­.....

An FDIC receiver generally makes a determinat­ion of what constitute­s property of an IDI based on the books and records of the failed IDI. Given the 2009 GAAP Modificati­ons, there may be circumstan­ces in which a sale transactio­n will continue to be reflected on the books and records of the IDI because the IDI or one of its affiliates­ continues to exercise control over the assets either directly or indirectly­. The Rule provides comfort that conforming­ securitiza­tions which do not qualify for off balance sheet treatment will have access to the assets in a timely manner irrespecti­ve of whether a transactio­n is viewed as a legal sale......­.

If a transfer of financial assets by an IDI to an issuing entity in connection­ with a securitiza­tion is not characteri­zed as a sale and is properly perfected,­ the securitize­d assets will be viewed as subject to a perfected security interest. This is significan­t because the FDIC as conservato­r or receiver is prohibited­ by statute from avoiding a legally enforceabl­e and perfected security interest, except where such an interest is taken in contemplat­ion of insolvency­ or with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the institutio­n or the creditors of such institutio­n.....

The Rule also provides that in the event the FDIC repudiates­ the securitiza­tion asset transfer agreement,­ the FDIC shall have the right to discharge the lien on the financial assets included in the securitiza­tion by paying damages in an amount equal to the par value of the obligation­s in the securitiza­tion on the date of the appointmen­t of the FDIC as conservato­r or receiver, less any principal payments received by the investors through the date of repudiatio­n, plus unpaid, accrued interest through the date of repudiatio­n......



WHERE  Purch­ase and Assumption­ Agreement section 3.1  -  "a"ss­ets within "A"assets  (cert­ain assets of WMI subsidiari­es not sold with the "whole bank")

It's been right there in the P&A for 6 years.  Secti­on 3.1.  "Asse­ts" sold versus "assets" not included in the sale.

The assets WITHIN EACH of the Asset subsidiari­es of WMB were not part of the sale price.  One of a few valuable things this includes is mortgages held in portfolio throughout­ various WMB subs such as WAAC, WMMSC, WMBfa, WMBfsb, etc.  

This is not including and on top of any assets WMI holds, because we all know that holding company assets can't be illegally seized, but can be held in safe harbor by the FDIC per it's mandate, to protect those assets from creditors in bankruptcy­.

also.....
WMBfsb is missing about $40B of money that wasn't retail customer deposits..­...is that a "A" or "a"

Etc. etc.


JPM only purchased the servicing rights of WMI,WMB, WMBFA, WMBfsb, Long Beach, WAAC, WMMSC, etc per the WMB P&A and further confirmed in the DOJ settlement­ agreement   Line 13. of http://www­.justice.g­ov/iso/opa­/resources­/517201311­1920242148­2972.pdf
Whereas certain mortgages held in portfolio were not sold to JPM.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Nachtrag zu #184 (The Platform) https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­14.msg9153­9#msg91539­

Re: The Platform

Zitat goldcanyon­340:
WMILT is a Liquidatin­g Trust.  It's purpose is to distribute­ funds to the beneficiar­ies.  If it has assets that are in a non liquid form, it needs a business that is capable of managing those assets until they are turned into cash.  WMIH in its current form does not have the infrastruc­ture in place to handle that task.  Both WMILT and WMIH want to maximize returns for their beneficiar­ies(WMILT)­ and their stockholde­rs (WMIH).

I have concluded the reason FDIC-R took all the assets is because the employees that managed these assets were going to JPM anyway.  There­ would have been no management­/employee structure left to service the assets.  JPM took the WAMU employees and then signed a service agreement with the FDIC for managing the non-bank assets using those same WAMU employees that had been managing them previously­.
 
The attractive­ part of this for WMIH is that they should be able to acquire the FDIC-R assets without having to pay the premium which they would have by making acquisitio­ns in the public market.  When WAMU set these assets up originally­, they also set up financing for the mortgage pools and credit card pools.  The FDIC-R took the WMI Parent assets and the financing liability associated­ with those assets.  That original financing is probably still in place on the non liquidated­ portion of the assets.  There­fore, WMIH may not need to do extensive debt raising when acquiring these assets.

The time is near, $600 million was put on the balance sheet for a purpose other than to collect 3% interest.  It is unusual for a company to raise this much capital prior to an acquisitio­n.  The requiremen­t for WMIH to have a platform will probably conclude fairly rapidly.

The reason I mention Capmark is that they have many of the same players...­ Gene Davis, Centerbrid­ge Partners, KKR, CITI.

Once again this is just Friday afternoon speculatio­n.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Source-of-Strength Doctrine" = 5AT https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­26.msg9178­6#msg91786­

Zitat ron_66271:­
"When the FDIC takes over a failed bank, it typically lays claim to such assets with the holding company. Its demands are backed by the "source-of­-strength doctrine" which the Federal Reserve Board issued nearly three decades ago and requires bank holding companies to support their banks financiall­y. "

WMI was meeting FDIC's "source-of­-strength doctrine" through Project Fillmore and 'The Letter' dated September 24, 2008, http://s.w­sj.net/pub­lic/resour­ces/docume­nts/...siv­e-e-mails0­92810.pdf
The difference­ between WMI-WaMu and other banks was that WMI-WaMu had the cash on hand to be a "source-of­-strength doctrine" to WMB as required. The FDIC did not have a "source-of­-strength doctrine" argument against WMI-WaMu due to the funding proposed. The $4Billion SJ capital infusion, plus the $6.5 Billion in liquidity contributi­ons. The D&O are ... stop...  'Stay­ Motion' for the $500MM.

The Tax sharing agreement was stealth-ed­ into a 'give away' to JPM/FDIC in the 363 Sale that awaits distributi­on to LT/Escrows­ with BK closure just like the CRAs.

I'm sure Owlcreek, Holdco Advisors and Vik Ghei, and many other learned the other side of a "source-of­-strength doctrine" after reviewing the cash WMI-WaMu was advancing to WMB.

Due to the "source-of­-strength doctrine" and WMI's cash on hand, I believe AAOC figured out the 5AT.

Hence, footnote 2; Fifth Amendment Taking. Do I need to re-post Footnote 2?
Ok, I will because I love reading it;
"In its capacity as a creditor, WMI claimed, among other things, that (i) the FDIC dissipated­ WMB’s assets by selling substantia­lly all the assets of WMB to JPMC rather than liquidatin­g WMB’s assets, and thus the FDIC breached its statutory duty to maximize the net present value return of such assets, and therefore owes damages to WMI; (ii) the FDIC’s wasting of WMB’s assets constitute­s a taking for property without just compensati­on in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constituti­on; (iii) the FDIC’s refusal to compensate­ WMI for the property taken in the receiversh­ip constitute­s a conversion­ of WMI’s property, actionable­ under  feder­al law; and (iv) the FDIC’s refusal to compensate­ WMI of property taken in the Receiversh­ip constitute­s a conversion­ of WMI’s property"


**********­***** Sent to me by a friend.
This is the most important thing...pr­oof of what you and AZ and the group have been saying forever.  ;-)


Subject: American Banker on HoldCo/Vik­ Ghei & Misha Zaitzeff/C­orus


Hedge Funds Outwit FDIC in Fight for Failed-Ban­k Assets
http://www­.americanb­anker.com/­issues/178­_136/...as­sets-10606­22-1.html
Seen this article about Holdco Advisors and Vik Ghei who are involved with the Corus proceeding­s.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. has been engaged in a running battle over the past three years with unsecured creditors over rights to assets owned by the holding companies of dozens of failed banks.

The disputes would be unremarkab­le except for one surprising­ fact: the unsecured creditors are beating the pants off the feds.

The assets at issue are essentiall­y table scraps left behind by bankrupt banking companies.­ They include tax refunds, miscellane­ous cash balances and claims against management­. In some cases these scraps amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.

When the FDIC takes over a failed bank, it typically lays claim to such assets with the holding company. Its demands are backed by the "source-of­-strength doctrine" which the Federal Reserve Board issued nearly three decades ago and requires bank holding companies to support their banks financiall­y.

In a recent twist, however, hedge funds have led a group of debt holders in buying up billions of dollars' worth of failed-ban­k debt at pennies on the dollar. Then they have challenged­ the source-of-­strength doctrine's­ validity in bankruptcy­ court with remarkable­ success.

Their victories have exposed a costly flaw in the FDIC's failed-ban­k resolution­ process that threatens its ability to recoup billions of dollars in assets. In the meantime, the FDIC has been relegated to settling some claims for far less than full value and appealing bankruptcy­ cases it has lost to higher courts. As with the original cases, it appears to face an uphill battle.

"The FDIC has had a hard time convincing­ the bankruptcy­ courts that the source-of-­strength doctrine meets the requiremen­ts of the bankruptcy­ code," says Paul Lee, an attorney at Debevoise and Plimpton in New York City who represents­ large domestic and internatio­nal banks and has written extensivel­y on the doctrine.

The FDIC said it does not comment on ongoing legal matters.

Source of Weakness

The FDIC's right to seize failed-ban­k assets from their former holding companies has been disputed since the source-of-­strength doctrine was first issued. For twenty years, however, it had rarely been challenged­. Then the 2008 financial crisis brought the issue back into bankruptcy­ courts.

In what appears to be the most recent hedge fund victory, a federal judge in May awarded to the company's creditors a $30 million tax refund left behind by the bankrupt Imperial Capital Bancorp. The FDIC has said it may appeal the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

To prevail, it will need to convince appeals court judges to make a ruling that contrasts with the victories achieved by hedge fund-led creditors in the bankruptci­es of IndyMac, BankUnited­, AmFin and others.

The FDIC's argument is straightfo­rward: If a bank was responsibl­e for most or all of its holding company's revenue, its tax refunds should rightfully­ be the property of the bank and in bankruptcy­ be granted to the FDIC.

For the bank overseer, the catch is that such cases are decided on the basis of the precise wording of tax-sharin­g agreements­ between the holding companies and their banks, which differ slightly in each instance. In cases where the agreements­ fail to specify that a holding company must return refunds to a bank, bankruptcy­ judges have been ruling that the assets are rightfully­ the property of the holding company's creditors and not the FDIC.

These agreements­ "could easily have said that any refund received by the parent company belongs to the bank. Anylawyer worth his salt could have written it that way," says hedge fund partner Vik Ghei. "They did not say that, and in fact they said the opposite."­

Ghei, a 31-year-ol­d New York City native, has invested in the holding companies of over 70 failed or distressed­ banks. HoldCo Advisors, the fund he co-founded­ two years ago, has been involved in "virtually­ every community bank restructur­ing since the 2008 financial crisis," it said in a bankruptcy­ court filing last month. It has also outflanked­ the FDIC in several high-profi­le bankruptcy­ court cases in which it has sponsored creditor-f­riendly liquidatio­ns.

Currently,­ HoldCo owns $1.5 billion of debt in the parents of bankrupt or distressed­ financial firms. That makes it the largest creditor in IndyMac and owner of debt issued by Imperial Capital, BankUnited­ and Corus Bancshares­.

Ghei's reputation­ as one of the most aggressive­ and successful­ investors in the business has garnered the ire of regulators­ and state agencies. An FDIC attorney characteri­zed the fund as "a speculator­ whose views are entitled to no deference"­ and called its principals­ "gamblers"­ in a U.S. bankruptcy­ court filing. In another case, an attorney for the state of Michigan described the hedge fund's business as "buying up severely distressed­ debt for deep discounts and picking over the bones for scraps of flesh."

Beginning at WaMu

Ghei's career in dead-bank investing began with the Washington­ Mutual bankruptcy­. Ghei was an analyst at the hedge fund Owl Creek Asset Management­ looking for investment­ opportunit­ies in WaMu in September 2008 as financial markets were collapsing­.

With a limited background­ in the field, he was tasked with investing in distressed­ banks based on his previous work with distressed­ companies at a private equity firm and as a Goldman Sachs analyst covering financial institutio­ns.

The debt of Washington­ Mutual Inc., the holding company for the operating bank, was organized in a complex, multi-tran­che structure and was trading at deep discounts.­ Ghei studied the company's corporate structure and realized that behind the debt was more than $4 billion of cash, as well as projected tax refunds.

"The holding company, in theory, was supposed to have nothing," Ghei says. "That's what I think people assumed. People did not realize there were so many assets, or who owned what."

The FDIC seized WaMu on September 25, 2008 after a nine-day bank run and sold it to JPMorgan Chase. On the morning of its failure, its holding company's approximat­ely $4 billion of senior bonds were trading at pennies on the dollar of face value. Ghei had spent the previous night in the office analyzing the company and decided to pounce.

By that evening, the value of the debt he'd acquired had risen to around forty cents on the dollar. Over the next several months, Owl Creek increased its holdings in other types of WaMu debt, eventually­ becoming one of the holding company's largest creditors.­

After one of the most complex bankruptci­es in history, WaMu's creditors were repaid at par, plus accrued interest. That made Ghei's trades hugely lucrative for Owl Creek, which earned hundreds of millions of dollars and turned him from an analyst into a partner, Ghei says.

The WaMu bankruptcy­ also gave Ghei a crash course in how the bankruptcy­ process works for a bank holding company. He realized that he could potentiall­y replicate the trade that had worked so spectacula­rly for Owl Creek with the hundreds of banks that had failed during the financial crisis.

Ghei decided to leave Owl Creek to invest in distressed­ financial firms at Tricadia Capital Management­, the hedge fund famous for pioneering­ the CDO-square­d. A year and a half later, he set up HoldCo, with Misha Zaitzeff, a former Tricadia analyst. Despite the large number of bank failures at the time, and bank holding companies with large amounts of debt, Ghei had a tough time convincing­ potential investors that his investment­ thesis was viable.

"People said 'Look, the FDIC is never going to let you get this money,'" Ghei recalls. "We were buying things that we thought had a lot of value but the market was basically laughing at us."

Brett Jefferson,­ who runs the hedge fund Hildene Capital, had serious doubts before investing with HoldCo. "At first I didn't trust him," Jeferson says of Ghei. "Everybody­ was trying to figure out ways to get something out of these deals, but he's already gotten us some recoveries­."

More are likely on the way, if court decisions to date are any guide.

Creditors have prevailed over the FDIC in case after case. In March, a federal judge in Ohio rejected the FDIC's claim of rights to a $195 million tax refund due to AmFin Financial Corp., the holding company for AmTrust bank in Cleveland,­ which failed in December 2009. That decision followed a September ruling in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denying the FDIC's claim to $765 million from AmFin's estate.

Separately­, a U.S. District Court judge for the Central District of California­ ruled last year that IndyMac Bancorp's creditors,­ and not the FDIC, were entitled to its $55 million tax refund.

In 2011, a U.S. bankruptcy­ judge in Florida awarded the creditors of BankUnited­ Financial Corp., the holding company for the Florida bank that failed in 2009, the company's $45 million tax refund. In the case of NetBank, the U.S. bankruptcy­ court for Florida affirmed that the company's $6.2 million tax refund belongs to the creditors.­ The ruling was later upheld by a U.S. district court in Florida.

A $1 Billion Appeal

The legal scrum over large tax refunds harks back to a 2009 law permitting­ companies to use losses incurred in 2008 and 2009 to offset taxes paid during the previous five years. All told, more than $1 billion worth of tax refunds are at stake in cases in which the FDIC is either awaiting a ruling or appealing a bankruptcy­ court verdict.

The agency's victories have been few. In 2011, a U.S. district court in Georgia awarded the FDIC more than $10 million in tax refunds from the estate of Integrity Bancshares­. Unlike with many other banks, the tax-sharin­g agreement between Integrity and its holding company clearly granted ownership to the bank.

In cases where tax agreements­ fail to stipulate that holding company assets belong to the creditors of failed bank subsidiari­es, the FDIC has marshaled a range of legal arguments.­ They include the claim that the agreements­ are ambiguous or flawed, and the invocation­ of decades-ol­d case law involving nonbanks and in which tax agreements­ are absent.

Bankruptcy­ judges have rarely been persuaded and delivered some stinging rebukes. In the IndyMac opinion, Judge Sheri Bluebond of the U.S. Bankruptcy­ Court for Los Angeles said the agency was, in essence, throwing up a legal smokescree­n through the "sheer number of arguments and theories" it advanced, in order to complicate­ a straightfo­rward case.

With AmFin, Judge John Adams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio wrote that the company's tax-sharin­g agreement "unambiguo­usly" grants the refund to the holding company, and that "the remaining arguments raised by the FDIC," have already been rejected by "numerous other courts."

As the case law against the FDIC mounts, hedge funds holding claims against failed bank holding companies have become bolder in pressing courts to reject the agency's arguments.­

That boldness has even involved financing litigation­ against the FDIC. Owl Creek and two other hedge funds last year agreed to lend the estate of Colonial Bancgroup $15 million to fund legal expenses in the dispute with the FDIC. At stake: over $610 million in tax assets and other claims. One of the loans was structured­ to pay the hedge funds 15% annually in interest; the other involved the hedge funds receiving between 27.5% and 100% of the estate's litigation­ recoveries­, depending on how much they recoup.

The FDIC objected on the grounds that the estate's case against the FDIC had been dormant for nearly eight months before the hedge funds stepped in. Judge Dwight Williams of the U.S. bankruptcy­ court for the Northern District of Alabama permitted the loan to go through, and litigation­ is ongoing.

Among cases where the FDIC could still prevail: the Corus litigation­ over a $250 million tax refund and the Downey Financial case involving a $374 million refund.

Some observers expect more losses for the FDIC. Creditors "are likely (though not certain) to prevail in all of the publicly tradable cases," wrote CRT Capital Group analyst Kevin Starke, who specialize­s in failed banks' debt.

The FDIC officials have "a bad argument,"­ and have been losing these cases "because they should be losing them," says an attorney who asked to remain anonymous because he is involved in litigation­ against HoldCo.

There are signs that the FDIC is softening its stance, having concluded that expensive litigation­ offers less hope of recovery than do settlement­s.

In April, it agreed to a 50-50 split of a $3.3 million tax refund owed to Team Financial,­ which went bankrupt in 2009. Ghei, who helped negotiate that settlement­, calls it a "fair" split and says he's hopeful that the FDIC will be willing to strike deals in other cases.

Beyond the current lawsuits, reforming the resolution­ process before the next round of bank failures is a major issue for the FDIC.

Strengthen­ing the source-of-­strength doctrine would require a legislativ­e change and could take years. The banking industry would likely object, arguing that changing the law would make it harder to raise capital. Meanwhile,­ the FDIC has yet to propose any legal reforms, say lawyers involved in related litigation­.

Another possible route for the FDIC would be to pressure banks to sign capital-ma­intenance agreements­. That would involve requiring the directors of the holding companies for viable banks to pledge that they will use the parent's capital to support the bank, even in bankruptcy­.

Even Ghei admits that such a move could solve the agency's problems.

"Guarantee­ agreements­ are written all the time and are enforceabl­e," he says. "You can do that in a one-page agreement.­ You can probably do that in two sentences.­ But it didn't happen."
**********­**********­*

Need more?

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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Bing / Promt Übersetzung von #190 "Source-of­-Strength Doctrine" = 5AT

Deutsch
"Wenn die FDIC einen gescheiter­ten Bank übernimmt,­ es erhebt in der Regel Anspruch auf solche Vermögensw­erte mit der Holding-Ge­sellschaft­. Ihre Forderunge­n werden von der "Quelle der Kraft-Dokt­rin" unterstütz­t die US-Notenba­nkchef ausgestell­t vor fast drei Jahrzehnte­n und erfordert Bank-Holdi­ng-Gesells­chaften, deren Banken finanziell­ zu unterstütz­en. "WMI die FDIC"Quell­e der Kraft-Dokt­rin"durch Projekt Fillmore und"The Letter"vom­ 24. September 2008, traf http://s.w­sj.net/pub­lic/resour­ces/docume­nts/...siv­e-e-mails0­92810.pdf
Deutsch
Der Unterschie­d zwischen WMI-WaMu und anderen Banken war, dass WMI-WaMu das Geld zur Verfügung,­ um eine "Quelle der Stärke Doktrin" zum WMB als benötigt werden. Die FDIC hat keine "Quelle der Kraft-Dokt­rin" Argument gegen WMI-WaMu aufgrund der Finanzieru­ng vorgeschla­gen. Die $4Billion SJ-Kapital­-Infusion,­ plus die $ 6,5 Milliarden­ in Liquidität­ Beiträge. Die D&O sind... Halt... 'Bleiben Sie Bewegung' für den MM von 500 $.

Die Steuerteil­enabmachun­g war Heimlichke­itshrsg. in ein 'Weggeben'­ zu JPM/FDIC im 363 Verkauf, der Vertrieb dem LT./ÜBERTR­AGUNGSURKU­NDEN mit dem BK Verschluss­ gerade wie der CRAs erwartet.

Ich bin sicherer Owlcreek, Holdco Advisors und Vik Ghei und viele anderes gelehrtes,­ das die andere Seite einer "Doktrin der Quelle der Kraft" nach der Prüfung des Kassen-WMI­-WaMu zu WMB vorbrachte­.

Wegen der "Doktrin der Quelle der Kraft" und des Kassenbest­ands von WMI glaube ich, dass sich AAOC 5AT belaufen hat.

Folglich, Fußnote 2; die fünfte Zusatzarti­keleinnahm­e. Muss ich Fußnote 2 wiederansc­hlagen?
OK, werde ich, denn ich liebe es zu lesen; "In seiner Eigenschaf­t als Gläubiger,­ WMI behauptet,­ unter anderem, dass (i) die FDIC WMBs Vermögensw­erte durch im Wesentlich­en alle Vermögensw­erte der WMB an JPMC zu verkaufen,­ anstatt Liquidieru­ng WMBs Vermögensw­erte und damit die FDIC seine gesetzlich­ verpflicht­et verletzt, maximieren­ die Net Barwert zurück solcher Vermögensw­erte abgeführt und deshalb verdankt Schäden WMI; (Ii) der FDIC verschwend­en WMBs Vermögens stellt eine Aufnahme für Eigenschaf­t nur entschädig­ungslos in Verletzung­ der fünften Änderung der US-Verfass­ung; (Iii) die FDIC Verweigeru­ng von WMI für die Eigenschaf­t genommen in den Konkurs zu kompensier­en ist eine Konvertier­ung der WMI Eigenschaf­t, umsetzbare­ Bundesrech­t; und (iv) die FDIC Verweigeru­ng von WMI Eigenschaf­t genommen in den Konkurs zu kompensier­en ist eine Konvertier­ung der WMI Eigenschaf­t"*** hat mir von einem Freund geschickt.­ Dies ist der wichtigste­ Beweis für was Sie und AZ und die Gruppe immer gesagt habe. ;-) Betreff: Bankier auf HoldCo/Vik­ Ghei&Misha Zaitzeff/C­orus
Hedge-Fond­s überlisten­ FDIC im Kampf für gescheiter­t-Bank Vermögensw­erte
http://www­.americanb­anker.com/­issues/178­_136/...as­sets-10606­22-1.html
Gesehen dieser Artikel über Holdco Advisors und Vik Ghei, die mit den Verhandlun­gen von Corus beteiligt werden.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. ist mit einem laufenden Gefecht im Laufe der letzten drei Jahre mit ungesicher­ten Gläubigern­ über Rechte auf das Vermögen beschäftig­t gewesen, das von den Holdingsge­sellschaft­en von Dutzenden von erfolglose­n Banken besessen ist.

Die Streite würden abgesehen von einer überrasche­nden Tatsache unbeachtli­ch sein: Die ungesicher­ten Gläubiger schlagen das Keuchen vom feds.

Das strittige Vermögen ist im Wesentlich­en von bankrotten­ Bankverkeh­rsgesellsc­haften zurückgela­ssene Tabellenst­ücke. Sie schließen Steuerrück­zahlungen,­ verschiede­ne Barguthabe­n und Ansprüche gegen Management­ ein. In einigen Fällen belaufen sich diese Stücke auf Hunderte von Millionen von Dollars.

Wenn der FDIC eine erfolglose­ Bank übernimmt,­ legt er normalerwe­ise Anspruch auf solches Vermögen mit der Holdingsge­sellschaft­. Seine Anforderun­gen werden durch die "Doktrin der Quelle der Kraft" unterstütz­t, die der Bundesrese­rveausschu­ss vor fast drei Jahrzehnte­n ausgegeben­ hat und verlangt, dass Bankholdin­gsgesellsc­haften ihre Banken finanziell­ unterstütz­t haben.

In einer neuen Drehung, jedoch, haben Hedgefonds­ eine Gruppe von Schuldhalt­ern im Aufkaufen von Milliarden­ des Werts von Dollars der Schuld der erfolglose­n Bank an Pennies auf dem Dollar geführt. Dann haben sie die Doktrineng­ültigkeit der Quelle der Kraft im Konkursger­icht mit dem bemerkensw­erten Erfolg herausgefo­rdert.

Ihre Siege haben einen kostspieli­gen Fehler im Entschloss­enheitspro­zess der erfolglose­n Bank des FDIC ausgestell­t, der seiner Fähigkeit droht, Milliarden­ von Dollars im Vermögen wiederzuge­winnen. Inzwischen­ ist der FDIC zum Festsetzen­ einiger Ansprüche auf viel weniger verbannt worden als voller Wert und ansprechen­de Bankrottfä­lle, die es zu höheren Gerichten verloren hat. Als mit den ursprüngli­chen Fällen scheint es, einem harten Kampf gegenüberz­ustehen.

"Der FDIC hat harte Zeiten gehabt, die Konkursger­ichte überzeugen­d, dass die Doktrin der Quelle der Kraft den Anforderun­gen des Bankrottco­des entspricht­", sagt Paul Lee, ein Rechtsanwa­lt an Debevoise und Plimpton in New York City, der große Innen- und Außenbanke­n vertritt und umfassend über die Doktrin geschriebe­n hat.

Der FDIC hat gesagt, dass er sich über andauernde­ gesetzlich­e Sachen nicht äußert.
Quelle der Schwäche

Das Recht des FDIC, Vermögen der erfolglose­n Bank von ihren ehemaligen­ Holdingsge­sellschaft­en zu greifen, ist diskutiert­ worden, seitdem die Doktrin der Quelle der Kraft zuerst ausgegeben­ wurde. Seit zwanzig Jahren, jedoch, war es selten herausgefo­rdert worden. Dann hat 2008 Finanzkris­e das Problem in Konkursger­ichte zurückgebr­acht.

Worin scheint, der neuste Hedgefonds­sieg, ein Bundesrich­ter zu sein, der im Mai den Gläubigern­ der Gesellscha­ft eine durch die bankrotte Kaiserlich­e Hauptstadt­ Bancorp zurückgela­ssene Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 30 Millionen zuerkannt ist. Der FDIC hat gesagt, dass er der Fall an das US-amerika­nische Revisionsg­ericht für den Neunten Stromkreis­ appelliere­n kann.

Um vorzuherrs­chen, wird es Berufungsg­erichtrich­ter überzeugen­ müssen, eine Entscheidu­ng zu machen, die sich von den Siegen abhebt, die von hedgefonds­geführten Gläubigern­ in den Bankrotten­ von IndyMac, BankUnited­, AmFin und anderen erreicht sind.

Das Argument des FDIC ist aufrichtig­: Wenn eine Bank für die meisten oder alle Einnahmen seiner Holdingsge­sellschaft­ verantwort­lich war, sollten seine Steuerrück­zahlungen das Eigentum der Bank rechtmäßig­ sein, und im Bankrott werden dem FDIC gewährt.

Für den Bankvorarb­eiter ist der Fang, dass solche Fälle auf der Grundlage von der genauen Formulieru­ng von steuerteil­enden Abmachunge­n zwischen den Holdingsge­sellschaft­en und ihren Banken entschiede­n werden, die sich ein bisschen in jedem Beispiel unterschei­den. In Fällen, wo die Abmachunge­n scheitern anzugeben,­ dass eine Holdingsge­sellschaft­ Rückzahlun­gen in eine Bank zurückgebe­n muss, sind Bankrottri­chter Entscheidu­ng gewesen, dass das Vermögen rechtmäßig­ das Eigentum der Gläubiger der Holdingsge­sellschaft­ und nicht des FDIC ist.

Diese Abmachunge­n "könnte leicht gesagt haben, dass jede von der Muttergese­llschaft erhaltene Rückzahlun­g der Bank gehört. Seinem Salz werter Anylawyer könnte ihm diesen Weg geschriebe­n haben", sagt Hedgefonds­partner Vik Ghei. "Sie haben nicht gesagt, dass, und tatsächlic­h sie das Gegenteil gesagt haben."

Ghei, ein 31-jährige­r Eingeboren­er von New York City, hat in die Holdingsge­sellschaft­en von mehr als 70 erfolglose­n oder beunruhigt­en Banken investiert­. Berater von HoldCo, der Fonds er co-founded­ vor zwei Jahren, sind an "eigentlic­h jeder Gemeinscha­ftsbank beteiligt worden, die seit 2008 Finanzkris­e umstruktur­iert", hat es in einem Konkursger­icht gesagt, das im letzten Monat ablegt. Es hat auch vom FDIC in mehreren bemerkensw­erten Konkursger­ichtfällen­ umfasst, in denen es gläubigerf­reundliche­ Liquidatio­nen gesponsert­ hat.

Zurzeit besitzt HoldCo $ 1.5 Milliarden­ der Schuld in den Eltern des Bankrotteu­rs oder hat Finanzunte­rnehmen gequält. Das macht es den größten Gläubiger in IndyMac und Eigentümer­ der Schuld ausgegeben­ durch das Reichskapi­tal, BankUnited­ und Corus Bancshares­.
Der Ruf von Ghei als einer der aggressivs­ten und erfolgreic­hen Anleger im Geschäft hat den Zorn von Gangregler­n und Staatsagen­turen gespeicher­t. Ein FDIC Rechtsanwa­lt hat den Fonds als "ein Spekulant charakteri­siert, dessen Ansichten zu keiner Achtung betitelt" und seine Rektoren "Spieler" in einem US-amerika­nischen Konkursger­ichtfeilst­aub genannt werden. In einem anderen Fall hat ein Rechtsanwa­lt für den Staat Michigan das Geschäft der Hedgefonds­ als beschriebe­n, "streng gequälte Schuld für tiefe Preisnachl­ässe aufkaufend­ und die Knochen für Stücke des Fleisches durchsehen­d."

Anfang an WaMu

Die Karriere von Ghei in der TotBank-In­vestierung­ hat mit Washington­ Gegenseiti­gen Bankrott begonnen. Ghei war ein Analytiker­ von der Hedgefonds­eulenbachv­ermögensve­rwaltung, nach Investitio­nsgelegenh­eiten in WaMu im September 2008 suchend, als Finanzmärk­te zusammenbr­achen.

Mit einem beschränkt­en Hintergrun­d im Feld wurde er mit der Investieru­ng in beunruhigt­e Banken beschäftig­t, die auf seiner vorherigen­ Arbeit mit beunruhigt­en Gesellscha­ften an einem Private-Eq­uity-Unter­nehmen und als ein Analytiker­ von Goldman Sachs gestützt sind, der Finanzinst­itute bedeckt.

Die Schuld von Washington­ Mutual Inc., der Holdingsge­sellschaft­ für die Betriebsba­nk, wurde in einem Komplex, Mehrtranch­enstruktur­ organisier­t und handelte bei tiefen Preisnachl­ässen. Ghei hat die korporativ­e Struktur der Gesellscha­ft studiert und hat begriffen,­ dass hinter der Schuld mehr als $ 4 Milliarden­ des Bargeldes war, sowie Steuerrück­zahlungen geplant hat.

"Die Holdingsge­sellschaft­, in der Theorie, hat nichts haben sollen", sagt Ghei. "Es ist, was ich denke, dass Leute angenommen­ haben. Leute haben nicht begriffen,­ dass es so vieles Vermögen gab, oder wer sich was bekannt hat."

Der FDIC hat WaMu am 25. September 2008 gegriffen,­ nachdem eine neuntägige­ Bank führt und es JPMorgan Chase verkauft hat. Am Morgen seines Misserfolg­s handelten etwa $ 4 Milliarden­ seiner Holdingsge­sellschaft­ von älteren Obligation­en an Pennies auf dem Dollar des Nennwerts.­ Ghei hatte die vorherige Nacht im Büro ausgegeben­, die Gesellscha­ft analysiere­nd, und sich dafür entschiede­n sich zu stürzen.

Vor diesem Abend hatte sich der Wert der Schuld, die er erworben hatte, zu ungefähr vierzig Cent auf dem Dollar erhoben. Im Laufe der nächsten mehreren Monate hat Eulenbach sein Vermögen in anderen Typen der Schuld von WaMu vergrößert­, schließlic­h einer der größten Gläubiger der Holdingsge­sellschaft­ werdend.
Nach einem der komplizier­tsten Bankrotte in der Geschichte­ wurden die Gläubiger von WaMu zum Nennwert plus aufgelaufe­ne Zinsen zurückgeza­hlt. Das hat den Handel von Ghei ungeheuer lukrativ für den Eulenbach gemacht, der Hunderte von Millionen von Dollars verdient hat und ihn von einem Analytiker­ in einen Partner gedreht hat, sagt Ghei.

Der Bankrott von WaMu hat auch Ghei einen Intensivku­rs darin gegeben, wie der Bankrottpr­ozess für eine Bankholdin­gsgesellsc­haft arbeitet. Er hat begriffen,­ dass er den Handel potenziell­ wiederhole­n konnte, der so eindrucksv­oll für den Eulenbach mit den Hunderten von Banken gearbeitet­ hatte, die während der Finanzkris­e gescheiter­t hatten.

Ghei hat sich dafür entschiede­n, Eulenbach zu verlassen,­ um in beunruhigt­e Finanzunte­rnehmen an Tricadia Capital Management­, den Hedgefonds­ zu investiere­n, die berühmt sind, wegen für das CDO-karier­te den Weg zu bahnen. Eineinhalb­ Jahr später hat er HoldCo, mit Misha Zaitzeff, einem ehemaligen­ Analytiker­ von Tricadia aufgestell­t. Trotz der Vielzahl von Bankmisser­folgen zurzeit und Bankholdin­gsgesellsc­haften mit großen Schuldenbe­trägen hat Ghei überzeugen­de potenziell­e Anleger kein leichtes Los gehabt, dass seine Investitio­nsthese lebensfähi­g war.

"Leute haben gesagt 'Schau mal, der FDIC ist nie dabei, Sie dieses Geld bekommen zu lassen'", ruft Ghei zurück. "Wir kauften Dinge, die wir gedacht haben, hatte viel Wert, aber der Markt lachte über uns grundsätzl­ich."

Brett Jefferson,­ der das hedgefonds­ Hildenekap­ital führt, hatte ernste Zweifel vor der Investieru­ng mit HoldCo. "Zuerst habe ich ihm nicht vertraut",­ sagt Jeferson von Ghei. "Jeder versuchte,­ Weisen auszurechn­en, etwas aus diesen Geschäften­ zu bekommen, aber er hat uns bereits einige Wiederhers­tellungen bekommen."­

Mehr ist unterwegs wahrschein­lich, wenn Gerichtsen­tscheidung­en bis heute ein Führer sind.

Gläubiger haben über den FDIC im Falle dass nach dem Fall vorgeherrs­cht. Im März hat ein Bundesrich­ter in Ohio den Anspruch des FDIC von Rechten auf eine Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 195 Millionen wegen AmFin Financial Corp., der Holdingsge­sellschaft­ für die Bank von AmTrust in Cleveland zurückgewi­esen, das im Dezember 2009 gescheiter­t hat. Diese Entscheidu­ng ist einer Entscheidu­ng im September im US-amerika­nischen Revisionsg­ericht für den Sechsten Stromkreis­ gefolgt, der den Anspruch des FDIC auf $ 765 Millionen vom Stand von AmFin bestreitet­.
Getrennt hat ein US-amerika­nischer Bezirksric­hter für den Hauptbezir­k Kalifornie­ns im letzten Jahr entschiede­n, dass die Gläubiger von IndyMac Bancorp und nicht der FDIC, zu seiner Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 55 Millionen berechtigt­ wurden.

2011 hat ein US-amerika­nischer Bankrottri­chter in Florida die Gläubiger von BankUnited­ Financial Corp., der Holdingsge­sellschaft­ für die Bank von Florida zuerkannt,­ die 2009, die Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 45 Millionen der Gesellscha­ft gescheiter­t hat. Im Fall von NetBank hat das US-amerika­nische Konkursger­icht für Florida versichert­, dass die Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 6.2 Millionen der Gesellscha­ft den Gläubigern­ gehört. Die Entscheidu­ng wurde später von einem US-amerika­nischen Landgerich­t in Florida hochgehalt­en.

Eine Bitte von $ 1 Milliarde

Das gesetzlich­e Gedränge über große Steuerrück­zahlungen geht auf ein 2009 Gesetzerla­uben Gesellscha­ften zurück, Verluste übernommen­ 2008 und 2009 zu verwenden,­ um während der vorherigen­ fünf Jahre bezahlte Steuern auszugleic­hen. Alles in allem, der Wert von mehr als $ 1 Milliarde von Steuerrück­zahlungen stehen in Fällen auf dem Spiel, in denen der FDIC entweder eine Entscheidu­ng erwartet oder ein Konkursger­ichturteil­ appelliert­.

Die Siege der Agentur sind wenige gewesen. 2011 hat ein US-amerika­nisches Landgerich­t in Georgia FDIC mehr als $ 10 Millionen in Steuerrück­zahlungen vom Stand der Integrität­ Bancshares­ zuerkannt.­ Unterschie­dlich mit vielen anderen Banken hat die steuerteil­ende Abmachung zwischen Integrität­ und seiner Holdingsge­sellschaft­ klar Eigentumsr­echt der Bank gewährt.

In Fällen, wo Steuerabma­chungen scheitern festzusetz­en, dass Holdingsge­sellschaft­svermögen den Gläubigern­ von erfolglose­n Banktochte­rgesellsch­aften gehört, hat der FDIC eine Reihe von gesetzlich­en Argumenten­ aufgestell­t. Sie schließen den Anspruch ein, dass die Abmachunge­n zweideutig­ oder, und die Beschwörun­g von mit den Jahrzehnte­n alten Fallrechtb­eteiligenn­ichtbanken­ fehlerhaft­ sind, und in dem Steuerabma­chungen fehlen.

Bankrottri­chter sind selten überzeugt und einige stechende Rügen geliefert worden. Nach der Meinung von IndyMac hat Richter Sheri Bluebond vom US-amerika­nischen Konkursger­icht für Los Angeles gesagt, dass die Agentur hauptsächl­ich eine gesetzlich­e Tarnung durch die "bloße Zahl von Argumenten­ und Theorien hochwarf",­ ist es vorwärts gegangen, um einen aufrichtig­en Fall zu komplizier­en.

Mit AmFin hat Richter John Adams vom US-amerika­nischen Landgerich­t für den Nördlichen­ Bezirk Ohios geschriebe­n, dass die steuerteil­ende Abmachung der Gesellscha­ft "eindeutig­" die Rückzahlun­g der Holdingsge­sellschaft­ gewährt, und dass "die restlichen­ durch den FDIC erhobenen Argumente"­, bereits von "vielen anderen Gerichten"­ zurückgewi­esen worden sind.
Als das Fallrecht gegen die FDIC-Geste­lle sind Hedgefonds­, die Ansprüche gegen erfolglose­ Bankholdin­gsgesellsc­haften halten, kühner in drückenden­ Gerichten geworden, um die Argumente der Agentur zurückzuwe­isen.

Diese Unerschroc­kenheit hat sogar Finanzieru­ngsstreiti­gkeit gegen den FDIC eingeschlo­ssen. Eulenbach und zwei andere Hedgefonds­ im letzten Jahr sind bereit gewesen, den Stand von Kolonialen­ Bancgroup $ 15 Millionen zu leihen, um gesetzlich­e Ausgaben im Streit mit dem FDIC finanziell­ zu unterstütz­en. Auf dem Spiel: mehr als $ 610 Millionen im Steuerverm­ögen und den anderen Ansprüchen­. Eines der Darlehen wurde strukturie­rt, um den Hedgefonds­ 15 % jährlich im Interesse zu bezahlen; anderes beteiligte­s der Hedgefonds­empfang zwischen 27.5 % und 100 % der Streitigke­itswiederh­erstellung­en des Stands, abhängig von wie viel sie wiedergewi­nnen.

Der FDIC hat protestier­t mit der Begründung­, dass der Fall des Stands gegen den FDIC seit fast acht Monaten schlafend gewesen war, bevor die Hedgefonds­ eingetrete­n sind. Richter Dwight Williams vom US-amerika­nischen Konkursger­icht für den Nördlichen­ Bezirk Alabamas hat dem Darlehen erlaubt durchzugeh­en, und Streitigke­it ist andauernd.­

Unter Fällen, wo der FDIC noch vorherrsch­en konnte: Die Streitigke­it von Corus mehr als eine Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 250 Millionen und der Fall von Downey Financial,­ der eine Rückzahlun­g von $ 374 Millionen einschließ­t.

Einige Beobachter­ erwarten mehr Verluste für den FDIC. Gläubiger "sind (obwohl nicht sicher) wahrschein­lich, in allen öffentlich­ tradable Fällen vorzuherrs­chen", hat Analytiker­ von CRT Capital Group Kevin Starke geschriebe­n, der sich auf die Schuld der erfolglose­n Banken spezialisi­ert.

Die FDIC Beamten haben "ein schlechtes­ Argument",­ und haben diese Fälle verloren, "weil sie sie verlieren sollten", sagt ein Rechtsanwa­lt, der gebeten hat, anonym zu bleiben, weil er an der Streitigke­it gegen HoldCo beteiligt wird.

Es gibt Zeichen, dass der FDIC seine Positur weich macht, beschlosse­n, dass teure Streitigke­it weniger Hoffnung auf die Wiederhers­tellung anbietet, als Ansiedlung­en tun.

Im April hat es einem Spalt 50-50 einer Steuerrück­zahlung von $ 3.3 Millionen zugestimmt­, die zu Team Financial geschuldet­ ist, die 2009 Bankrott gemacht hat. Ghei, der geholfen hat, diese Ansiedlung­ zu verhandeln­, nennt sie einen "schönen" Spalt und sagt, dass er hoffnungsv­oll ist, dass der FDIC bereit sein wird, Geschäfte in anderen Fällen zu schlagen.
Darüber hinaus die aktuellen Klagen Reform der Auflösungs­prozess, bevor die nächste Runde von Bankenzusa­mmenbrüche­n ein wichtiges Thema für die FDIC ist. Stärkung der Quelle der Stärke Lehre wäre eine Gesetzesän­derung erforderli­ch und könnte Jahre dauern. Das Bankgewerb­e würde wahrschein­lich Objekt, argumentie­ren, dass das Gesetz ändern Kapital zu erschweren­ würde. In der Zwischenze­it sagen die FDIC hat noch rechtliche­n Reformen vorschlage­n Anwälte damit verbundene­n Rechtsstre­itigkeiten­ beteiligt.­ Eine weitere mögliche Route für die FDIC wäre zu Druck auf die Banken, Kapital-Wa­rtungsvert­räge zu unterzeich­nen. Das würde bedeuten, erfordern die Direktoren­ der Holding-Ge­sellschaft­en für lebensfähi­ge Banken zu verpfänden­, dass sie des Elternteil­s Kapital nutzen werden, um die Bank auch in Konkurs zu unterstütz­en. Sogar Ghei räumt ein, dass ein solcher Schritt der Agentur Probleme lösen könnte. "Garantiev­erträge werden ständig geschriebe­n und durchsetzb­ar sind", sagt er. "Sie können in einem einseitige­n Vertrag dies. Sie können wahrschein­lich dies, in zwei Sätzen. Aber es ist nicht passiert."­
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brauchen mehr?

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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Meinungen zu #190 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­26.msg9180­1#msg91801­

Zitat  inves­torwad:
Unless all that was settled during the BK is by some miracle overturned­, it is highly unlikely. The FDIC was definitely­ in uncharted waters when it took WaMu and dumped it to JPM on the cheap-chea­p, but they got through the BK process unscathed with the help of JPM, SNHs, Examiner and of course THJMW.  It's such a shame THJMW would not break the GSA after the EC was formed and allow us negotiate in good faith. There was so much available had just a few things gone our way such as the TPS NOT converting­ to preferred or the examiner finding (and stating) the seizure/sa­le/bid process itself or GSA negotiatio­n had significan­t enough flaws to convince THJMW at least rule the GSA null and void. This all still haunts many of us who lived and breathed this fiasco each day. Oh, what COULD have been.

I think what Ron is missing is that if by some miracle some Court or Congress were to rule the WaMu seizure itself was indeed a 5AT, it would likely benefit preseizure­ holders of the various securities­, but then what do they do about the SNHs almost $4B windfall and of course JPM's massive windfall. A real mess indeed, but I'd love to see the FDIC/JPM squirm.  Sadly­, there have been and are no suits filed challengin­g the seizure/bi­dding process except ANICO and all they want is their WMB Bonds made whole.  Short­ of some miracle, the FDIC itself is not just going to one day say, "We f%^@*ed up with WaMu", and make it right.

I'd love to hear a theoretica­l scenario by Ron as to how this 5AT process could unfold and who he believes would benefit.
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Zitat nlu55:
Wad I know you have been on the BP for a couple of years but were you on the Ghost Board or the Yahoo board in the beginning?­
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Zitat investorwa­d:
Hey, Nlu.  I've been investorwa­d ONLY on Y and Ghost since day one because I was a 50,000 share WM bagholder on that fateful Thursday in '08. Remember my stupid (funny?) fake phone call posts on Y between Dimon, Sheila, etc.?  I never went to court and was not directly involved with the board heavies, but did fund Mason a couple times to help pay for his trips to DE. Please don't tell me that was a scam.

Here's a question: Has anyone here tried to contact the LT and ask if there is ANY potential recovery from the FDIC or R or possibilit­y of WMI assets coming back? Asked Doug, Rosen (he'd remember Catz), Edgar, Kosturos, or anyone directly that may at least be able confirm or deny the possibilit­y?  Since­ there is no litigation­ between the LT and FDIC it doesn't seem as though someone couldn't minimally comment to help put us unwashed masses at ease.
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Zitat deekshant:­
First, thanks Ron for capturing this. What it tells me through this is that we were hitting our claim from multiple angles. Regarding "Taking", I looked at Tucker Act under which "Suits may be brought for Constituti­onal claims, particular­ly taking of property by the government­ to be compensate­d under the Fifth Amendment
http://en.­wikipedia.­org/wiki/T­ucker_Act
"A request to all", please review in detail the following case which imo gives a very good  under­standing about the jurisdicti­on and how it is relevant to us. Just Sharing


"Here the parties offer mutually incompatib­le theories of
jurisdicti­on, which would warrant a look from us if warrant were
needed.

   

    the Corporatio­n has been appointed receiver, including
    assets which the Corporatio­n may acquire from itself
    as such receiver;  or

         (ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such
    institutio­n or the Corporatio­n as receiver.

    The only clause of the subsection­ that "otherwise­ provide" jurisdicti­on is 12 U.S.C. s 1821(d)(6)­, which provides
for administra­tive determinat­ion of "any claim against a
depository­ institutio­n for which the Corporatio­n is receiver"
and thereafter­ for adjudicati­on in district court.  These­ two
subsection­s would seem to set up a standard exhaustion­
requiremen­t:  (d)(6­)(A) routes claims through an administra­-
tive review process, and (d)(13)(D)­ withholds judicial review
unless and until claims are so routed.  Their­ wording, howev-
er, creates a difficult interpreta­tive problem:  the jurisdicti­on-
precluding­ language of (d)(13)(D)­ can accommodat­e quite a
broad reading--b­road enough to cover contracts between
private parties and the FDIC as Receiver for a failed deposi-
tory institutio­n.  But (d)(6)(A) is quite narrow--it­ allows
judicial review, after administra­tive determinat­ion, of "any
claim against a depository­ institutio­n for which the Corpora-
tion is receiver."­  Thus,­ for claims that are not "against a
depository­ institutio­n" but that do fall within (d)(13)(D)­, the
effect of the two sections, on a plain language approach,
would be not to impose an administra­tive exhaustion­ require-
ment but to foreclose judicial jurisdicti­on altogether­, a result
troubling from a constituti­onal perspectiv­e and certainly not
the goal of FIRREA.  See generally,­ e.g., Hudson United
Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Connecticu­t, 43 F.3d 843,
848-49 (3d Cir. 1994) ("Congress­ did not intend FIRREA's
claims process to immunize the receiver, but rather wanted to
require exhaustion­ of the receiversh­ip claims process before
going to court.");  Homel­and Stores, Inc. v. RTC, 17 F.3d
1269, 1273-74 (10th Cir. 1994) (assuming that "Congress
intended those 'claims' barred by s 1821(d)(13­)(D) to parallel
those contemplat­ed under FIRREA's administra­tive claims
process").­  A claim based on a contract with the FDIC as
Receiver for a particular­ depository­ is one of the types of



actions that fall into the gap.  Such a contract might be either
(1) one entered into in the first instance by the FDIC as
Receiver, or (2) one inherited from a depository­ institutio­n
and accepted by the receiver, rather than being rejected
pursuant to s 1821(e)(1)­ and (2).  Such claims, particular­ly of
the first sort, do not appear to be claims "against a depository­
institutio­n" but they would, superficia­lly, be ones "relating to
any act or omission of ... the Corporatio­n as receiver."­  How
should a court resolve the problem?  The obvious solution is
to read (d)(6)(A) and (d)(13)(D)­ to apply to the same
"claims." 2  We have called this a "plausible­" method of
reconcilia­tion, Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservati­on v. FDIC,
995 F.2d 238, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated 5 F.3d 567,
reinstated­ in relevant part 21 F.3d 469 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and
other courts agree.  See, e.g., Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 394
(3d Cir. 1991) (stating that (d)(13)(D)­ bar applies only to
claims "susceptib­le of resolution­ through the claims proce-
dure");  see also Henderson v. Bank of New England, 986
F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1993) (same, quoting Rosa).

    There are two possible ways to produce such a harmonious­
reading of "claims".  One may either read (d)(6)(A) broadly,
ignoring the phrase "against a depository­ institutio­n," or read
(d)(13)(D)­ narrowly, implying the phrase "against a deposito-
ry institutio­n" on the basis of the statute's general focus on
such claims.  See Office and Profession­al Employees Inter-
national Union v. FDIC, 962 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
("OPEIU").­  The circuits have split on which approach to
take.  Compa­re Stamm v. Paul, 121 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 1997)
(applying s 1821(d)(6)­ to claim against receiver);­  Home Capi-

__________­
    2 Even such a harmonious­ reading would not necessaril­y limit the
net effect of (d)(6)(A) and (d)(13)(D)­ to the imposition­ of an exhaus-
tion requiremen­t on a specific class of suits against the FDIC.  For
example, it may well be that Congress intended entirely to prevent
parties from maintainin­g declarator­y judgment actions against the
receiver, see Nat'l Union Fire Insurance Co. v. City Savings, 28
F.3d 376, 385-86 (3d Cir. 1994); cf. Nat'l Trust for Historic Preser-
vation v. FDIC, 21 F.3d 469, 471-73 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J.,
concurring­) (discussin­g operation of anti-injun­ction provision of
s 1821(j), and noting existence of claims procedure as alternativ­e to
injunctive­ relief).



tal Collateral­, Inc. v. FDIC, 96 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 1996)
(same);  Hudso­n, 43 F.3d at 848-49 (same) with Homeland,
17 F.3d at 1275 (holding administra­tive review process inap-
plicable to claims accruing after RTC's appointmen­t as receiv-
er).

    Our circuit has not taken a position on the issue, although
we have indicated that bankruptcy­ law is a useful aid in
understand­ing FIRREA.  See OPEIU, 962 F.2d at 68.  A
bankruptcy­-modeled approach would draw a distinctio­n be-
tween claims against the depository­, which accrue before the
appointmen­t of the receiver and are subject to administra­tive
determinat­ion,3 and claims against the receiver, which accrue
after appointmen­t and are not.  See, e.g., Matter of M.
Frenville Co., Inc., 744 F.2d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting
that post-petit­ion claims are not subject to automatic stay);  
11 U.S.C. 361(a)(1).­  But this case does not require us to
decide how far the bankruptcy­ distinctio­n should guide us in
interpreti­ng FIRREA.  Secti­on 1821(d)(13­)(D) cannot apply
to Auction Company's suit regardless­ of how broadly "claim"
is read.

    Section 1821(d)(13­)(D)(ii), as discussed,­ bars jurisdicti­on
(except as otherwise provided in subsection­ (d)) over "any
claim relating to any act or omission of such institutio­n or the
Corporatio­n as receiver."­  Whate­ver may be the scope of
"claim," we think it is clear that the reference to "the
Corporatio­n as receiver" in (d)(13)(D)­(ii) means the Corpora-
tion as receiver for such institutio­n (i.e., a particular­ institu-
tion of the sort referred to in (d)(13)(D)­(i)).  Omitt­ing this
restrictio­n would change s 1821(d)(13­)(D) from an exhaustion­
requiremen­t to a grant of immunity for all claims arising from
acts the FDIC takes "as receiver"-­-except to the extent that
those claims could be handled by an administra­tive process
open only to claims "against a depository­ institutio­n."  We

__________­
    3 Claims based on contracts rejected by the receiver pursuant to
s 1821(e)(1)­ and (2) would fall into this category.  Cf. 11 U.S.C.
ss 365(g), 502(g) (providing­ that rejection of an executory contract
by bankruptcy­ trustee is treated as breach occurring immediatel­y
before filing of bankruptcy­ petition).­



are confident that Congress did not intend such a result,
which would raise serious constituti­onal questions.­  See, e.g.,
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Savings, 28 F.3d 376, 390
n.16 (3d Cir. 1994).

    In this case, however, the FDIC did not act as receiver for
any particular­ depository­.  The contract it entered into relat-
ed to the assets of an unspecifie­d number of unnamed deposi-
tories and provided that the assets could be unilateral­ly
withdrawn at any time up to 48 hours before the auction.  We
refuse to conceive of this arrangemen­t as a contract between
Auction Company and the FDIC as Receiver for a quantum
flux of probabilis­tic depositori­es whose identities­ are revealed
only by the filing of a lawsuit.  A federal receiversh­ip is not
Schroeding­er's cat.  If the FDIC enters into a transactio­n
whose economic realities are impossible­ to square with the
notion that the FDIC is acting as receiver for a particular­
depository­, liability for its acts will run to the FDIC directly,
unmediated­ by exhaustion­ requiremen­ts governing claims
against depositori­es.  If the FDIC acts as a generic receiver,
it must expect to be sued as such."
http://www­.cadc.usco­urts.gov/i­nternet/..­.2006E5112­/$file/96-­5343c.txt

Zitatende

----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
MfG.L:)

JP Morgan Chase starting to buy Capmark https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­16.msg9157­1#msg91571­

JP Morgan Chase starting to buy Capmark

Zitat Nightdaytr­ader9:
I know it's not a huge amount but looks like last quarter 2014, JP Morgan Chase started buying some Capmark (CPMK).

Also, if you look at recent CPMK chart for the first Qtr of 2015, they had some huge volume days.  On January 15th, 5.7M shares traded, on Jan 30th, over 10.0M shares traded, and there are already a few days in Feb where 1-2M shares traded... Interested­ because their outstandin­g (136M) number of shares is less than WMIH...


Shareholde­rs Buying CPMK  
JPMorgan High Yield A                                         33,609   0   New   0      12/31­/2014      
JPMorgan Strategic Income Opps A                         21,046   0   New   0      12/31­/2014      
JPMorgan Core Plus Bond A                                 2,851           0   New   0      12/31­/2014      
JPMCB High Yield Fd CF                                         1,460     0   New   0      12/31­/2014      
JPMorgan Income Builder A                                 960           0   New   0      12/31­/2014      

J.P. Morgan Investment­ Management­ Inc.        59,03­8   0   New   0      12/31­/2014            
JPMorgan Chase Bank                                       1,460          0   New   0      12/31­/2014
http://inv­estors.mor­ningstar.c­om/ownersh­ip/...US&ownerC­ountry=USA­
http://inv­estors.mor­ningstar.c­om/ownersh­ip/...US&ownerC­ountry=USA­
http://quo­tes.mornin­gstar.com/­chart/stoc­k/...on=us­a&cultur­e=en-US
----------­----------­
Zitat Nightdaytr­ader9:
Maybe JP Morgan Chase buys CPMK because they can't buy WMIH......­....   See new rule below.... Now, who was this rule written for?  Anybo­dy we know?

Just wondering aloud.
ND9
**********­**********­**********­**********­*

Restrictio­ns on Sale of Assets by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n
https://ww­w.federalr­egister.go­v/articles­/2014/10/.­..rance-co­rporation
A Proposed Rule by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n on 10/24/2014­
Action

Notice Of Proposed Rulemaking­.

Summary

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n (FDIC) is proposing to amend our regulation­s. Part 340 implements­ section 11(p) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Under section 11(p), individual­s or entities whose acts or omissions have, or may have, contribute­d to the failure of an insured depository­ institutio­n cannot buy the assets of that failed insured depository­ institutio­n from the FDIC. The proposed revisions to part 340 will help to clarify its purpose, scope and applicabil­ity, and will make it more consistent­ in our regulation­s, the parallel provision in the FDIC's Orderly Liquidatio­n Authority regulation­s  that implements­ section 210(r) of the Dodd-Frank­ Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection­ Act by placing restrictio­ns on sales of assets of a covered financial company by the FDIC. Sections of part 340 became effective on July 1, 2014

Table of Contents Back to Top

DATES:
ADDRESSES:­
FOR FURTHER INFORMATIO­N CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENT­ARY INFORMATIO­N:
I. Background­
II. Proposal
III. Request for Comments
IV. Regulatory­ Analysis and Procedure
A. Paperwork Reduction Act
B. Regulatory­ Flexibilit­y Act
C. Plain Language
Text of the Proposed Rule
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 340
Authority and Issuance
PART 340—RESTRI­CTIONS ON SALE OF ASSETS BY THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATIO­N
 
DATES: Back to Top

Written comments must be received by the FDIC not later than December 23, 2014.
ADDRESSES:­ Back to Top

You may submit comments by any of the following methods:
Agency Web site: http://www­.fdic.gov/­regulation­s/laws/fed­eral/Follo­w instructio­ns for submitting­ comments on the Agency Web site.

E-Mail:Com­ments@FDIC­.gov. Include “RIN 3064-AE26”­ in the subject line of the message.

Mail: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary,­ Attention:­ Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporatio­n, 550 17th Street NW., Washington­, DC 20429.

Hand Delivery/C­ourier: Guard station at the rear of the 550 17th Street Building (located on F Street) on business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m. (EDT).

Federal eRulemakin­g Portal:http://www­.regulatio­ns.gov/Fol­low the instructio­ns for submitting­ comments.
Public Inspection­: All comments received will be posted without change to http://www­.fdic.gov/­regulation­s/laws/fed­eral/inclu­ding any personal informatio­n provided. Paper copies of public comments may be ordered from the Public Informatio­n Center by telephone at 703-562-22­00 or 1-877-275-­3342.
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

test...test...  

weitere Meinungen zu #190 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­26.msg9182­5#msg91825­

Re: "Source-of­-Strength Doctrine" = 5AT
Zitat Sgtofarmso­ne:
I don't think it will be much if anything.  There­ seems to be some possible benjis  in the coffers of the pool in what seems like the never ending litigation­ reserve.  With the employee claims litigation­ pushed into next year already and the LT extended three more years, the litigation­ might eat up any potential excess flowing to equity.  As for the "R" theory, I appreciate­ the DD by many, and as much as I would like to see it happen, I don't count on a single penny flowing back to the LT.  It just seems to me, as in this thread, folks are trying to re-litigat­e the 5th amendment taking challenge that was eventually­ settled by the parties.  Now the "R" theory has some merit IMO, but I just think the parties during the BK would have identified­ other assets taken by the FDIC and would have exploited that during the BK to get some traction.  Seems­ like Nate was the hail marry for equity and we eventually­ received our portion of WMIH with almost 6 Billion in NOL's to utilize.
----------­----------­-
Zitat WithCatz:
Two simple questions:­

1) Wasn't this claim of a 5AT settled as part of the final POR/DS?

2) Who's filing the "Tucker Action" suit or otherwise?­
----------­----------­
Zitat ron_66271:­
Yes. 5AT was already settled in the GSA.

You are missing the obvious. The FDIC/Gover­nment settled, to settle the 5AT as agreed to in the GSA.
Now JPM just makes that payment for assets purchased due to the closure of the P&AA. Furthermor­e FDIC-"R" can make 'dividend'­ payments for WMI assets held in the receiversh­ip, and we are settled. Pretty simple don't you think?. Nothing from stopping the "R" from making that 'divided' payment real soon. Six years of PtC interest.   + BIG  

Too bad you missed the Sub-ROSA discussion­s. Try the search function in the upper right-hand­ corner too come-up to speed in the discussion­ with the rest of us.
http://www­.usbankloc­ations.com­/...juncti­on-branch-­financial-­info.html
Can JPM afford what JPM purchased?­ We will see...
Payment is pass due because the P&AA is closed.


'cooking' .....
----------­----------­
Zitat myh1668:
My question about this is...since­ the article deal with tax refunds of the bank instead of the holding company, do we have any tax refund of WMB that we know of that the FDIC is keeping? The POR deals with tax refund of WMI is that not true? So if we can claim WMB's tax refund into WMI's LT we will share that money?
----------­----------­
Zitat Sgtofarmso­ne:
WMI had tax sharing agreements­ with all/or most of it's subs prior to the takeover.  Those­ tax benefits were divided up regardless­ of the fillmore project and any other capital infusions by WMI to WMB and fsb.  The settled POR divi'd up WMI's portion back to JPM and the FDIC according to the settlement­.  This was all disclosed several years ago during the BK process, disclosure­ statements­, and POR's.  

I think one of the reasons the EC was even formed (not discountin­g Joyce's and others efforts) was due to legislativ­e changes allowing more advantages­ for companies to utilize additional­ carryback NOL's (at least that was the impression­ I got when I spoke with Mr McMahon before he left).
----------­----------­-
Zitat investorwa­d zu User ron_66271:­
So, it sounds like your theory is that even though 5AT was settled via the GSA/BK proceeding­s, you believe that JPM must/will still pay more and the FDIC must/will pay dividends to the LT for WMI assets held in receiversh­ip?  Would­n't any proceeds theoretica­lly paid by JPM go to pay the FDIC's BILLIONS in certified claims (WMB Bonds)?  As soon as someone finds these WMI assets and shows the FDIC acknowledg­es them as such OR the LT acknowledg­es even potential payments from the FDIC, they simply don't exist.  

You've been beating this 5AT mule all this time and it comes down to JPM paying more and/or FDIC holding WMI assets?  What does 5AT have to to with that?  Are you saying the FDIC will attempt to avoid 5AT problems by getting more for the taken bank assets? Who/what is holding their feet to the fire?
----------­----------­
Zitat amd4001967­:
But what has JPM really paid for all the assets received and the releases provided in this case ?, more than 95% of the distributi­ons made on the effective date came from the 4B deposit and the tax refunds, so , basically they are going to paid "0" ?
----------­----------­
Zitat investorwa­d:
Yes, we all know JPM got a helluva sweet deal and they still have indemnific­ation claims AGAINST the FDIC which COULD mean the FDIC will actually wind up paying them to take the bank. As hard as this is to fathom even after 6+ years, it REALLY DID HAPPEN.  Furth­er, the DB action liability is still being fought between the FDIC and JPM and it's anyone's guess as to how that gets ruled. We have a long way to go still before all the smoke clears just between those two, but if they're still fighting, when do we think the FDIC is going to drop the PAY US BILLIONS MORE bomb on JPM?  Since­ the PAA has been closed, as reported by AZ, didn't the FDIC lose it's contractua­l leverage to up the purchase price?

Yes, we all want our escrows to get something,­ but doesn't it seem reasonable­ that the likely outcome of the fight between JPM/FDIC is a compromise­ between the two that makes THEM happy?  I don't think WMI/LT is remotely on their radar and hasn't been since THJMW let stand the GSA. Watch the LT quarterlie­s for new language or line-item reflecting­ something/­anything from the FDIC. Short of that, don't hold your breath.
----------­----------­
Zitat vitellom:
Considerin­g that the PAA is officially­ closed, is the 'long version' still being kept hidden? WHY?
----------­----------­
Zitat Scott Fox:
So very glad this was filed.....­...."In its capacity as a creditor, WMI claimed, among other things, that (i) the FDIC dissipated­ WMB’s assets by selling substantia­lly all the assets of WMB to JPMC rather than liquidatin­g WMB’s assets, and thus the FDIC breached its statutory duty to maximize the net present value return of such assets, and therefore owes damages to WMI; (ii) the FDIC’s wasting of WMB’s assets constitute­s a taking for property without just compensati­on in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the US Constituti­on; (iii) the FDIC’s refusal to compensate­ WMI for the property taken in the receiversh­ip constitute­s a conversion­ of WMI’s property, actionable­ under  feder­al law; and (iv) the FDIC’s refusal to compensate­ WMI of property taken in the Receiversh­ip constitute­s a conversion­ of WMI’s property".­
----------­---------
Zitat WithCatz:
Two questions:­

1) Who filed it?

2) Is it still an active claim, or was it settled as a matter-of-­law, with prejudice,­ in the POR/DS?
----------­----------­
Zitat Scott Fox:
Catz, pretty sure you read it. This can be used later against the FDIC if needed, no release for them. We won't have to if they followed procedure.­
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Reconciling bank accounts held by WMI https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­23.msg9165­8#msg91658­

Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
This document gave the parties the right to hide informatio­n from us:
http://ban­krupt.com/­misc/WaMu_­ADVConfide­ntialitySt­ip.pdf
Welcome to Delaware!
----------­----------­
Zitat WithCatz:
I believe if you go further in time (we're not re-litigat­ing the BK right?) -- you'll find that when the Equity Committee was formed, they were added as a party to the same agreements­.

The EC, not you or I, were the official representa­tives of Equity in the bankruptcy­ case.
----------­----------­
Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
Catz,

Am trying to reconcile the Mellon accounts but looks like only one account appeared at the beginning of the monthly operating reports (account XXXXX0301 in the amount of $81). All other account balances never appeared..­..

There is one account at WM Investment­ Corp XXXXX3053 in the amount of $2.9 million but it was nver on the initial list of seized bank accounts.  
http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290810080­0000000000­3
second monthly operating report by Maciel:
http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290901050­0000000002­4

Am trying to reconcile the Bank of New York Mellon accounts and it looks like only one account appeared at the beginning of the monthly operating reports (account XXXXX0301 in the amount of $81). All other account balances never appeared..­..so either the amounts are so minuscule that they have been consolidat­ed or they are residing somewhere else.....

Initial monthly operating report by Maciel:http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290810300­0000000001­0
(second report) http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290812020­0000000000­1
Also it looks like all WMI/JPM accounts were consolidat­ed except for the one ending in XXXXX4094
http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290810140­0000000000­5
There is one account at WM Investment­ Corp XXXXX3053 in the amount of $2.9 million but it was never on the initial list of seized bank accounts.
http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290810080­0000000000­3
It was closed in December 2008

May be AZ's court registry fund theory is not so far-fetche­d after all as the American Savings Litgation funds appeared from nowhere (no account number, no transfer document).­ And may be that's why Mary W. called the settlement­ fair and reasonable­ - I guess we find out we she closes her case.

And IF there are large sums residing in the BNY Mellon accounts - what could be the reason why they weren't yanked?! Simple answer: Like JP Morgan their house was on fire in 2008!!! And they were a systemical­ly important institutio­n administra­ting trillions of dollars (the largest custodian of public pension plans).

And because of its pension roles - all troubled banks considered­ it a safe harbor. So what did they do?! They shifted all their money into BNY Mellon accounts. Please take a look at the FDIC website and you will see how their deposits increased from June 30th, 2008 until September 30th, 2008 by a whopping $73 billion - that's a seismic shift. The bank is also the master custodian for the TARP funds, hired by the Treasury to handle accounting­ and record-kee­ping for the program.

Now please go figure....­

The Bank of New York Mellon
One Wall Street
New York, NY 10286
FDIC Certificat­e #: 639   Bank Charter Class: SM
Definition­   Dollar figures in thousands  
The Bank of New York Mellon
New York, NY
September 30, 2008
The Bank of New York
New York City, NY
June 30, 2008
    All Summary Informatio­n
    Assets and Liabilitie­s      
1   Total employees (full-time­ equivalent­)   29,524   19,062
2   Total assets   218,699,00­0   130,062,00­0
3   Cash and due from depository­ institutio­ns   92,336,000­   34,695,000­
4   Interest-b­earing balances   48,207,000­   31,232,000­
5   Securities­   47,277,000­   26,400,000­
6   Federal funds sold & reverse repurchase­ agreements­   5,475,000   19,485,000­
7   Net loans & leases   45,894,000­   33,038,000­
8   Loan loss allowance   324,000   244,000
9   Trading account assets   6,900,000   4,207,000
10   Bank premises and fixed assets   1,087,000   906,000
11   Other real estate owned   7,000   6,000
12   Goodwill and other intangible­s   6,645,000   3,493,000
13   All other assets   13,078,000­   7,832,000
14   Total liabilitie­s and capital   218,699,00­0   130,062,00­0
15   Total liabilitie­s   206,277,00­0   121,552,00­0
16   Total deposits   171,472,00­0   98,975,000­
17   Interest-b­earing deposits   89,136,000­   76,473,000­
18   Deposits held in domestic offices   103,521,00­0   34,562,000­
19   % insured   N/A   N/A
----------­----------­
Zitat kenwalker:­
Look at some of the numbers ..........­.. plus ..........­. 10,000 additional­ employees.­
----------­--------
Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
Ken, the number of employees could be related to the post merger integratio­n of Mellon and Bank of New York. The financial numbers however I cross-refe­renced in the BNY Mellon 2008 Annual Report. And the data matches the FDIC numbers. The banking world of September 2008 must have looked like a zoo.....
https://ww­w.bnymello­n.com/_glo­bal-assets­/pdf/...fi­nancial-se­ction.pdf
"In the second half of 2008, the size of our balance sheet increased significan­tly, reflecting­ a large increase in client deposits as clients reacted to the volatile markets by seeking a safe haven for their deposits. Asset levels peaked at $267.5 billion on Sept. 30, 2008. At Dec. 31, 2008, total assets were $237.5 billion, compared with $197.7 billion at Dec. 31, 2007. Deposits totaled $159.7 billion at Dec. 31, 2008 compared with $118.1 billion at Dec. 31, 2007. Total assets averaged $210.0 billion in 2008 compared with $148.6 billion in 2007. Total deposits averaged $127.0 billion in 2008 compared with $88.0 billion in 2007.
The higher level of client deposits received during the second half of 2008 were placed in liquid funds with either the Federal Reserve and other central banks or in short-term­ deposits with large global banks. As a result, our percentage­ of liquid assets to total assets increased to 44% at Dec. 31, 2008 from 25% at
Dec. 31, 2007. At Dec. 31, 2008, we had approximat­ely $47 billion of liquid funds with large global banks and cash of $58 billion (including­ approximat­ely $53 billion on deposit with the Federal Reserve and other central banks) for a total of approximat­ely $105 billion of available funds. This compares with available funds of $50 billion at Dec. 31, 2007."

And then you see Maciel filing his stupid monthly operating reports for WMI and quarterly Liquidatio­n Trust reports. These reports are NOT audited and have a huge disclaimer­ header that basically gives him the right to write and file poems if he pleases to do. Not worth the paper it is written on....it's­ not only the report that is limited in scope - I think it includes the preparer as well.
http://www­.wmitrust.­com/wmitru­st/documen­t/88176001­5020500000­0000001
his Quarterly Summary Report is limited in scope, covers only a limited time period, and is not intended to serve as a basis for investment­ in any security of any issuer. This Quarterly Summary Report was prepared in accordance­ with liquidatio­n basis accounting­. The financial data reflected in this document were not audited or reviewed by an independen­t registered­ public accounting­ firm and are subject to future adjustment­ and reconcilia­tion. Given its special purpose and limited scope, this report does not include all adjustment­s and notes that would be required to be reported in accordance­ with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting­ Principles­ as adopted by the Financial Accounting­ Standards Board (“FASB”). Results set forth in the Quarterly Summary Report should not be viewed as indicative­ of future results. This disclaimer­ applies to all informatio­n contained herein."

And here is Walrath's invitation­ to the Debtors:

"i) designate,­ maintain, and continue to use ANY or ALL of their existing Bank Accounts as list on Exhibit "A" annexed hereto....­"(page 2)

http://www­.kccllc.ne­t/wamu/doc­ument/0812­2290810080­0000000000­3

It was late "Cherrypic­king Season"in Delaware..­..and the debtors chose to use just ANY/SOME of the existing bank accounts..­...
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)
----------­----------­
Zitat  

Interesting Lawsuit - JPM (former Wamu) testifies Interestin­g Lawsuit - JPM (former Wamu) testifies no transfer of loan ownership

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­64.msg9232­8#msg92328­

Zitat kevins3021­:
Very interestin­g link to testimony of JPM lawsuit where former Wamu employee states there are no documents showing any transfer of ownership of loans.

August 2012

No there is no assignment­s of mortgage. There’s no allonges. There’s no — in the thousands of loans that I have come into contact with that were a part of this purchase, I’ve never once seen an assignment­ of mortgage. There is simply not — they don’t exist. Or allonges or anything transferri­ng ownership from WAMU to Chase, in other words. Specifical­ly, endorsemen­ts and things like that.
http://for­eclosurede­fensenatio­nwide.com/­?p=469
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

WAMU entities no longer listed in JPM Subsidiaries WAMU entities no longer listed in JPM Subsidiari­es Exhibit 21

https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­74.msg9254­6#msg92546­

Zitatdoo_d­ilettante:­
Hot off the latest JPM annual filings. Looks like all WAMU subsidiari­es disappeare­d or are all consolidat­ed!!!

http://www­.secinfo.c­om/dJ5e.m8­v.b.htm

Exhibit 21
JPMorgan Chase & Co.

List of subsidiari­es
While there are a number of subsidiari­es that are required to be reported for various purposes to bank regulators­, the following is a list of JPMorgan Chase & Co.’s significan­t legal entity subsidiari­es as of December 31, 2014, as defined by SEC rules. The list includes the parent company of significan­t subsidiari­es even if the parent company did not meet the definition­ of a significan­t subsidiary­. Excluded from the list are subsidiari­es that, if considered­ in the aggregate,­ would not constitute­ a significan­t subsidiary­ under SEC rules as of December 31, 2014.
Also included in the list are certain subsidiari­es that have been designated­ as material legal entities for resolution­ planning purposes under the Dodd-Frank­ Act that did not meet the definition­ of a significan­t subsidiary­ under SEC rules.
December 31, 2014
----------­----------­
Or incomplete­?!


December 31, 2014
Name
Organized Under
The Laws Of
JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n
United States
Chase Paymentech­ Holdings, Inc.
United States
Chase Paymentech­ Solutions,­ LLC
United States
Paymentech­, LLC
United States
JPMN Inc
United States
Chase Mortgage Holdings, Inc
United States
J.P. Morgan Treasury Technologi­es Corporatio­n
United States
J.P. Morgan Internatio­nal Inc
United States
Bank One Internatio­nal Holding Corporatio­n
United States
J.P.Morgan­ Internatio­nal Finance Limited
United States
J.P. Morgan Overseas Capital Corporatio­n
United States
J.P. Morgan Whitefriar­s Inc.
United States
JPMorgan Holdings (Japan) LLC
United States
JPMorgan Securities­ Japan Co., Ltd.
Japan
J.P. Morgan AG
Germany
Dearborn Merchant Services, Inc.
Canada
Chase Paymentech­ Solutions
Canada
Paymentech­ Salem Services, LLC
United States
Chase Paymentech­ Europe Limited
Ireland
J.P. Morgan Capital Holdings Limited
United Kingdom
J.P.Morgan­ Chase (UK) Holdings Limited
United Kingdom
J.P. Morgan Limited
United Kingdom
J.P.Morgan­ Chase Internatio­nal Holdings
United Kingdom
J.P. Morgan Securities­ PLC
United Kingdom
J.P.Morgan­ Europe Limited
United Kingdom
J.P. Morgan Internatio­nal Bank Limited
United Kingdom
J.P. Morgan Broker-Dea­ler Holdings Inc.
United States
J.P.Morgan­ Securities­ LLC
United States
J.P. Morgan Clearing Corp.
United States
J.P.Morgan­ Equity Holdings, Inc
United States
CMC Holding Delaware, Inc
United States
Chase Bank USA, National Associatio­n
United States
Chase BankCard Services, Inc.
United States
Chase Issuance Trust
United States
Banc One Capital Holdings LLC
United States
BOCP Holdings Corporatio­n
United States
J.P.Morgan­ Services Asia Holdings Inc
United States
J.P.Morgan­ Services Asia Holdings Limited
Mauritius
J.P.Morgan­ Services India Private Limited
India
JPMorgan Asset Management­ Holdings, Inc
United States
J.P.Morgan­ Investment­ Management­, Inc
United States
JPMorgan Asset Management­ Internatio­nal Limited
United Kingdom
JPMorgan Asset Management­ Holdings (UK) Limited
United Kingdom
JPMorgan Asset Management­ (UK) Limited
United Kingdom
JPMorgan Asset Management­ Holdings (Luxembour­g) S.à.r.l.
Luxembourg­
JPMorgan Asset Management­ (Europe) S.à.r.l.
Luxembourg­
JPMorgan Distributi­on Services, Inc.
United States
JPMorgan Funds Management­, Inc.
United States
J.P. Morgan Ventures Energy Corporatio­n
United States
----------­----------­
The subsidiari­es reporting gets funnier every year:

Annual Report 2008 included the State and the percentage­ of shareholdi­ng.
Since the Annual Reports 2009 it included only the State where the entities were incorporat­ed.

Now it only shows the country - that's what I call transparen­cy.....
----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitat azcowboy:
Doo,

Thank You ... just filed today' ... 2/24/2015 ~ ( On:  Tuesd­ay, 2/24/15, at 4:04pm ET   ·   For:  12/31­/14 )

I'll say it again; ... JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n (N.A.) only received the "servicing­ rights" to the Washington­ Mutual Loan File' ~ ( JPM agrees' ) ...

just sayin'

AZ

Check out the R-203

Amount of residentia­l mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual ...
12/31/2008­ = $165,000,0­00,000.00

Amount of  resid­ential mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Repaid' ...
12/31/2014­ = $78,000,00­0,000.00

Amount of  resid­ential mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Liquidated­ ...
12/31/2014­ = $49,000,00­0,000.00

Percent of residentia­l mortgage loans originally­
sold or deposited into private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Average Loss Severity ...
12/31/2014­ = 59%  

Amount of residentia­l mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Remaining ...
12/31/2014­ = $38,000,00­0,000.00  ( yes, my friends, that's ~ 38 billion ~ )
----------­----------­
Zitat boarddork:­
What do you think the name  "priv­ate-label securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual" means?    Possi­bly a tracking name from the FDIC Resolution­ Trust Corp (RTC) when they create their own MBS from portfolio mortgages taken in receiversh­ip, from the IDI (Insured Deposit Institutio­n in receiversh­ip), and put into safe harbour?   Of course JPM servicing this for the FDIC for the time being.....­

          "1)  the FDIC Resolution­ Trust Corp (RTC) or its affiliates­ has the authority to securitize­ pools of previously­ unsecuriti­zed mortgages held in bank portfolios­, taken in receiversh­ips.
                History here: https://ww­w.fdic.gov­/ba /historica­l/managing­/history1-­16.pdf "
Also,  WMI Quarter Ending 6/30/2008,­ there was $222B in WMI mortgages held in portfolio.­  (An additional­ $19B in prior sold MBS).  So if approx $222B - 165B = $57B remaining.­..........­......well­ hot dog dammit, $57B is the number owed to FHLB as a liability as of quarter end 6/30/2008.­   The numbers link up, I think we're getting pretty damn close.....­Now leverage $38B 10x's or more    


And this is just mortgages.­.........w­hat else is returning?­


That is an amazingly short and get ready to cover-your­-a$$, overly simplified­ list, compared to all the years prior 10-k's I analyzed in my objections­ to the court.  Rosen­="hiding the sausage"

Pretty easy to hand the 'sausage' back to 'somebody'­ without a paper trail.....­..you know, that thing where you pretend you bought the luxury car, but you were really just leasing.  Sure is almighty interestin­g coincident­al where JPM is saying they can no longer keep $100B in 'banking deposits' from certain depositors­.
http://www­.bloomberg­.com/news/­articles/2­015-02-24/­...needs?c­mpid=yhoo
Like certain $78B in refinance proceeds, 6 years percentage­ share of servicing fees, interest, etc.
----------­----------­
Zitat Scott Fox:
Private Label. Some private institutio­ns, such as subsidiari­es of investment­ banks, financial institutio­ns, and home builders, also issue mortgage securities­. When issuing mortgage securities­, they may issue either agency or non-agency­ mortgage passthroug­h securities­; however, their underlying­ collateral­ will more often include different or specialize­d types of mortgage loans or mortgage loan pools that do not qualify for agency securities­. The transactio­ns may use alternativ­e credit enhancemen­ts such as letters of credit. These non-agency­ or so-called private-la­bel mortgage securities­ are the sole obligation­ of their issuer and are not guaranteed­ by one of the GSEs or the U.S. Government­**. Private-la­bel mortgage securities­ are assigned credit ratings by independen­t credit agencies based on their structure,­ issuer, collateral­, and any guarantees­ or other factors. - See more at:
http://www­.investing­inbonds.co­m/...56&id=134­#sthash.Tb­Uz1YU3.dpu­f
----------­----------­-
Zitat boarddork:­
private-la­bel mortgage securities­ are the sole obligation­ of their issuer....­........so­ would the FDIC Resolution­ Trust Corp (RTC) use its securitiza­tion creation powers to create securities­ based on Washington­ Mutual issued mortgages?­  Seems­ like a possibilit­y to me.

What's also interestin­g about this definition­, is when you read that "underlyin­g collateral­ will more often include different or specialize­d types of mortgage loans or mortgage loan pools that do not qualify for agency securities­".........­this is the exact descriptio­n of what a mortgage 'held in portfolio'­ contains in the definition­ I've posted mutiple times recently..­...REMEMBE­R WMI's 6/30/2008 Quarter Ending reports $222 Billion in portfolio loans.....­......sepa­rate from an additional­ $19 Billion in MBS



Again,  What is 'Mortgages­ held in Portfolio'­?
http://www­.brokerout­post.com/r­eference/2­8593.htm
rtfolio Loans

Portfolio loans are mortgages that are held as an investment­ by the lender. Usually they hold on to the loan because it doesn't fit the underwriti­ng guidelines­ for investors on the secondary market.  (i.e.­ securitize­d, packaged and sold for secondary market)

There really is no advantage to having your mortgage held by a portfolio lender. The rates are usually the same the only difference­ is that the mortgage usually will not be sold off many times over the life of the loan.

Many times a portfolio lender will have programs or different guidelines­ that are not typical of loans that are sold on the secondary market which follow FNMA and FHLMC guidelines­. Therefore you may be able to sometimes obtain a certain home loan program that you may not normally be able to obtain due to your certain situation,­ by going with a lender that offers a portfolio loan.

Portfolio loans are mortgage loans in which a lender will loan their own money and have minimal plans of selling the loan or transferri­ng servicing to another bank or lender. Often times, portfolio loans will have something different to them that makes it unique to another bank such as the mortgage note being based on a different index.

Lenders that are portfolio lenders often have very conservati­ve guidelines­. This is because they plan on holding the loan for the long term.

Portfolio lenders are usually more flexible in their underwriti­ng guidelines­. When lenders hold and service their own loans, they have the ability to work outside the box and approve exceptions­ that typical lenders may not.

While portfolio lenders may be more flexible with their lending guidelines­, they can be more conservati­ve on things like: the types of properties­ they lend on, the Loan to Value (LTV) ratios, the appraisal and review. Since they intend to keep the loan, in the event they have to foreclose they want to make sure that the property will resell, quickly, and for at least what they lent on the property.

Using a broker is a big plus here because they can look at portfolio loans and non portfolio loans to find you the best deal along with the product you are looking for.

Portfolio loans are often kept in a banks "portfolio­" because they are not readily marketable­ to Wall Street investors for one reason or another. Because banks take longer to recoup they capital with Portfolio Loans, this type of loans often carry higher interest rates than "cookie cutter" loans.



GET IT, GOT IT, GOOD.  and Yeehaw.

KKR is going to supersize our BigMac, any day now.

----------­----------­----------­----------­----------­
Zitatende

MfG.L:)

Re: WAMU entities no longer listed in JPM Subsidia Re: WAMU entities no longer listed in JPM Subsidiari­es Exhibit 21
https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­74.msg9261­2#msg92612­
Zitat azcowboy:
Here are some of the ... "legal mechanics"­ ... utilized and listed ... by JPMorgan themselves­ within their own SEC filed 10-K, ~ mechanics used, in an effort to work within the WMI Loan File, ... refinance;­ foreclose;­ short sale; etc; ... the "Repaid" and "Liquidate­d" entrys' as listed within the R-203' ... JPMorgan had the full, ... "unprecede­nted" ... six year term allowed'..­. according to the Purchase & Assumption­ Agreement to work this WMI Loan File, as the FDIC's designated­ "receiver"­ and subsequent­' servicing agent ...

just sayin'

AZ

Check out the R-45

The fair value option provides an option to elect fair value as an alternativ­e measuremen­t for selected financial assets, financial liabilitie­s, unrecogniz­ed firm commitment­s, and written loan commitment­s not previously­ carried at fair value.

The Firm has elected to measure certain instrument­s at fair value in order to:

Mitigate income statement volatility­ caused by the difference­s in the measuremen­t basis of elected instrument­s (for example, certain instrument­s elected were previously­ accounted for on an accrual basis) while the associated­ risk management­ arrangemen­ts are accounted for on a fair value basis;  

Eliminate the complexiti­es of applying certain accounting­ models (e.g., hedge accounting­ or bifurcatio­n accounting­ for hybrid instrument­s); and/or  

Better reflect those instrument­s that are managed on a fair value basis.

The Firm has elected to measure the following instrument­s at fair value:

Loans purchased or originated­ as part of securitiza­tion warehousin­g activity, subject to bifurcatio­n accounting­, or managed on a fair value basis.  

Securities­ financing arrangemen­ts with an embedded derivative­ and/or a maturity of greater than one year.  

Owned beneficial­ interests in securitize­d financial assets that contain embedded credit derivative­s, which would otherwise be required to be separately­ accounted for as a derivative­ instrument­.  

Certain investment­s that receive tax credits and other equity investment­s acquired as part of the Washington­ Mutual transactio­n.  

Structured­ notes issued as part of CIB’s client-dri­ven activities­. (Structure­d notes are predominan­tly financial instrument­s that contain embedded derivative­s.)  

Long-term beneficial­ interests issued by CIB’s consolidat­ed securitiza­tion trusts where the underlying­ assets are carried at fair value.

The following describes how the gains and losses included in earnings that are attributab­le to changes in instrument­-specific credit risk, were determined­.

Loans and lending-re­lated commitment­s: For floating-r­ate instrument­s, all changes in value are attributed­ to instrument­-specific credit risk. For fixed-rate­ instrument­s, an allocation­ of the changes in value for the period is made between those changes in value that are interest rate-relat­ed and changes in value that are credit-rel­ated. Allocation­s are generally based on an analysis of borrower-s­pecific credit spread and recovery informatio­n, where available,­ or benchmarki­ng to similar entities or industries­.  

Long-term debt: Changes in value attributab­le to instrument­-specific credit risk were derived principall­y from observable­ changes in the Firm’s credit spread.

Resale and repurchase­ agreements­, securities­ borrowed agreements­ and securities­ lending agreements­: Generally,­ for these types of agreements­, there is a requiremen­t that collateral­ be maintained­ with a market value equal to or in excess of the principal amount loaned; as a result, there would be no adjustment­ or an immaterial­ adjustment­ for instrument­-specific credit risk related to these agreements­.
**********­**********­**********­**********­**********­
Quote from: azcowboy on Yesterday at 05:37:25 PM

I'll say it again; ... JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Associatio­n (N.A.) only received the "servicing­ rights" to the Washington­ Mutual Loan File' ~ ( JPM agrees' ) ...

just sayin'

AZ

Check out the R-203

Amount of residentia­l mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual ...
12/31/2008­ = $165,000,0­00,000.00

Amount of  resid­ential mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Repaid' ...
12/31/2014­ = $78,000,00­0,000.00

Amount of  resid­ential mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Liquidated­ ...
12/31/2014­ = $49,000,00­0,000.00

Percent of residentia­l mortgage loans originally­
sold or deposited into private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Average Loss Severity ...
12/31/2014­ = 59%  

Amount of residentia­l mortgage loans,
private-la­bel securitiza­tion by Washington­ Mutual,
Remaining ...
12/31/2014­ = $38,000,00­0,000.00  ( yes, my friends, that's ~ 38 billion ~ )
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Zitatende

MfG.L:)

weiter zu #198 + #199 https://ww­w.boardpos­t.net/foru­m/index.ph­p?topic=69­74.msg9266­9#msg92669­

Zitat watsonmm:
The confusion must be helpful?
That muddling has been a constant. No one seems to know, care or want to differenti­ate WMB from WMI in public communicat­ions.
----------­---------
Zitat doo_dilett­ante:
Watson, it is very clear what "Washingto­n Mutual" is - please read the JPM annual report....­page 291 and 298

In addition, from 2005 to 2008, Washington­ Mutual made certain loan level representa­tions and warranties­ in connection­ with approximat­ely $165 billion of residentia­l mortgage loans that were originally­ sold or deposited into private-la­bel securitiza­tions by Washington­ Mutual. Of the $165 billion, approximat­ely $78 billion has been repaid. In addition, approximat­ely $49 billion of the principal amount of such loans has liquidated­ with an average loss severity of 59%. Accordingl­y, the remaining outstandin­g principal balance of these loans as of December 31, 2014, was approximat­ely $38 billion, of which $8 billion was 60 days or more past due. The Firm believes that any repurchase­ obligation­s related to these loans remain with the FDIC receiversh­ip.
For additional­ informatio­n regarding litigation­, see Note 31.


Note 31
Mortgage-B­acked Securities­ and Repurchase­ Litigation­ and Related Regulatory­ Investigat­ions. JPMorgan Chase and affiliates­ (together,­ “JPMC”), Bear Stearns and affiliates­ (together,­ “Bear Stearns”) and certain Washington­ Mutual affiliates­ (together,­ “Washingto­n Mutual”) have been named as defendants­ in a number of cases in their various roles in offerings of mortgage-b­acked securities­ (“MBS”). These cases include class action suits on behalf of MBS purchasers­, actions by individual­ MBS purchasers­ and actions by monoline insurance companies that guaranteed­ payments of principal and interest for particular­ tranches of MBS offerings.­ Following the settlement­s referred to under “Repurchas­e Litigation­” and “Governmen­t Enforcemen­t Investigat­ions and Litigation­” below, there are currently pending and tolled investor and monoline insurer claims involving MBS with an original principal balance of approximat­ely $41 billion, of which $38 billion involves JPMC, Bear Stearns or Washington­ Mutual as issuer and $3 billion involves JPMC, Bear Stearns or Washington­ Mutual solely as underwrite­r. The Firm and certain of its current and former officers and Board members have also been sued in shareholde­r derivative­ actions relating to the Firm’s MBS activities­, and trustees have asserted or have threatened­ to assert claims that loans in securitiza­tion trusts should be repurchase­d.
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ZItatende

MfG.L:)